Daily Report

East Europe

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Albania: Media's 'Anti-American Silence' Analyzed

AU0208082796 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 1 Aug 96 p 3

[Unattributed article: "The Official Anti-American Silence Broken"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The state television this week reported a new resolution on Kosova approved by the U.S. Congress on the initiative of Eliot Engel, the Democratic congressman from New York. The essence of this resolution is that the United States and Mr. Clinton's administration are obliged to exert pressure on Serbia and on Serbian President Milosevic personally to establish civil and political rights for the Albanians in Kosova.

The state television did very well to give publicity to this new step, which is one of a series of consistent stands taken by the United States over this problem.

However, at a time when experience has shown that the Radio-Television is entirely dependent on the ruling party, and when the Democratic Party [PD] and its leader President Berisha are passing through a period of very shaky relations with the United States as a result of the U.S. administration's total condemnation of the rigging of the 26 May elections, the state media's coverage of the most recent resolution of the U.S. Congress is worth analyzing.

As we know, especially in the wake of the stern attitude taken by the U.S. State Department over the PD's theft of the votes on 26 May and the solution proposed by the U.S. Administration, the PD bosses, following the inspiring example of President Berisha, are increasingly exposing themselves as outright anti-Americans. Their annoyance over the repeated U.S. stand that Washington refuses to recognize the 26 May elections has been followed by a manner of behavior totally at variance with elementary standards of political and diplomatic life. This was especially apparent in the boycott of the United States' 4 July celebrations by the most senior state leaders, including Berisha; in the president's refusal to meet Assistant Secretary of State Wirth, an unprecedented event that could not fail to have consequences for bilateral relations; and latterly in Berisha's refusal to receive Congressman Engel himself.

All this was followed by deep official silence over every step taken by the U.S. Administration in relation to Albania.

It is today no exaggeration to say that U.S.-Albanian relations have sunk to levels that recall the chilliness and frost of international relations during the time of the dictatorship, which were rightly interpreted as political adventurism.

The official anti-American silence was broken the day before yesterday [30 July] by the publicity that the Radio-Television gave to the most recent resolution of the U.S. Congress about Kosova the day before yesterday. Yet one cannot fail to ask why Tirana officials are more sensitive about giving publicity to, i.e. supporting, U.S. criticisms about relations between Kosova and Serbia, when U.S. criticisms intended to bring Albanians into agreement with one another and the government into agreement with the opposition are considered "interference in internal affairs" or "violations of our state sovereignty."

In other words, this implies that the authorities of the ruling party are more disposed to dialogue between Serbia and our brother Albanians in Kosova than to dialogue between the government and the opposition in Albania.

This is beyond political waywardness. Perhaps this is why the Democratic Party's newspaper paid no attention to this resolution.

Albania: Shehu's Meetings in Austria, Ireland Reported

AU0108170896 Tirana ATA in English 0939 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 31 (ATA)—The Albanian delegation headed by Tritan Shehu, vice prime minister and foreign minister, on its way to Ireland, was received in the Vienna airport by high ranking officials of the Austrian Foreign Ministry and Deputy President of the Constitutional Court Karl Piska.

They exchanged opinions on the democratic developments in Albania, on the work of the Albanian new parliament and on the future local elections, Press and Information Office of Albanian Foreign Ministry said.

The delegation, during its first day in Ireland, met Mr. Rabit, minister of technology, science, and trade. They agreed to set up a joint commission in economic cooperation between the two countries.

Shehu, Minister Vrioni, and other members of the delegation met the leader of the opposition Mr. Berti Aher and its general secretary Mr. Pat Farell and exchanged opinions in the indispensability of wider bilateral cooperation between the two governments and between the two parties.

In the afternoon, the delegation met former Irish prime minister Mr. Reynold, parliamentarians and representatives of business.

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Albania: Interior Minister Wants 'Improvement' in Laws

AU0108144596 Tirana ATA in English 1338 GMT 31 Jul 96

[Report by A. Sakja]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 30 (ATA)—The Albanian Interior Minister Halit Shamata set forth in the Parliamentary Commission of the Public Order and ShIK (National Information Service) his commitment in the creation of legislation and improvement of the present laws which will help the Interior Ministry in fulfillment of its work.

He demanded in this context, as soon as possible, approval of the Road Code, of the Law on Border, of an ethic code for the military personnel in the Interior Ministry, of setting up police control structures within the Interior Ministry to check the law implementation.

Shamata said that it was necessary to make amendments in the Law on Arms and changes in the structures of some police commissariats in different districts of the country. A further increasing of the role of Interpol and creation of an Anticrime Committee is necessary, he added.

Shamata made a briefing of the present situation in the Interior Ministry and especially stressed the need of professionalism and creation of new structures.

He briefed the measures taken to discover the authors of the recent crimes against senior police officials.

Albania: European Human Rights Convention Ratified

AU0208081496 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 1 Aug 96 p 1

[Unattributed editorial: "Freedoms Up to Human Standards"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Albanian parliament ratified yesterday the European Convention on Basic Human Rights and Freedoms.

The inauguration of this convention in Albania represents an entirely new standard set by the Albanian state as compared with four years ago. In Albania today, as a result of the approval of dozens of laws in the previous session of the Albanian parliament, the rule of law has been established in Albania up to European standards. Human rights and freedoms have not only been consolidated by the extension of democracy into all fields of life, but have also been embodied into law by the Albanian parliament. Three years ago, the Law on Human Rights was discussed and approved upon the initiative of the Democratic Party [PD] parliamentary group. This law laid the foundations for modern Albanian life, and confirmed once again the PD's aspirations to establish the equality of individuals before the law. There are no distinctions in the exercise of human rights and freedoms in Albania, and the freedom of every individual is sanctioned as part of the general freedom and the democratic order.

When this law was put to the vote, the Socialists voted against it. They spent a long time concocting all kinds of accusations against the Democratic government over alleged violations of the rights of the opposition, on the basis of the conviction of their chairman Fatos Nano, whom they themselves are subjecting to discrimination today. Bogus protests followed incessantly throughout these years, but the Socialists never took back that contrary vote they passed three years ago.

Their demand, expressed toward the end of the parliament's proceedings, for the ratification of the convention that was approved yesterday, was a mere diversion to draw attention away from the PD's policies. It had long ago been said that this convention would be ratified as soon as possible, and before even one month had elapsed the new parliament carried out the PD's policy for Albania's legal integration into Europe according to European standards.

Even now the Socialist opposition has denied itself the chance to vote. It has boycotted the parliament, thus inevitably cutting itself off from basic changes in Albania's political, economic, and legal life.

Since yesterday, the Albanians have established for themselves European standards for the respect and protection of their rights. Every Albanian now enjoys the right to appeal to the international court in order to realize his rights. This is another important step forward in raising the level of democracy in Albanian life and making Albanians the equals of all other citizens of Europe.

The PD has always been and remains the most sincere champion of human rights and freedoms in Albania. It was precisely these rights that were at the center of its struggle from its very foundation.

Yesterday, the party fulfilled its promise. The ratification of the convention is another step forward in perfecting the democratic order in Albania.

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Albania: Human Rights Union Faces 'Crisis of Confidence'

AU0108164696 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 1 Aug 96 p 6

[Article by Ilir Babaramo: "Human Rights Union in Crisis: Mico Attacks Chairman Melo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Thoma Mico, the number two in the Human Rights Union [PBDNj] has unleashed a storm of criticism against party chairman Melo. Melo's entry into parliament and his "neither chalk nor cheese" political attitude has led to the greatest ever crisis in the history of the Greek party in Albania. "Our party is experiencing a crisis of confidence among the electorate," party secretary general Thoma Mico said.

The crisis in the PBDNj and the bitter conflict in its presidium started immediately after the 26 May elections. The party presidium together with party chairman Melo decided to denounce the electoral farce and to boycott the parliament that emerged from it. However, only three days after this decision, Melo performed an turnabout and agreed to recognize the elections. Thanks to the proportional list, he entered the parliament, while two other deputies who won under the first-past-the-post system adopted the opposition's stand of boycotting parliament. It still remains a mystery what persuaded Melo to recognize the 26 May elections, which he had denounced only a few days previously. Mico commented, "If Melo has no other duties besides those to his party, he has demonstrated political immaturity. As PBDNj general secretary, I express the conviction that Melo's presence in the parliament is only his personal initiative rather than our official stand." Not only Melo's presence in the parliament, but his entire political attitude has obliged the party's deputy leader to publicly admit the conflict. "Even though the program of our party has not been incorporated in the government program, Melo supported the government in its parliamentary vote of confidence. He considered this to have been a private initiative of Melo taken 'without consulting the party presidium.'" Mico, like the other minority deputy Dule, refused to enter the parliament that came out of the votes counted by the Democratic Party militants. "One cannot join a parliament that has not been democratically elected. This parliament has not been created on the basis of the free ballot of the people," said Mico, making the assumption of his seat in the parliament conditional on the state's opening Greek schools in three towns in the south. Melo's unfulfilled dream of taking the portfolio of minister of emigration constitutes another reason for Mico to attack his party's leader. "He sought a government post, despite our party's need to take an opposition stance," Mico said. Within a short time, Melo has said he is both on the government's and the opposition's side. "The professor is confusing the two," Mico said ironically.

In any event, even without Mico's attacks, the PBDNj is in crisis. Only a short time ago, party deputy chairman Kosta Makaradhi attacked Meio, using the same arguments as Mico. On order to overcome the crisis their party is facing and to repair its image before the electorate, Mico said that Melo should tender his resignation from the party leadership. "A realistic politician would have the courage to tender his resignation. In a democratic society, tendering your resignation is a normal civil act," Mico said.

Albania: Daily Views Possible Partition of Kosovo

AU0108162996 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 1 Aug 96 pp 5, 24

[Commentary by Vladimir Prela: "Bosnian Variant for Kosova"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The commentary by the professor of political sciences Aleks Dragic in the prestigious newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST, to which the Voice of America has devoted an interesting discussion, has revived debate over a subject that seemed obsolete and forgotten. Yet it appears that the idea of the well-known Serbian nationalist writer Dobrica Cosic, the spiritual father of Serbia's president Slobodan Milosevic, is not simply a theoretical matter. It appears to be a detailed project and above all a possible variation that might be put on the table of any hypothetical Serbian-Albanian talks.

When Cosic made this idea known years ago, it seemed a Bosnian-style way of solving the Kosova problem. According to the map of the writer-president, the territory of Kosova would be divided, giving 39 percent to Serbia and 61 percent to the Albanians. It was not explained how this division would be carried out, and however you looked at it Cosic's idea gave you the impression of a Serbian anti-Albanian sally, which would perhaps initiate a final settling of accounts between the Albanians and the Serbs.

However, it has turned out that the partition of Kosova and the transfer of its population is now a studied plan, already discussed. and ready to be carried out in case of need. In a way, it is reminiscent of the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which became the bible of Serbian nationalism during the decomposition of Yugoslavia. On the basis of this logic, it must be stressed that Cosic's idea is now contained in a plan submitted by academicians close to Mr. Milosevic. The Serbian opposition, which has

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recently been talking a lot about Kosova, has not offered territorial partition as an alternative on its national platform.

This would not be the first time that a dispute has been solved by the partition of territory and an exchange of population. The most recent case was in Bosnia, but there have also been "peaceful" cases of this kind. Nevertheless, if we take Bosnia as a precedent, one can see that Kosova, too, is a kind of "leopard skin," although not with the same ethnic composition as Bosnia. In the case of this "province," the partition of territory and the exchange of populations would create a major Albanian problem. We would be the witnesses of an exodus which, if not controlled, would lead to a second Bosnia.

Moreover, the present leaders of the Albanian resistance movement have not come anywhere close to this idea. Mr. Ibrahim Rugova insists on the Republic of Kosova, equidistant from Serbia and Albania and guaranteed by the great powers. It seems that a political and economic class has been created in Kosova today that believes it is able to live and prosper in a second Albanian-speaking state. This topic has therefore been broached only in the nonparty or academic press of Kosova. The leaders of the Kosova Democratic League have simply ignored it or anathematized it with the typical vocabulary of Albanian politics that leaves no room for any alternative.

As for Albania, the idea of Cosic and the Serbian Academy has been a topic for the press but not for official circles or for politics. In fact, Albanian foreign policy, although making attempts to keep Kosova its first priority, has been forced by political developments in the last few years to lie low on this problem, to the point of even consciously avoiding it. It appears that Albanian diplomacy is not prepared and has no ready-made platform to lay on a discussion table. Albania's official formula for Kosova is now respect for the national rights of the Albanians of Kosova, the removal of Serbian troops from the province, and talks in the presence of a third party. However, not only those whom Berisha has appointed to formulate Albanian foreign policy have been able to fully work this out. In the final analysis, the politicians of Tirana have left it to international diplomacy to solve the problem of Kosova.

The international community is quite clear about Kosova. As Mr. Repishti underlined in his introduction on the Voice of America, the Conference of London left Kosova under the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia. Moreover, even the most forward U.S. or German statements talk about a Kosova with "extensive autonomy." We thus do not have even a shred of international readiness to undertake an operation like that in Bosnia.

The partition of Kosova between the Serbs and the Albanians seems a practical idea, which would theoretically solve the Serbian-Albanian conflict once and for all. However, it poses a danger, if it does not receive the blessing of the great powers, the backing of international institutions, and financial support from the international community. Until these conditions pertain, the formula of a peaceful and democratic evolution of the problem remains the ideal.

Albania: Democratic Party Paper Argues Against Partition of Kosovo

AU0208085596 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 1 Aug 96 p 2

[Unattributed editorial: "The Partition of Kosova—A Compromise Offer Unacceptable to the Albanians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian press has recently been putting forward increasingly often ideas that differ in form, but are in essence the same, regarding the partition of Kosova between the Serbs and the Albanians. Whereas this idea has its proponents and opponents among the Serbs, the Albanians have rejected it as an unrealizable and very dangerous proposal.

The academician Pavle Ivic, writing in POLITIKA EKSPRES on 21 June and supporting the proposal of Aleksandar Despic, chairman of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, for the detachment of Kosova from Serbia, considers that this idea can be realized by just and peaceful means, and recommends that the territory including the historical monuments should be left to the Serbs. The architect Bransilav Krstic goes further in his book "Kosovo Between Historical and Ethnic Justice," and openly expresses the idea that, besides the cultural and historical monuments, Serbia should also be given all the energy and mineral resources.

The academician Mihajlo Markov, the former chief ideologue of the Serbian Socialist Party, writing in POLITIKA EKSPRES on 22 June, rejects this idea and proposes that the easiest solution would be to postpone settling the question of Kosova and to leave a period of 20 years before it is to be examined again. The writer Milan Andrijevic expresses the same viewpoint when he writes that this is an alternative worth further study. He asks what will be divided, because the political problems also involve economic questions. A certain Aleks Dragan has also jumped into the same pool by publishing a book that reflects the concerns of hegemonistic Serbian policies. The book is called "The Saga of Kosovo," and is pervaded by the obsolete

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idea of partitioning Kosova between the Serbs and the Albanians. For the author, the partition of Kosova is the only logical and realistic solution that might secure for Serbia the opportunity of saving as many of its historical and cultural monuments as possible.

This amalgam of worn-out ideas about the partition of Kosova or its integration with Serbia shows how far from reality are those few Serbs who describe themselves as realists.

The reopening of this file by the Serbian Academy at the present moment, done on instructions from Belgrade in order to test the pulse of public opinion and to prepare it for possible radical changes in Kosova, sounds like an offer of compromise on the part of democratic Serbian forces. It shows that something has begun to budge in the consciousness of the Serbian elite, who are beginning to realize that Kosova is not a narrow issue but an international problem.

However, this positive aspect of the Serbian academicians' ideas is only an apparent one; Hydajet Hyseni, deputy chairman of the Kosova Democratic League, has said that there are obvious and essential differences between the Albanian attitude and what the Serbian academicians propose. As President Rugova has put it, this is an old game that was first played at the Peace of Versailles in 1920, and was repeated in 1945 and then a few years ago by the former Yugoslav president, the academician Dobrica Cosic. He even put forward this idea officially at Geneva to Vance and Owen, the cochairmen of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, but the latter categorically rejected it. The demands for the partition of Kosova are motivated by greed for its great mineral resources, and, as the Albanian academician Mark Krasniqi has put it, the most sacred monastery for the Serbs is Trepca. We are against the partition of Kosova and are working against this partition with all our powers of resistance and survival in these difficult and dangerous years.

This clear and unambiguous stand taken by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, the president of the Republic of Kosova, found legal support at the Conference of London in 1992 and the Badinter Commission in 1991. In London, the inviolability of the borders of the republics and the autonomous provinces of the former Yugoslavia was decided. These documents show clearly that the idea of a partition of Kosova, in which the Serbs would take the lion's share including the areas with valuable underground and aboveground resources (not the monasteries), is a compromise offer that the Albanians will never accept and will not meet with either legal or international support. Nevertheless, even this proposal that is now being aired increasingly often in Serbian circles shows that the question of Kosova is not simply a cultural or educational issue or a matter of Serbian historical justice. It is a political, economic, and legal question that must be provided with a solution on the basis of the international documents that guarantee the peoples the legitimate right of self-determination.

Albania: Deputies Protest Jailing of Tetovo University Rector

AU0108152396 Tirana ATA in English 1845 GMT 31 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 31 (ATA)—The Albanian Parliament approved on Wednesday [31 July] a decree of the Albanian president on excises in the Republic of Albania and a credit agreement for development between the Albanian Government and the international association for development.

This agreement envisaged a credit worth 8 million and $550,000 and a grant worth 2 million and $500,000 to develop forestry in Albania.

It also approved a resolution which says, among others, that the Albanian public opinion is seriously concerned about the imprisonment of the rector of the Tetovo University Prof. Dr. Fadil Sulejmani, head of the University Senate Milaim Fejziu, and other activists.

The Albanian Government being always interested in mutual and friendly good neighbourliness in the interest of two peoples and peace and stability in the region has helped for the legitimacy of the new Macedonian state since its founding. It has also eased the interethnic dialogue between the Macedonians and Albanians as two major entities of this country.

Therefore, the negation of the right for higher education in the mother tongue as well as severe measures against personalities of the Tetovo University, not only are contrary to the international right but also compromise the spirit of bilateral cooperation. Without being a referee in this issue, the resolution said, it is our duty to stress that the observance of the fundamental rights of Albanians living in their territories in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] inevitably determines the level of Albanian-Macedonian relationships.

This is the reason why the Albanian Parliament protests against the Macedonian police act which led to the imprisonment of the rector and other activists of the Tetovo University.

Albanian Parliament expressing its good will hopes that the Macedonian Government considers the right demands of the Albanians for higher education in their mother tongue and put an end to these practices.

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At the same time the parliament urged the Albanian Government and the Foreign Ministry to undertake all necessary actions to pave the way for the rights for higher education of the Albanians in Macedonia.

Albania: Republican Paper Welcomes Resolution on FYROM

AU0108172296 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 1 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by G.L: "A Step To Be Welcomed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the first time, an Albanian institution has condemned the work of the Macedonian Government in convicting the leaders of the University of Tetovo. For a long time, the discriminatory attitudes of the Macedonian Government toward the Albanians living there, denying them even the right to education in their own language, have been arousing anxiety and anger in Albanian political circles on both sides of the border.

All the more surprising was the passive attitude of the Tirana government, which hesitated to denounce such anachronistic attitudes on the part of Skopje, which, as far as the Albanians are concerned, continues to keep alive the atmosphere of the political imprisonments of the communist era. Albanian official circles have also failed to make the necessary approaches to international institutions in order to seek their help in defense of the Albanians' rights. In this way, the Albanians of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] have felt betrayed, lacking tangible support even from their kin-state. For its part, the Republican Party has not only expressed its solidarity with the fair demands of the Albanians in Macedonia, but has also denounced the passivity of the Albanian state toward the Macedonian state's successive violations of the rights of the Albanians.

The resolution approved yesterday by the Albanian parliament condemns the arrest of Mr. Fadil Sulejmani, rector of the University of Tetovo, and of Mr. Milaim Fejziu, the chairman of the university senate, and must be appreciated as a very important step forward in Tirana's official political stance over the problem of the Albanians in Macedonia. It must from now on be clear to Skopje that Tirana's official policy, whereby "Macedonian-Albanian relations will also depend on the attitude of the Macedonian Government toward the Albanians," is something tangible and specific.

However, it is very important for the government and our country's other political institutions to follow up this step undertaken by our parliament with others. We hope that our officials have finally understood that the rights of our brothers across the border cannot be defended without joint action. The time has come for all the Albanian political centers to act on the basis of a common line as far as the problems of the Albanians in Yugoslavia and Macedonia are concerned. This has unfortunately not been the case so far.

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Bulgaria: UK's Portillo Interviewed on Cooperation, NATO

AU0208113196 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 31 Jul 96 p 4

[Interview with Michael Portillo, UK secretary of state for defense, by Vasil Lyutskanov; place and date not given: "We Would Like Bulgaria To Facilitate Good Relations Between NATO, Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lyutskanov] Minister Portillo, in an interview for the BBC, you said that the West is not clear regarding Bulgaria's intentions on the issue of joining NATO, and stressed Bulgaria's special relations with Russia. What did you mean?

[Portillo] If Bulgaria has special relations with Russia, I think it is a significant contribution to Europe's security. What we always tried to construct in the old continent were bridges of confidence between the East and West. We would like all our friends, including Bulgaria, to do whatever they can in order to facilitate good relations between NATO and Russia. Bulgaria's willingness to join NATO is entirely in its own hands. I have not come here to apply any pressure, but to learn something more on this matter.

[Lyutskanov] Do you think that the $50 million that the United States is offering is sufficient for facilitating the integration of eastern Europe into NATO? Could Bulgaria participate in the distribution of this subsidy?

[Portillo] It is very difficult to determine the price of integration into NATO. What we are talking about is rather raising the standards and adopting new standards in order to achieve an operational compatibility between NATO and its eastern European partners. Those are expenditures that Bulgaria could undertake in any context, regardless of whether the final result is joining NATO.

[Lyutskanov] Representatives of the UK military-industrial complex are accompanying you to Sofia. What weapons will they advertise here?

[Portillo] I did not come to offer any special plan or program regarding arms deals. However, the UK military industry has a good reputation. We have great exports and have constructed many joint enterprises. I certainly would welcome any future scientific-technical cooperation with Bulgaria.

Bulgaria: Foreign Espionage Alleged at Kozloduy

AU0208084296 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 30 Jul 96 p 16

[Article by Konstantin Dimitrov: "Cabinet Puts Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant Safety at Stake"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In their typical decisive manner, the ministers have decreased the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant safety budget from 900 to 700 million leva, thus almost guaranteeing power shortages during the winter. The means earmarked for safety were limited in any case, and could not have sufficed either for repair or for nuclear fuel. Deputies from all factions warned the government to not decrease Kozloduy's budget, but rather to increase it because of the increase in the dollar rate and inflation. However, no one listened to them. Obviously our leaders do not understand that the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant is not a toy, but a real nuclear plant, which functions on the basis of exceptionally strict internal safety rules, and produces electricity not by using coal but nuclear fuel. If the repairs at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant were not conducted according to all legal requirements, the plant will not be connected to the country's power grid. This is the case because one can hardly afford any compromises after Chernobyl. On the other hand, if there is no fuel, the nuclear power plant could only serve as a monument to the historical policy of former Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov, who cut the plant's budget.

The consequences of stopping the nuclear plant's activity would be horrible. With its 3,760 megawatts, Kozloduy provides almost one-half of Bulgaria's electricity. Obviously, if we cannot rely on Kozloduy, we will face murderous electric power restrictions in the winter. Power Supply Minister Rumen Ovcharov himself admits that by September alone we need $50 million for the import of nuclear fuel and other raw materials. Afterward we will need another $75 million for the cold season. However, it is not clear where the money will come from. The fact that such a purchase will jack up the dollar rate to unprecedented heights is another issue.

The situation is even grimmer, as it already is clear that the first reactor will not function during the winter because of the metal samples that must be taken from the reactor's structure. This will most likely happen during the second part of August. The samples will be taken by Inetech [spelling as transliterated], Westinghouse' subsidiary, and afterwards will be sent to Moscow for testing at the Kurchatov Institute and Siemens. The results are expected by mid-December. This means that the first reactor will not function precisely when we need it most, and this will deprive Bulgaria of 440 megawatts of nuclear power.

Many experts expressed suspicion regarding the goal of the experiment with the first reactor. Some even went as far as suspecting the involvement of foreign special services. According to them, the real intention of the testing was to learn the secret composition of the metal from which the reactor is constructed. This suspicion was strengthened by the fact that Westinghouse and Siemens are taking part in the experiment, and will have direct access to its results.

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Many hints were dropped regarding military and industrial spying. Military spying, because according to certain experts the Russian nuclear submarines are made of the same metal with the same composition as Kozloduy's first reactor. Industrial spying, because the foreigners want to learn by all means the secrets of the Russian reactors, as it has been proven that their corpuses are stronger than those of Western reactors.

Observers recall that a few years ago people from the West cut pieces from the former East German nuclear reactor in Greifswald. The reactors of that nuclear plant are identical to our WWER-440, like Kozloduy's first reactor. However, it appears that the results of the experiment with the East German reactor did not satisfy the Western experts. Some of our experts think that now they want more information from the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant.

Many experts claim that precisely such goals are at the foundation of the foreign pressure to test the first reactor by all means. The official reason is to determine how much longer the reactor could function. People from the West are prepared to give us $1.5 million if it becomes necessary to repair the places from which the metal samples will be taken.

Whatever the reason for the test is, the only sure thing is that we could forget about the reactor for a long time, experts from the National Electricity Company point out.

What is more important in this case is that the safety budget should by no means be decreased, because it would be an exceptionally dangerous precedent. It is true that electric power rates have increased by 122 percent, and another 22 percent increase is expected in August. The basic goal of the increase is to make the National Electricity Company able to provide by itself the necessary funds for repairs, fuel, and spare parts. However, the revenue from the new rates will arrive at the company with a delay of 45-50 days, and in addition the government continues to protect industrial plants that do not settle their electric power bills. Thus the effect of the new rates is cut to a minimum. Therefore the ministers must provide funds for the nuclear power plant, as long as they are unable to put some order into their administration and stop the waste of money. If they really do prevent the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant from functioning normally during the winter, this would mean that they doom the entire nation to savage cold and darkness, and all this on the eve of the 21st century.

Bulgaria: Pirinski Says Court Ruling Violates Rights

AU0108135896 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 26 Jul 96 p 5

[Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski, BSP presidential candidate, answers journalists' questions at his 25 July news conference in Sofia]

[FBIS Translated Text] [KONTINENT] Mr. Pirinski how do you view the Constitutional Court ruling on Bulgarian citizenship?

[Pirinski] Unfortunately, in this case the Constitutional Court crossed the limits of its activity as stipulated in the Constitution, namely, to interpret the Constitution. In this case, the court dealt with the application of a law, a prerogative it does not possess. It not only dealt with issues outside the sphere of its prerogatives, but it also based its ruling on a law that has been quashed, and violated the rights of a section of the Bulgarian citizens.

[KONTINENT] Why did you select Professor Marazov as your vice president?

[Pirinski] I used high criteria because the head of state is a high-ranking position. I was looking for a strengthening factor for the slogan "Together for Bulgaria." I am a politician who is committed to political life. I think that the vice president must be a personality with clearly expressed positions and unquestionable authority in civil society. There is no more convincing person in this respect than Professor Ivan Marazov.

[KONTINENT] Do you not think that your tolerant behavior until now could be interpreted by the voters as weakness?

[Pirinski] I have no intention of conducting a timid campaign or of evoking an impression of indecisiveness or weakness. Our force is not measured by the strength of one's voice, namely, the louder you yell and the more uncontrolled positions you express, the stronger you are.

[KONTINENT] Theoretically, you could lose. Would this be the end of your career or a springboard to the post of prime minister?

[Pirinski] I am convinced of our victory. According to the Constitution the same person cannot hold both posts.

[KONTINENT] Why are you keeping your distance from the Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD]?

[Pirinski] Because now it is necessary to render the government maximum help in the difficult measures it is adopting. The OSD is not sufficiently consistent in

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its motivation and appeals. Please remember that OSD means an Alliance for Social Democracy.

Their activity does not prompt unity.

[KONTINENT] Your opponents declared you as the most convenient rival candidate.

[Pirinski] I agree to a certain degree. When they lose the race against me, they will say that they tried, but against the strongest candidate all they could do was lose. As far as reacting to what has been said about me, I think that the voters themselves will be able to judge whether what has been said corresponds to the truth.

Bulgaria: Failure of OSD Anti-Videnov Attack Viewed

AU0108133596 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 26 Jul 96 p 11

[Article by Dobri Kozhukharov: "OSD Balloon Burst"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD] faction again wants to topple Zhan Videnov, and this time from all of his posts. Their spouses joined the group of sociologist husbands in the OSD.

Professor Kyuranov said that the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] has not reformed itself, and has not turned into a social democratic party. The OSD has thus lost the essence of its existence. If the task were an impossible one to implement under any circumstances, or by any deadline, then its announcement five years ago was either an illusion or a hoax. The party should therefore have admitted that this was a mistake. The OSD members are not, however, responsible for this, and they have not erred. It has emerged that the OSD ideological-political elite agrees neither with its party, its party leadership, nor its party leader.

From the viewpoint of party interests, this attack is a self-destructive one. One can hardly cite a precedent for a party faction wanting during an election campaign to replace the party leader as a precondition for the party candidate's success in the elections. The election slogan "Together for Bulgaria!" is being compromised, as the party leader and his circle are being excluded from the general campaign. Ivan Kostov [Union of Democratic Forces—SDS leader] is therefore justified in asking ironically: "It would be especially interesting to hear whether Georgi Pirinski also supports the demand for Zhan Videnov's ouster."

The thesis that winning the presidential elections is the BSP's main task was described as outrageous. However, this is not only Videnov's position, but the position of the entire plenum. The OSD thus opposes not only a specific person, but the collective leadership itself. The appropriate reaction is already evident.

Everything seems stupid and crazy if it is viewed as an isolated and separate action. However, things become clearer when one notices a well-organized choir in the crowing that has been raised from the political chicken coop.

Political roosters who use the same score are well known since the beginning of the so-called democracy in our motherland. Today their crowing is heard from different directions, although they stem from the same nucleus, which had diligently practiced the melody they crowed in support of the reforms. They are grouped in the OSD, around President Zhelev, behind Ahmed Dogan [leader of the Rights and Freedoms Movement—OSD], and with trade union leader Professor Petkov. Some of them are crowing a solo against their parties—Aleksandur Tomov [leader of the Civic Alliance for the Republic—GOR] is doing this with the courage of the desperate, and Ivan Kostov sotto voce.

They do not like the situation in the country because they do not control it, and because they have been gently or roughly pushed out of the positions they conquered in the troubled 1990. The time is no longer theirs. The scheme they concocted then, and which was so pleasant to the eyes and stomachs, is bursting along the seams. What Nikolay Slatinski [former chairman of National Assembly Commission on National Security] describes as the political, economic, and social status quo is an extremely unstable factor. Actually, they themselves are the most vulnerable factors in this status quo, both because of the collapse of the pro-Gorbachev external support, and because of the natural amortization during the political developments.

They need a strong move, but lack the necessary composure and fantasy. They are therefore returning to a well-known trick—the demand for a new policy. This is a new negation of their own old negation. An old crowing song, sung this time with hoarse voices. The political roosters are convinced that without their help the sun will not rise, the watches will stop, and time as a dimension will disappear.

The trade unions want again to topple the cabinet. The OSD wants to restructure the political sphere. Zhelev himself directed his lance against Article One of the Constitution itself. Everyone wants to trace a new path.

All this was called in the past "the road to Europe." Today the chief of the confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] [Prof. Krustyo Petkov] claims that a new Euroleft has been formed in Bulgaria, and that it will emerge strongly by the end of the year.

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Down with the retroleft! Rejecting the retroleft with disgust, the new faces demand new faces. According to this logic of theirs, the BSP candidate-president has no chance, but otherwise OSD Deputy Chairman Pirinski is fit for every post. After all, he is a new face with Eurosocialistic radiation. And after all, isn't the entire choir of roosters composed of new faces?

When Aleksandur Tomov left the red party with his GOR, Prof. Kyuranov [OSD leader] did not reproach him, but said only that it was too soon for this. Apparently, the majority within the OSD has today assessed that the time has come. However, the slyest and most informed OSD members did not follow them. If Pirinski and Paparizov [minister of trade and foreign economic relations] hold the same position, they should immediately leave the cabinet. The members of the party leadership and the Democratic Left parliamentary faction should initiate specific actions aimed at toppling the party leader and prime minister. However, they prefer to lie low in the corridors of power, while their spiritual mentor Andrey Lukanov [former prime minister] is completely under cover after he was ousted from Topenergy.

Lukanov, Aleksandur Lilov [former BSP leader], and Yanaki Stoilov [deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council], also known as Small Ginyo, probably know best who is organizing Pirinski's political death, and why. They would hardly answer this question now, because a split in the faction rather than in the party itself is emerging. They are deliberately marching toward harakiri in order to keep a part that is loyal to the BSP idea, and which rejected the split at a difficult moment, inside the party. Others, known as overt opponents of the leaders, will strive to form the aforementioned Euroleft with a liberal nuance.

The OSD members understand that now is the moment to adopt decisive political actions. This is dictated by the privatization processes, which have entered their final stage. The future owners and managers of the now private and formerly state wealth are well known. Their names and the names of their relatives have been registered in the privatization funds lists, and duly published. What a few had already sensed in the past has become a matter of general knowledge for a broad, impoverished, and desperate public.

Ivan Kostov is not simply the leader of a political force, but the head of a fund. George Ganchev [leader of the Bulgarian Business Bloc—BBB] is advertising another fund from the television screens. Boyan Slavenkov, who is very close to Zhelev, is also an essential figure in this fund, but this apparently does not disturb the poet.

The Alternative Socialist Party [ASP] members are also grooming their elephant with a charming impudence. After sufficiently grooming their symbol, the first renegades, who joined the rulers in three governments, will turn it into something big and clean that resembles the Golden Calf.

The old and new nomenclature no longer can hide the transformation of party-political positions into economic power. The intercourse of labor and capital in the privatization fund with the same name ["Labor and Capital" Fund], is especially arrogant. The party-trade union nomenclature around Krustyo Petkov, which was very active in the last seven years in the secret and semitransparent privatization of state and trade union property, now is a leading factor in the open privatization. The brothers by birth of the pariahs are climbing the high steps of the capital. Their rosy world is becoming public knowledge. At the same time, the plebeians are clutching their privatization vouchers, read the names of their future bosses, and click their tongues in amazement.

The new patricians no longer need the BSP and SDS with their powerful electoral armies, composed of poor and disappointed people. They were necessary during the transition stage of the anarcho-liberal revolution. Now the goal is to restructure not only the political space, but first of all the electoral space. The absolute majority of any political force in forming the new parliament must not be allowed again. Many of those who have been deceived continue to be members of various levels of the existing political entities. If they survive, they would certainly create great difficulties, and have the support of the great majority of the impoverished traditional voters on their side.

Changing the ownership, and the emergence of the new owners to center stage, produces a new economic situation with clear political consequences. The emotional diapers are about to be removed in front of the public, and a new political spectrum is about to be formed in accordance of the already different social strata. This is the natural course of things. The problem for the sly ones of 10 November 1989 [the date Zhivkov was toppled from party and state leadership] is to manipulate the processes in their favor, and assume crucial positions in the new political elite. Otherwise they are lost, especially if the BSP survives along basic lines, and people like Zhan Videnov remain in its leadership.

Funds such as "Labor and Capital" and "Golden Lev" would also find it difficult to survive without the necessary party-political support to which their bosses are used.

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Common interests and a justifiable concern for the future are at the foundation of the coordinated attacks against Videnov. The government's grave mistakes and the deterioration of the economic situation of the state and the population are merely a convenient pretext. The opposition understands or at least senses this, and does not support Zhelev's efforts to change the Constitution, refuses to join the trade unions' "mass" actions, and rejects the OSD formula regarding the bad Zhan and his circle of friends.

The OSD has failed to gain understanding either in the BSP or among those who are dissatisfied with the government—and they are numerous. The OSD balloon has burst, and those who were blowing it up could now use its remnants to cover their loins to avoid the shame.

Bulgaria: Democratic Party's Savov Discusses Future Plans

AU0208074396 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 30 Jul 96 p 9

[Interview with Democratic Party leader Stefan Savov by Mariya Velkovska; place and date not given: "Stefan Savov: I Want To Pass the Party Helm to Someone Else"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Velkovska] Mr. Savov, what is the present situation of the democratic formations? Disagreements emerged again after nominating a joint presidential candidate. For example, Mrs. Mozer [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union—BZNS—leader] refuses to accept the 2:1 ratio between the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and the partners in the structures of the united opposition.

[Savov] I must admit that certain disagreements emerged, but this is a natural phenomenon against the background of the entire preelection tension. However, I am sure that the closer the elections are, the faster the disagreements will be cleared out. Of course, this will not be done with a magic wand, but because of the conviction that we could win only through joint efforts. It is not only Mrs. Mozer and the BZNS, but the Democratic Party also disagrees with the quota principle. Equality and consensus are the best foundation for achieving an active coalition cooperation, at least as far as the basic issues are concerned. [passage omitted]

[Velkovska] Could the Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD] provoke a coup in the Democratic Left, which could lead to toppling Videnov's cabinet? When could early presidential elections be prompted?

[Savov] The OSD deserves praise for its efforts to construct a real social democratic party. The bad thing is that those people have no willpower or power to implement their declared intentions. It appears that the past and the loyalty to old principles are stronger than anything else. Everything remains within the framework of talking. There is no chance of provoking a coup.

We could talk about early parliamentary elections only after a convincing victory of the opposition in the presidential elections. I repeat—a convincing victory! Therefore, let us concentrate our efforts on attaining this goal. There is another possibility, namely, to reach an agreement between a part of the opposition and a group or a circle of friends within the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. I do not want to even think about this possibility. It reminds me of past times, which were damaging and even lethal to democracy. [passage omitted]

[Velkovska] Could you comment on the statement of former SDS leader Filip Dimitrov, who claims that you prevented the publication of the personal files in the 36th National Assembly?

[Savov] Mr. Filip Dimitrov and all those of us who at that time were members of the SDS leadership, know precisely how the issue was presented then. It is not serious to claim that as National Assembly chairman, and afterward as leader of the SDS parliamentary faction, I had the possibility of imposing my position on this issue through whining (this is Filip Dimitrov's expression), or through force. Filip Dimitrov is only demonstrating his usual uncontrolled and senseless venom when he again attacks me, Mrs. Mozer, and Ahmed Dogan [Movement for Rights and Freedomsleader].

However, there is something even more dangerous. Recently, Filip Dimitrov and his dwindling circle of collaborators are filling the newspapers' pages with interviews, which in essence are directed against the line of the present SDS leadership that aims at uniting the democratic formations. Since the aforementioned campaign of statements is not organized by stupid people, a dangerous provocation becomes evident. [passage omitted]

[Velkovska] Would you heed your party members' request and remain as party leader?

[Savov] We will have a congress at the end of the year. My age compels me to withdraw from my post. I have always encouraged the young. I think that we already have several excellently trained young leaders. I hope that by the end of the year they will be joined by other prominent figures who are close to the Democratic Party. However, if the circumstances require this, it could be necessary for me to remain in the party leadership in some form for a year or two. We will decide this issue at the congress.

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Czech Republic: Officials Discuss Use of U.S. Aid Funds

AU3107131996 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 31 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by "gag": "Funds From the Americans Will Be Used Mostly for the Soldiers To Expand Their Knowledge"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The $60 million that the U.S. Congress approved last week as military aid for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are referred to by diplomats and army representatives as a sign sent by the North Atlantic alliance to the countries that have the best chance of admission. "I understand the Congressional decision as a step that is to indicate which countries the alliance considers to be the leading candidates for expansion," Deputy Defense Minister Miroslav Kalousek said.

Jaroslav Janda, deputy director of the Institute for International Relations, considers the Congressional decision to be an important gesture. "Less than 600 million korunas is likely to come to the Czech Republic; that can get us a negligible amount of modern military hardware but, on the other hand, the sum can be used to train many experts," Janda said. He is of the opinion that the money should be used for the instruction of foreign languages, for instance, or to send soldiers to foreign schools.

Colonel Vit Sevcik, head of the army materiel-technical supplies unit, agrees with this statement. "The Army still is to discuss with the Americans how it will utilize the $20-million shot in the arm," he said. According to Sevcik, the funds will probably be used on one of the priorities—transmission systems, command, control, or communications, and this includes the ability of the officers to communicate with their Western colleagues.

Kalousek brushed off the concerns that the Army could use the U.S. funds for operational spending. "If we wanted jam, toilet paper, or diesel fuel, Lord knows, the Americans would not give us a penny. They will, however, release the funds for any investment that would bring the Army closer to the technical standards of the alliance," Kalousek said.

Czech Republic: Havel's Speech at NATO Workshop

96CH0137A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 22 Jun 96 p 5

[Speech by President Vaclav Havel delivered at the 13th NATO Workshop in Warsaw on 21 June: "Idea of NATO Does Not Belong on the Dustheap of History"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed presidents, ministers, generals, and members of the audience: The communist coup in my country in 1948 was not reminiscent in any way of the beautiful ballet performance we witnessed a little while ago. It was a brutal victory of dark forces over freedom and democracy at the very center of our continent; a victory that, much like many other events in Czech or Czecho-Slovak history, left its mark on the situation in all of Europe. That victory was also the immediate impetus for the Western democracies to establish the North Atlantic alliance as a union intended for their defense against a further expansion of totalitarianism and other possible attempts on behalf of the Soviet leadership to bring the world under its domination.

The origin of the alliance had two dimensions: one was the idea of jointly defending the values of the democratic Western world against any kind of threat, which was incorporated in the Washington Treaty, and the second was the realistic status of affairs that led to this idea. This status was the result of the threat of Soviet and communist expansion. Therefore, everything else had to be subordinated to the existence of the strategic threat, that is to say, to the actual status of things. This can explain that there were times the alliance had to accept even countries that, at that time, it was difficult to consider as being actually democratic. However, consideration of the extent to which these countries adhere to the protected values had to give way to their strategic significance.

After four decades, the realistic status of affairs has changed radically, and this type of threat, which led to the origin of NATO, passed with the fall of the Iron Curtain. Many are led to ask whether the alliance still makes any kind of sense today.

Anyone asking this question is only looking at the second dimension behind the origin of the alliance—in other words, the circumstances that led to its formation—and is overlooking the first dimension, or its very idea. Together with you, I am deeply convinced that the alliance continues to make sense. This is so mainly because the change in circumstances does not result in pushing the idea of the alliance onto the dustheap of history, but precisely the opposite: It makes it topical in new ways and presents a direct challenge for its renaissance and toward its, so to speak, pure fulfillment, which is not subordinated to mere strategic interests. With the loss of a powerful and clearly localized strategic opponent, the reasons also disappear for the real status of affairs to compel this grouping to partially pursue those values that it protects or to back off from its fundamental principles, but, on the contrary, challenges this grouping only now to fully verify these principles.

Yes, after all it is not until today that the alliance has an opportunity to actually and fully become that which it is

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supposed to be, according to the Washington Treaty—an open union of all democratic countries of the Euro-Atlantic region, protecting this area and the values it shares! In other words, this is not merely a question of changing the basic idea of the alliance, but, on the contrary, of giving it new life.

I believe that this is precisely what the alliance should clearly declare anew and with complete clarity as early as this year. This is necessary for a number of reasons, among others so that no one who has no intention of threatening the NATO member countries would have the slightest reason to fear it or to undertake any special-purpose political operations out of fear of the alliance.

As rapidly as the danger of a global conflict is declining, so—unfortunately—the danger of regional conflicts is growing at the same pace. The end of the straitjacket of power blocs or of a unity brought about by the common threat opens room for various partial confrontations. Such confrontations can increase in number if a new and firm security order in Europe is not created in sufficient time. In my opinion, therefore, the alliance should clearly define itself from the beginning as the principal guarantor of internal stability applicable to conditions and of internal peace within the euro-atlantic area. At the same time, it should, to the maximum extent possible, adapt itself and its doctrine to this new situation, that is to say, to the task of operationally preventing the danger of regional and local conflicts. And it should do so—under certain clearly specified conditions—even beyond the borders of its member states, as was the case recently in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that the concept behind the creation of the CJTF [expansion not given] is precisely such an event, and it is necessary to support it to the maximum.

But that is not all. Conflicts in the area of the former Yugoslavia, but also in many other locations—for example, in the Near East—clearly show that today the sharp delineation between local armed conflicts and terrorism is ever more clearly disappearing. It therefore seems to me that the North Atlantic alliance should also devote some thought as to whether and how it could confront even this type of security risk, a type that could play an ever more significant role in upcoming years and decades.

Similarly, it is also inevitable for the alliance to again and clearly say, in the spirit of its fundamental treaty, that it is open to all countries in the euro-atlantic area who share its common values and who want to and are ready to defend them within the alliance's framework. However, I believe that this alone no longer suffices today. In the foreseeable future, the alliance will have to clearly state how it intends to expand, whom it intends to include, and when. It should explain the submitted schedule for its expansion and primarily its logic. Every discriminating individual understands that if NATO does not wish to risk the loss of its capability to act then it cannot suddenly and overnight expand by including all countries interested in membership. Nevertheless, no one should have reason to feel that by accepting one or another country for membership, the process of expansion ends. All should have the assurance and outlook, all should be familiar with the criteria that will be imposed on them, and all should be aware of all the rational reasons why one or another country is expected to come to membership sooner and why one or another country is expected to come to membership later. The formulation of all of this will undoubtedly be assisted even by the initial findings based on the individual dialogue between the alliance and its partners, which has already begun.

I know that there is a colorful palette of those who doubt the sensibility and purpose of expanding NATO and that these doubters operate via a colorful palette of arguments. I have no intention of polemicizing with them. I dare address only the following to them: To doubt the sensibility of expanding the alliance means either to doubt its very idea or a desire to preserve the situation that was created during the time of the Cold War and to reject the fact that we are living in a different world today.

A big topic these days is the relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation, or the entire Commonwealth of Independent States. I believe that there are truly only a few people in the world who would not wish for the best of possible partnership relationships between these two large entities, relationships that could even be somehow formalized, which would express and confirm the fundamental significance they possess in today's globally interconnected civilization. Without good collaboration between the euro-atlantic region and the giant and influential Euro-Asian power, which the Russian Federation is and will always be, with a power that has a great gravitational force and has its own security partners, world peace is truly difficult to visualize.

These two entities can, of course, cooperate creatively and establish ever more deep partnerships only if they are both clearly defined, clearly demarcated, and if they both mutually and fully honor their identities. The existence of embittered borders between individual regional unions or the existence of various zones of countries who do not know where they belong is always the best way toward unrest, instability, fighting for influence, mutual distrust, and ultimately to potential confrontation. Decisions about where a certain country or nation belongs or feels that it belongs or wants to

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belong should be made primarily by these countries or nations themselves. Similarly, various regional unions can and must define themselves. No one else has the right to do this for them or to even have veto rights in such matters. Only an order that is just and that takes account of the will of all—in other words, even of the small ones—and perceives their security interests can be actually functional and stable. If the great and powerful decide on the fate of the small and less powerful, then this never leads to peace, but always to war. I believe that the horrendous history of two world wars provides an adequate lesson to us regarding this fact.

I believe that the alliance should tell all this, in a completely unequivocal manner, to Russia in the foreseeable future. It should say that it wishes to establish the best possible partnership relationships with Russia, as well as stating that a condition for the creation of such relationships should be the knowledge of each of the partners as to who he is and should not attempt to dictate to the other as to how the partner is to define itself or who belongs to the partnership or who may belong to it.

To start out from the idea that the alliance should not expand because it would thus threaten the security interests of Russia means to actually state that it is aimed against Russia and that Russian fears are legitimate. Such considerations, however, do not lead into the future, but rather into the past; they do not lead to peace, but to confrontation. And this is so without regard as to whether someone speaks like this in Russia, in West Europe, in East Europe, or in the United States.

The time is approaching when we shall remember the 50th anniversary of the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, as well as the time that the North Atlantic alliance will be celebrating the 50th anniversary of its origin.

You will surely not be angry with me if, as a representative of the Czech Republic, I conclude my remarks with the wish that my country wou'd celebrate this anniversary as a full member of the union to whose origin its bitter fate provided the impetus.

As a country that lies at the very center of Europe and is the traditional crossroads of European history, we have repeatedly experienced very sad events that left their mark on the fate of the entire continent. Has the time not come for matters to occur in our country that will open the way to a better future for all of Europe?

I would be happy to be able to welcome all of you in Prague in a year.

Czech Republic: Daily Warns Army Facing 'Collapse'

AU0108124196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 1 Aug 96 p 2

[Commentary by Jan Gazdik in the "Analysis" column: "Army Badly Needs Not Only Money, But Also New Laws"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While the Army is succeeding in gradually modernizing its equipment and weaponry with a view to bringing them closer to NATO standards as soon as possible, on the other hand it is facing the danger that soon there will be no one to operate the purchased equipment.

People responsible for personnel issues in the Army are warning that for several years now, the number of professionals leaving the Army has greatly exceeded the number of newly hired career soldiers. The situation is paradoxical in that while the Army is moving in the right direction, at the same time it is getting dangerously close to the limit, beyond which the troops are awaiting the collapse caused by depopulation [vylidneni].

At the same time, experts are warning that the problem does not dwell in money alone, which the Army is short of, but also in that professional soldiers still do not know exactly what is in store for them in the Army.

Therefore, unless parliament approves in the foreseeable future the law on the terms of employment of career soldiers, and unless the Army subsequently expeditiously adopts rules of the game that will appeal to young people, it could happen that by the end of the millennium, that is, at the time of the country's expected entry into NATO, the Army will be paralyzed by the total shortage of professional soldiers.

Colonel Vlastimil Kucera, chief of the Personnel Administration of the Air Defense Corps, fears that people will not rush to join the Army as long as commanders are not paid better, or before their social and working conditions change. "But money is not the only issue," Kucera confirms.

According to Kucera, even in the professional NATO armies salaries are not dizzyingly higher compared with other professions. However, in these countries the Army offers other advantages—an elite education, and decent social and working conditions. The Army even finances studies at civilian universities. Moreover, the soldiers of the Alliance know exactly what awaits them in uniform, provided they meet the qualification criteria.

While domestic military schools, too, offer prestigious education, the snag is that the courses of study are often a long way from the reality of Army life. The Army

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is therefore groping in a vicious circle—it is training first-rate specialists who, however, under the influence of difficult conditions of service, low salaries, shortage of apartments, or lack of training equipment, presently apply to be discharged into civilian life. The attitude of the Army, which refuses to let go of specialists, into whose education it has invested hundreds of millions from the taxpayers' pockets, is also logical.

Solving this problem requires the cooperation of the government, parliament, and the Ministry of Defense. The Klaus cabinet should live up to the promise from its policy statement, and treat the country's external security, which includes the Army, as one of its priorities. Parliament, in turn, should approve without delay the law on defense and the terms of employment of career soldiers. The appropriation of sufficient funds for the Army's social and modernization programs also depends on the Chamber of Deputies. The Army, finally, must determine the exact rules and, at the same time, make efficient use of taxpayers' money.

Czech Republic: BIS Supervision Head Requests More Powers

AU0108150696 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 1 Aug 96 p 2

[Report by Jan Hrbacek: "Basta Wants To Supervise the BIS Completely, But Fendrych Warns Against Possible Consequences"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new head of the parliamentary Commission for Supervision of the Security Information Service (BIS), social democrat Jaroslav Basta, is asking for the power to supervise all the work of the civilian counterintelligence, including the access to the so-called active files. Deputy Interior Minister Martin Fendrych fears, however, that if the commission were authorized to access even this highly classified agenda, the secrecy of the service could be jeopardized, including the plans in serious cases, and lives could even be put in danger.

Nevertheless, Basta categorically rejects Fendrych's concerns. According to him, there is no threat to either the work of the counterintelligence or human lives. At the same time, Basta is convinced that top secret information would not be leaked from the Commission for Supervision of the BIS, despite the members of the commission not being experts on the work of secret services. The present commission consists of five members, with social democracy pushing for its reduction to only three members. "I respect the proper election of Mr. Basta, and if he can push through the new law on greater powers for the parliamentary supervisory body for the BIS, I will have to respect it also," Fendrych stated. Nevertheless, Fendrych insists that facilitating the access of the commission to the active files is neither possible nor necessary. "It does not have to be leaks of the type that we would read about some facts in the papers. It could be much more," the deputy minister emphasized. The main reason, according to Fendrych, not to allow access to the active files, is to protect the persons named therein.

Basta believes that the parliamentary supervision of the intelligence services could work on a similar principle to those in the Great Britain or the United States. According to Basta, in these countries, any citizen who suspects that he is followed, may request a check that subsequently goes through the entire system of intelligence agenda. This means that the principle applied in the aforementioned countries facilitates access to all cases, i.e. also to the processed, "active" files. "If, in England, you believe someone is bugging you, you fill out a form that is available in every post office, you mail it to the relevant office, and you will receive an answer," Basta said.

Czech Republic: Changes in Deputy Minister Posts Described

AU0108150296 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 1 Aug 96 p 2

[Report by "LIDOVE NOVINY correspondents": "Deputy Minister Chess"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When filling the deputy minister posts, cabinet members must consider not only the expert qualifications of the candidates but also the principles of the coalition agreement.

In particular, the posts at the Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Finance Ministries are filled according to the coalition agreements. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus declared prior to the elections that he considers it a great achievement of the past several years that "there is not a whole pack of deputy ministers knocking on the door and looking forward to the minister leaving for whatever reason."

At the Interior Ministry, Jaroslav Kopriva (KDU-CSL) [Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party] remains in the post of deputy minister, as do Martin Fendrych (no party affiliation), Borek Valvoda (ODA) [Civic Democratic Alliance], and Vladimir Zeman (ODS) [Civic Democratic Party]. So far the situation has not changed at the Finance Ministry, either. The deputy posts are held by Jan Klak (ODS), Vladimir Rudlofcak (no party affiliation), Miroslav Havel (no party affiliation), and Libuse Benesova (ODS). At the Defense Ministry, following the departure of the MP,

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Petr Necas (ODS), Hana Demplova, and Miroslav Kalousek (both KDU-CSL), remain in the deputy minister posts.

Minister Without Portfolio Pavel Bra.inka (ODA) chose just one deputy minister, former MP Viktor Dobal (ODA). Bratinka himself was replaced in the post of deputy foreign minister by Cyril Svoboda (KDU-CSL). Minister Zieleniec's deputies, Alexandr Vondra and Helena Bambasova (both with no party affiliation), remain in their posts from the last election term. Svoboda was replaced in the office of the new justice minister by Pavel Zarecky (no party affiliation), whom the new minister brought from his old office. Another of Kalvoda's deputies is Pavel Pelant (no party affiliation). The post of the third deputy minister has not yet been filled.

Of the hitherto four deputy health ministers of Jan Strasky (Civic Democratic Party), two will apparently stay—Legislative Deputy Ales Dvoulety and Economy Deputy Josef Suchopar (both with no party affiliation). Antonin Pecenka and Kamil Kalina (ODS) will most likely leave their posts. Former MP Miroslav Cerbak (ODA) has been described as a possible replacement.

Jan Koucky (ODS) left the Education Ministry because of the demands of his MP position. Jan Belohlavek, Emanuel Ondracek (both with no party affiliation), and Miroslav Bartosek (ODS) are staying at this time. Culture Minister Jaromir Talir (KDU-CSL) will get a new deputy in a party colleague, Vladimir Koronthaly. Another People's Party member, Josef Svoboda, and unaffiliated Zdenek Novak remain in deputy culture minister posts from the previous term.

Until the jurisdiction bill is passed, the previous deputy economy ministers will work as deputy ministers for the development of regions—the sector of Jaromir Schneider (KDU-CSL). It is expected, however, that the final personnel structure will be different.

Czech Republic: Results of Elections Summarized

96CH0136A Prague NOVA PRITOMNOST in Czech 96 p 23

[Commentary by Petr Prihoda: "Transformation Weariness and Communications Crisis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of this year's elections are not a repetition of 1992, nor of the reworked version of those elections. Much has changed. The structure of the political field is simpler, clearer, and the colors of its spectrum can be easily named. Little parties with changeable titles failed. A few of their more specific representatives will spend some time wandering about and looking for a political roof over their heads; the hard-headed ones will stay behind at lost guard posts—let us not bear a grudge against one or the other. However, the most important thing is that the existing government coalition no longer has a majority.

The most successful leader is Milos Zeman. The electorate of his party grew more than fourfold. The victory of the CSSD [Czech Social Democratic Party] provided adequate insight into two principal topics of these elections. The first is transformation weariness ("I have had enough already"). It is discernible in all postcommunist countries. Public confidence there is being garnered by the postcommunist parties. The Zeman party actually does not completely fit in among them, but its rise signals the same shift. The second topic is the question regarding the ability of the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] to engage in coalition-type cooperation—more precisely stated, the apathy regarding the style of its political conduct.

The Social Democrats grew thanks to the escalation of the feeling "I have had enough already," for which Milos Zeman gets credit as a result of his skillful demagoguery. The party's new followers came from the electorate of parties that previously proclaimed that they were centrist parties (the former LSU [Liberal Social Union], SD-LSNS [Social Democrats-Liberal National Social Party], and the Moravian parties), which would, however, not have been enough for this year's victory. Because neither the number of communists nor republicans really diminished (there are fewer of the former and a few more of the latter), there is no choice but to judge that even one-time followers of the ODS and the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance] cast their vote for Zeman. It is a delicate problem to consider whether the Czech "centrist followers" were influenced by the rhetoric in which populist chords predominated.

The simplification of the Czech political scene is unpropitiously balanced by the opacity of the suddenly hypertrophied Social Democratic Party, which is now the second strongest party. Apart from perennially sworn anticommunists, it was joined by former communists, both the decent type and also those who were normalized, by theoretical admirers of the fiction of a "modern leftist party," by campsite orators and those who warned against abuses, but it lacks the type of people represented by Horak as well as Battek—in other words, people who represented a promise that this party could direct and govern. The Zeman preelection demagoguery, crowned by an unexpected win, tended to set the party and its electorate "to jumping," and it is not certain how long it will take to calm down.

It is possible to believe the Social Democrats when they say that they are a democratic party; however, it

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is not quite clear which stratum of the transformation weariness among its voters it addressed. The party apparently does not reject transformation per se, but it can reject its scope, its pace, its style.

Transformation per se can deprive a person of his social status and role and put an individual into a situation without a future (a certain group could feel impacted in this manner as a result of the scope of transformation). The pace of transformation could instill insecurity in a person because it threatens his social standing. The style of the transformation could insult his feelings, his self-awareness.

And this is precisely what the ODS as planner as well as "designer" of the transformation did. Vaclav Klaus, the brilliant formulator, but the mediocre communicator, supported "okres Jacobins" within the ODS, that is to say, of one-time election managers of the OF [Civic Forum], of people who were self-conscious, but not always wise and unselfish, whose deserved political rise shaped the ODS into a gravitational center of all manner of economic business activities. Now, everyone has indicated to the party that they have had enough. A cogent example is the fact that this party made enemies of the opposition, caused the president to be reserved, and brought about the vexation of its coalition partners. Despite every recognition for having started the transformation, this cannot be considered as a political success for the ODS.

This year's elections also uncovered the neglected malady of Czech society, which is represented by the communications crisis; simply put: a status in which everyone does his own thing. It is a sad balance of six years of freedom that the leaders of two of the most important parties bear so much antipathy toward each other that it is hard to imagine any collegial agreement between them. But the communications crisis does not apply only to political parties; the latter had unconsciously already admitted it prior to the elections by their unwillingness to sit down to a roundtable discussion before the television camera—with the honorable exception of the KDU [Christian Democratic Union]. The crisis is no less applicable to the media, to television stations primarily (be it through fawning in the face of the strongest government party or by wasting the viewer's time). Our editors in chief and commentators frequently played the role of gray eminences in political lobbies, but proved unable to broker a political discourse, to expose it to public control, and to thus assist in its cultivation.

We are now confronted with efforts to form a functioning minority government—at first, a rightist one, and following a possible failure of that move—a centrist one. One as well as the other will be subject to blackmail by one or another opposition. The first round will be an opportunity for the CSSD to prove its ability (or inability) to mature, in the person of its chief. Both rounds will be an opportunity for the ODS to test its willingness to meet others halfway, in other words, a test of the maturity of Vaclav Klaus himself. It is not out of the question that the ODS will not be able to avoid personnel changes in its first team; they could be painful.

It is not necessary to stress that much depends on what happens or does not happen in the immediate weeks and months ahead, as seen from within as well as from without. It cannot be estimated how large a portion of the public will enjoy these events or what attentive interest they will generate. In such a short period, it cannot be expected that substantial changes of party political preferences will become manifest. If a long-term government crisis is to be avoided, then this task must be performed primarily by the leadership groups of the political parties, particularly by their chiefs. That which we expect from Vaclav Klaus and Milos Zeman can be called heroism, without exaggeration.

The other parties are only a little better-off. The People's Party could end up with a burden of responsibility that would be over and above its forces. The heavily frustrated ODA will not be able to ignore the question involving the method of its continued existence in solving this crisis. And what about the two remaining parties that are not mentioned in polite society? Ostentatious ignorance of virtually one-fifth of the entire electorate need not be among the most useful strategies. Perhaps more unprepossessed median interest in this direction would help everyone, and not only those in these parties.

This year's unexpected election results, and particularly the inadequately perceived consequences, have brought Czech society to a crossroads. I do not now have in mind the dilemma of Klaus-Zeman. The recognition that many important matters in politics and journalism will need to be handled differently is an achievement that should crown the present postelection irritation, be it in the image of a hangover or euphoria.

The time for contemplation over the tasks of the next government has, for the time being, unfortunately not yet arrived.

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Slovakia: Foreign Ministry Responds to U.S. Statement

AU0108140196 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 1 Aug 96 p 2

[Report by "(jm)": "U.S. Position on Autonomy Is Concordant With Ours"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Foreign Ministry welcomes the statement issued by the U.S. State Department through its spokesman N. Burns at a press briefing held on 27 July 1996. N. Burns confirmed the negative stance of the United States toward ethnic autonomy. He also said that the United States "does not support territorial autonomy based on the ethnic principle as a right or as a right to set apart an ethnic group from the appropriate state." Like the United States, the Slovak Republic also believes that "ethnic issues must be dealt with within the borders of the extant states." The positions adopted by the Slovak Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State Department on these matters are concordant and unequivocal. The Slovak Republic, like the United States, "supports fully the endeavors by the ethnic minorities in central Europe to preserve their cultural heritage and their free and fair participation in political events in the countries of which they are citizens." In harmony with the expectations of the United States that the governments of central Europe, including the Hungarian Government, will take steps in their countries to create an atmosphere of peace and stability as well as good relations between the majority and the minority ethnic groups, "the Slovak Republic has, in the past, already demonstrated its accommodating attitude in this sphere and is prepared to continue to do its best to assist this process," says the statement issued by the Slovak Foreign Ministry.

Slovakia: HZDS Deputy Comments on Hungary's EU, NATO Entry

AU0108143096 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA (SLOVENSKO DO TOHO Supplement) in Slovak 1 Aug 96 p I

[Article by Roman Hofbauer, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, HZDS, deputy: "Hungarian Cudgel Against Slovakia Through the Medium of the EU and NATO?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The hypocritical crocodile tears shed by our political opposition leaders over the expressions of alarm by various representatives, individuals, internationals, Western officials, and also political and power structures in assessing the Slovak Republic and the prospects of our admission into the EU and NATO cannot fail to conceal something else—the satisfaction of our "political crybabies" at the fact that their efforts to mendaciously discredit and slander our state, with whose existence neither they nor those who order such slanders from them and are exploiting them further have become identified, are bringing the presumed "coveted" results.

Under the government of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]+Slovak National Party [SNS]+Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] coalition and under Vladimir Meciar's premiership, to paint Slovakia in the darkest possible colors and to portray only Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland as the only bright examples for EU and NATO membership among the central European countries. [sentence as published] But are they such bright examples?

It is impossible to ignore the neuralgic point in the center of Europe, the parameters of which Hungary openly declared at the Budapest conference "Hungary and Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders" on 4 to 5 July in Budapest, in the presence of the highest representatives of the Hungarian state. Since doubts are being voiced about the Slovak Republic regarding its admission into European and transatlantic structures, as well as fears because of the alleged possibility of the importation of our fictitious destabilizing elements into the EU and NATO, let us take a look at Hungary's contribution to these supranational institutions, in the event of its admission. There is no need to devise any hypothetical theories, as is being done by our opposition "political crybabies" in besmirching Slovakia. It is absolutely sufficient to abide by the facts contained in the declaration of the Budapest conference:

—Hungary proclaims the Hungarian ethnic minorities on the territories of other, mostly neighboring, states to be an integral part of its nation and state.

—The relationship of unanimity between the Hungarian Government and ethnic Hungarian political parties abroad is placed above Hungary's interstate relations with the neighboring states.

—The basic issue facing Hungarians living beyond the borders of the Hungarian state is the establishment of their autonomy on the territories of these neighboring states in direct coordination with Hungary.

—Hungary's joining the Euroatlantic structures is of crucial importance. Hungary also supports the efforts of the neighboring states to join the EU and NATO, the goal being to use the Euroatlantic structures to achieve a specific approach to Hungarian minorities in these states and to bring pressure to bear on these states through the medium of the EU and NATO.

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—The interests of Hungary and of Hungarians living beyond its borders are identical, and any policy that would set them against one another must be condemned. (This is an ultimatum not only for the Hungarian political scene, but particularly for foreign countries!) The Hungarian Government considers the organizations of Hungarians outside Hungary to be its legitimate partners and supports their presence at international forums.

—Hungarian political representatives undertake to consult the organizations of Hungarians beyond the borders on all issues that concern them.

—Hungary will finance Hungarian minority political entities abroad from its state budget.

—Hungary and organizations of Hungarians from outside Hungarian state territory form an incessant process of cooperation and interaction.

This remarkable Budapest document, which has stirred the calm waters of central Europe, fundamentally affects states bordering on Hungary—Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Slovenia.

However, in the event of Hungary's integration into the EU and NATO, it would affect in an exceptionally severe manner also the states associated in these structures because the extremely destabilizing principles of Hungarian state policy would be implanted in them, especially in the following areas:

—the systematic destabilizing of neighboring states through the instigation of autonomy for Hungarian minorities;

—the direct linking up of ethnic Hungarian political entities abroad with the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian Parliament and their direct linkup with the Hungarian state budget;

—the placing of Hungary's relations with ethnic Hungarian parties abroad above bilateral interstate relations;

—the misuse of the institutions of the Euroatlantic structures for exerting pressure on neighboring states with Hungarian minorities on their territories.

No explanatory campaign, such as is now being offered by the Hungarian side, is needed to understand these facts. The conclusions from the Budapest conference have been enumerated so clearly that it is impossible not to understand them. Provided, of course, that the failure to comprehend is not deliberate and intentional.

Let us therefore wait and see whether the EU and NATO institutions will realize these facts, which, in the event of Hungary's admission, will cause them unimaginable problems, or whether they will have a tendency to pretend something else. At any rate, we must take their attitude extremely seriously.

This is because we had bitter experience with the belittling by supranational institutions of our neighbors' similar ambitious yearnings in 1938. The then belittling of the state of permanent escalation of minority extra rights and permanent capitulation in the face of this pressure led to a very cruel awakening, not only for us, but for the whole of Europe and the world at large.

Because even the then "peacemakers" succumbed to their own illusion that the partitioning and giving away of the nation and the state is a sufficient sacrifice to the Moloch of aggressiveness and territorial and national expansionism.

Slovakia: Protocol Signed With Russia on Military Academies

AU0108162396 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 1 Aug 96 p 2

[Unattributed report from the "Briefly at Home" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] A protocol giving Slovak Army officers an opportunity to study at Russian Federation Defense Ministry military academies has been signed at the Slovak Defense Ministry. It was signed on behalf of the Slovak side by Colonel M. Stegena, the director of the section for the development and provision of human resources, and on behalf of the Russian side by Colonel M. Lukin, the plenipotentiary of the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Slovakia: Defense Minister Sitek Outlines Planned Army Laws

AU0208095396 Bratislava OBRANA in Slovak 3 Aug 96 No 31 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek signed by "(K)"; place and date not given: "With the Defense Minister on the Planned Laws"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The existence for three years of the army of this independent and sovereign state has underlined the necessity of adopting appropriate laws to regulate matters within the Defense Ministry sector. The preparation of several important draft legal norms directly concerning Slovak Army personnel, and their discussion in the National Council of the Slovak Republic, is envisaged this year. We asked Defense Minister Jan Sitek for specific information.

[OBRANA] At what stage of preparation are the planned legal norms?

[Sitek] In preparing the draft laws, which will deal with issues relating to the Slovak Army, the Defense

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Ministry is proceeding in harmony with the Slovak Government's Plan for Legislative Tasks in 1996. The draft defense law, the law on the conditions of service for career soldiers, the draft law on remuneration for career soldiers, and the draft law on social provision for career soldiers are at the compilation stage. At present, all of the drafts are going through the interdepartmental comments procedure. They should be discussed in the defense minister's advisory board before the end of August. After the comments are worked in, the drafts will be submitted to the government's legislative council for consideration, and then to the Slovak Government for discussion. Deputies will deal with them thereafter in parliament. As far as the draft laws on the provision of defense and the military districts are concerned, these have been submitted to the State Defense Council for discussion.

[OBRANA] A basic military code is important for the everyday life of the forces and for the activity of commanders.

[Sitek] I agree with this statement, but the situation with the basic code is slightly more complicated. The draft has been compiled, but the approval of some of its passages depends on the adoption of the aforementioned laws. An important element is the fact that in the formulation of all laws and of the procedural regulations to them, we have to respect fully the Slovak Republic Constitution, especially Article 13, according to which duties can only be imposed on the basis of the law, within its confines, and while preserving basic rights and freedoms and the other valid generally binding legal regulations.

[OBRANA] At what stage are the so-called social laws?

[Sitek] On the basis of the resolution adopted at the 12th meeting of the State Defense Council and in harmony with the aforementioned government Plan for Legislative Tasks, we are preparing a law on remuneration for career soldiers and a draft law on social provision for career soldiers. The interdepartmental comments procedure was held in July. After the comments are worked in, we will discuss them at the August session of the minister's advisory board. I envisage that they will be discussed in the State Defense Council, and that the further appropriate legislative course of action will be taken so that they can be debated by the Slovak Government at the beginning of November. The next step will depend on its point of view. It is our aim to make sure that the two laws come into effect on 1 January 1997.

[OBRANA] The abolition of the service contribution is being talked about openly in connection with these laws.

[Sitek] The service contribution is provided at present in accordance with the appropriate paragraph of the law on certain conditions of service for soldiers, and will continue to be provided. Its function is highlighted even more in the prepared draft laws. Of course, the validity of the proposed solution depends on the decision of the National Council. In no way is the Defense Ministry drafting laws that would be more disadvantageous for Slovak Army personnel than the current laws. It is interesting that at meetings of an army-wide nature, I am informing the commanders of these matters. It is possible that the flow of information downwards is not functioning as it should. It is no problem, after the draft laws have been discussed in the minister's advisory board, to give them to the OBRANA editorial office for publication to keep army personnel better informed.

[OBRANA] But something else is being said among the troops. Certain so-called verified reports are circulating that misinform army personnel.

[Sitek] The various rumors and so-called guaranteed reports, spread almost at the speed of light, are the worst thing for the army. Some of them arise because various unverified reports are made public. I have the impression that sometimes they are merely the wishful thinking of a small number of people who try to increase their prestige in this inappropriate manner. It is much worse if certain functionaries from the Defense Ministry, at various meetings of units, consultative meetings, and gatherings of experts, say something that is not true and contribute themselves to spreading all sorts of misinformation. It is up to everyone to check the reliability of such reports; it is the responsibility of their authors. Then the stage is reached in which the impression is created about the Defense Ministry's management that it is proceeding against the department's personnel. These people do not realize, however, that, by their activity, they are trying to introduce politics where it does not belong and are creating a dangerous precedence for the politicization of the army. As defense minister, I cannot tolerate this.

Slovakia: Trade Unions Protest Power Price Increase

AU0208090096 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 1 Aug 96 p 2

[Report by "jk": "Englis: The Government Started an Avalanche"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The trade unionists consider the government decision on raising the price of electric power, water, sewage, and fuels beginning today to be a violation of the social partnership. The claim by Jozef Kalman, chairman of the Council for

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Economic and Social Agreement, that there would not be any increases before the end of the year is, according to Alojz Englis, president of the Confederation of Trade Unions [KOZ], a commitment to the public.

Moreover, Englis said at a briefing yesterday that although there were discussions on the Tripartite Council about the increase in the price of electric power, the government had decided on the prices of water and sewage beforehand, and fuels were also added to the package increase. "We believe that the government yielded to pressure from the manufacturers, and passed the burden of dealing with problems onto the population. This government measure can clearly induce social tensions. We are going to call a session of the KOZ Presidium probably for next Tuesday, and subsequently an assembly to deal with these issues. The government started an avalanche by the price increases," Englis added. At the same time, he appealed to the government to prepare proposals to adjust the subsistence minimum, and thereby respond to the increased cost of living. Namely, according to the trade unionists' calculation, the cost of living rose from July 1995 to June 1996 by 6.5 percent. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the subsistence minimum by 1 October or 1 November, at the latest. Emil Machyna, chairman of the KOVO trade union, said that the government decision on raising the price of electric power, water, sewage, and fuels without first discussing it with its social partners brought the trade unions into the position of movie extras. The last indexation of the subsistence minimum took place in Slovakia in June 1995. At the time, following the increase in prices of travel fares and the elimination of transport discounts, the cost of living rose 1.2 percent. The trade unionists expect an increase of 2 percent in the cost of living this August.

Slovakia: HZDS Secretary on Coalition Agreement Supplement

AU0108155896 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 1 Aug 96 p 3

[Interview with Gustav Krajci, secretary of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, by Pavel Kapusta; place and date not given: "Series of Talks Will Continue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The supplement to the coalition agreement, which is being assessed by the coalition partners, should eliminate the development of crises between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], the Slovak National Party [SNS], and the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]. This was the starting point of our interview with HZDS Secretary Gustav Krajci.

[Kapusta] Could you briefly outline the contents of this supplement?

[Krajci] It was drafted by a group of lawyers looking for ways to forestall crises of the type that emerged in the coalition in June. I suppose that it will contain certain safeguards guaranteeing that the coalition will endure and will vote jointly in parliament.

[Kapusta] Could you specify those safeguards in greater detail?

[Krajci] They should concern two basic levels. The first is political and should deal with the method of talks in the event of conflicting situations arising at various levels. The talks conducted in the spirit of the existing coalition agreement failed in a certain phase. Following disagreements, broader political bodies were to take up the issue, but these were not able to meet. In other words, it is necessary to find a mechanism whereby, during a crisis, a larger number of people will be involved in the flow of information. The second level concerns cooperation between parliamentary clubs, particularly mutual exchange of information and coordination of individual coalition steps. Legal safeguards should be part of the supplement as well. These will address the method of abrogating the coalition agreement in the event of violation of the agreed mechanisms.

[Kapusta] Are there within the framework of the supplement any ranges of issues on which you have not yet reached an agreement with your partners?

[Krajci] The supplement is a living document, and all three parties are making suggestions for extra provisions or changes. Of course there are disputed points, but I am convinced that a mechanism will be found to sort them out.

[Kapusta] Information has appeared in the press about planned talks with the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] and other opposition entities. What should they concern?

[Krajci] The SDL played a crucial role during the coalition crisis when it took the side of the HZDS and mentioned the possibility of its support for a minority government. However, in June we started a series of talks with all political entities represented in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR]. The aim of these talks was to clarify how to continue in this electoral term. Regrettably, we will not be able to communicate further with the Democratic Union [DU] because it gave us unacceptable conditions. This series of talks will, of course, continue. The first round of these talks produced certain conclusions, and the dialogue will develop further according to their fulfillment. I am thinking in particular of the reconstruction of the Slovak

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Television Council, National Property Fund bodies, the Special Supervisory Body [overseeing the activity of the secret service], and parliamentary committees. First and foremost, however, these talks should concern ways of stabilizing the political scene. It is necessary to realize that there are several alternatives for further political development. That is why we asked all partners if they want to go into early elections. Not a single political entity agreed to early elections. If that is the case, we need to clarify what we actually favor and agree on the second alternative, which must last for two years. After all, we know foreign countries respond negatively to permanent political confrontations, which benefit neither the politicians nor the citizens of Slovakia.

Slovakia: SDL's Migas Comments on Country's 'Isolation'

AU0108154996 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 1 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Slovak SDL Chairman Jozef Migas: "Isolation Does Not Benefit Anyone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It will soon be seven years since the barbed wire was removed from Europe's borders, the walls came tumbling down, and the two worlds existing until then were joined into one. It was a time filled with hope for something new and better. The peoples reared on the ideas of a certain civilization expected that they would build a new united Europe.

The decision is being made on which of the Central European states will be admitted into the EU and NATO. Unfortunately, the most recent statements from the U.S. Congress House of Representatives and Senate and German Chancellor H. Kohl exclude Slovakia from the list of candidates because of the defects in its democratic development. The cards are again being dealt in Europe. In this process, the Slovak Republic should not be shoved aside into the European "Balkans."

Such development alarms me. I ask, is there not a realistic danger that new "Berlin" walls will be raised in Moravia, Zakopane, and Sturovo? It would not be good for Slovakia if it were left out of the united Europe and its security structures. This scenario would not even be auspicious for Europe, whose history has already been marked by division. No one should be isolated in Europe. This is in the interest of the harmonious development and security of the whole of the old continent.

The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], however, considers admission into NATO to be a major step that has to be decided upon by the most democratic means; that is a referendum, a popular plebiscite. The citizen should be acquainted beforehand with the conditions for entry and the arguments for and against. He should have the opportunity to decide for himself on the basis of objective information. This is the government's duty to citizens.

I cannot, and I do not want to imagine Slovakia without Europe or Europe without Slovakia. The Socialist International's Committee for Central and East Europe, which met in Bratislava recently, has also—with the active participation of the SDL—expressed itself in this manner.

Slovakia: Article Views SDL's Migas Stance on Coalition

AU0108142996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 1 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by "(jo)": "Luptak, Slota, and Meciar Are Building a Wall in Europe Claims SDL Chairman Migas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—We are in a situation in which the implementation of the government's program is at risk and Slovakia is being struck off the list of EU and NATO candidates because of the defects in its democratic development. This statement was made yesterday by Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Chairman J. Migas. According to him, no one is reproaching Slovakia for or casting doubt on its independence. But independence does not mean isolation, said the SDL chairman. He asked whether we wanted a new wall in Europe, and how many bricks the ruling coalition had already laid in it. At the same time he said that while Luptak is digging the foundations, Slota is reinforcing them, and Meciar is adding the cement. Migas repeated that the SDL does not want to be in a fraternity with the ruling coalition or in a privatization conglomerate with the Christian Democratic Movement, Democratic Union, Hungarian Coalition, Slovak National Party, and Association of Workers of Slovakia. We want to be a third force, emphasized the SDL chairman.

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Hungary: Defense Minister on Integration With NATO

WS0108135296 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 3 Aug 96 p 34

[Interview with Hungarian National Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, by Tadeusz Olszanski; place and date not given: "Brother in Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Olszanski] The number of American soldiers stationed in Hungary is 3,000. Although Hungary has not joined NATO yet, the alliance has already entered its territory.

[Keleti] One of the bases of the international peacekeeping forces in Bosnia (IFOR) has been established in the town of Taszar, Hungary. The forces which we are hosting are not NATO forces, but IFOR, part of which is a Hungarian unit of engineering troops which is building bridges on the Sava River. It is doing this not only for American soldiers, but also for Polish and Swedish liaison officers of the northern group of IFOR, which is referred to as the Nord-Pol.

[Olszanski] Does Hungary feel more secure as a consequence?

[Keleti] It certainly does. For five years, we experienced the results of the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia. The war was waged near our borders, the borders were often violated; there were even cases of shooting or dropping bombs—in the town of Barcs, for instance.

[Olszanski] You have certainly begun closer cooperation with NATO. Will it facilitate Hungary's integration with the alliance?

[Keleti] I am not a fortune teller, but I believe that new countries will be admitted to NATO by the end of the century. I am unable to predict how exactly this will happen. All I know is that as soon as this year negotiations with the interested countries will begin. The admission of Hungary to NATO is a realistic possibility.

[Olszanski] What about the stand taken by Russia?

[Keleti] So far Russia has not submitted any reservations concerning Hungary. Russia's policies—to a lesser or a greater degree, which depends on its internal situation—envision opposition to the expansion of NATO. However, so far we have not encountered any official objection to our efforts to become a NATO member-state. When Prime Minister Gyula Horn visited Moscow a year ago, the issue of our integration with the alliance was looked upon as an internal affair of a sovereign Hungary.

[Olszanski] What about the readiness of the Hungarian Armed Forces to meet NATO requirements?

[Keleti] Right now none of the armed forces of the countries which are applying for NATO membership, incuding the Hungarian Armed Forces, meet the requirements of the alliance. It is impossible to achieve compatibility overnight—not only in terms of military hardware, which depends on money, but also in terms of the spirit, which depends on people themselves. For decades, a different way of thinking, a different philosophy was required in our Armed Forces. Still, it is worth recalling that when Spain was admitted to NATO 13 years ago, its Armed Fores were not fully adjusted, either. Spain was given some time, seven or eight years, to catch up with the others. As far as people are concerned, it is necessary to do the following: 1) to quickly introduce the English language—the common language used in NATO, particularly for officers; 2) to teach this language to lower-level cadres—noncommissioned officers—in order to avoid problems with presenting tactical situations on a map; and 3) to become familiar with command procedures at levels higher than a company, which we are learning only now, during exercises which are part of the "Partnership for Peace" program.

As far as military hardware is concerned, very soon we will launch three vital projects: defense against objects flying at low altitude; replacement of detection stations with new ones—not because they are Soviet-made, but because they are obsolete. Finally, we must also replace our aircraft with new planes—again, not because they are Soviet-made, but because they have already served long enough and their time is over. Thus, at the end of the 1990's, we will have to buy 30 new planes, which will be a huge expense. Of course, we will have to choose the best offer and make the purchase together with other partners, which will reduce the cost. It will be possible to cut our expenditures, because recently we have seen a greater supply of arms than demand for them in the world; also, we will pay for our military hardware in installments.

[Olszanski] Will the traditions of the Polish-Hungarian brotherhood-in-arms stand the test in NATO as well?

[Keleti] I am convinced that it will, although it will be a difficult test. I am all for competition in our striving to join NATO, but this cannot spell the end of cooperation within the Visegrad Group. Regardless of the unique character of each country, and which we should keep, it would be bad if we found ourselves in a race in the area of military hardware, if we tried to outbid each other. This would only make integration with NATO more difficult for our four countries, whose chances are certainly the biggest. Thus, if we are able

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to continue cooperating with each other—which is not very easy because there is one country which does not consider this indispensable—then we will find ourselves in NATO sooner by supporting each other rather than trying to reach our destination separately.

[Olszanski] Thank you for the interview.

Hungary: FIDESZ Opens Internet World Wide Web Page

AU3107125296 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 31 Jul 96 p 4

[Correspondent's report: "FIDESZ on Internet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Every basic document of the Federation of Young Democrats-Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP] will be available of Internet from now on.

Jozsef Szajer, head of the FIDESZ group in Parliament, described the unprecedented information opportunities on Internet, and he also provided relevant statistics: An increasing number of the technical intelligentsia get their information from the Internet, and this service is becoming increasingly popular with the younger generation. FIDESZ will make the relevant documents available mainly in English and German, and will also provide information that has so far been available only after lengthy searches in libraries. Thus from now on, everyone will be able to wander at his will in the past, present, and future of this party, and FIDESZ will also publish its own newsletter on Internet. The Internet address is the following: www.fidesz.hu.

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B-H: Assembly Blames Butrus-Ghali, UNPROFOR for Fall of Towns

LD0108200296 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly is continuing. Our colleague Raska Denjalic reports live for Bosnia-Herzegovina Television:

[Denjalic] After a break, the seven-member parliamentary commission proposed draft conclusions consisting of 12 points. The assembly endorsed the conclusions. The following are the most important:

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly maintains that the international community is responsible for allowing the Bosnian Serb aggressors to commit unprecedented acts of genocide and massacres against the Bosniaks [Muslims] of Srebrenica and Zepa, the protected demilitarized areas. The international community had information that the aggressors were preparing attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa. The Republic's Presidency, Government, and Foreign Ministry informed the international community about it in good time on several occasions asking for the protection of Srebrenica and Zepa.

The assembly maintains that UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commanders are directly responsible because they refused to allow NATO forces to protect the demilitarized areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, for which there is sufficient reliable evidence.

The assembly, therefore, demands that the United Nations and the UN Security Council [UNSC] examine their responsibility. The republican parliament also demands that the Hague tribunal invite Butrus-Ghali, Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy, and General Bertrand Janvier as witnesses in connection with the genocide against the people of Srebrenica and Zepa.

As far as the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Ministry of Interior police are concerned, it is said in the conclusions that, due to the arms embargo imposed on our country and the UNSC resolution regarding the demilitarized area of Srebrenica, they could do nothing more to protect and defend Srebrenica. The state organizations have been given the task of examining possible illegal activities in Srebrenica during and after the town's blockade and reporting to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly on the findings.

Another conclusion of the assembly is that one-sided reports saying that not enough had been done for Srebrenica and that Srebrenica had been sacrificed are unfounded.

A debate on missing persons is under way at present. Jasmin Odabasic, deputy chairman of the state commission in charge of missing persons, is speaking. The assembly will be in session until about 2100 this evening. The session will resume tomorrow.

B-H: Croats Reportedly Agree to Herzeg-Bosnia Dissolution

AU3107134896 Paris AFP in English 1331 GMT 31 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 31 (AFP)—Separatist Bosnian Croats have proposed dissolving their mini-state in southern Bosnia in the next few days, the Croatian presidency said in a statement released here.

Bosnian Croat leaders have proposed "transforming" the mini-state of Herzeg-Bosnia into a "political community" of Croats, as it was before the Croats announced the creation of Herzeg-Bosnia in mid-1993, the statement said.

B-H: Zubak Reacts to Statement on Abolishing Herzeg-Bosnia

LD0108125696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak has told journalists in Mostar about yesterday's meeting of the Federation Forum in Sarajevo and commented on Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic's statements following his meeting with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb yesterday. Here is Antun Mrkonjic reporting from Mostar:

[Mrkonjic] I learned about the meeting with President Tudjman, which was held at Ejup Ganic's request, from the Croatian president's office, which is unusual, President Zubak said at the beginning. Ganic arrived in Zagreb to convey the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency's official stance that Herzeg-Bosnia has to be abolished by a certain deadline, or else the Dayton agreement would be put in jeopardy, which would have a negative impact on the Federation and mutual relations. According to Zubak, these are coordinated actions by Muslim leaders. He substantiated this by the fact that the abolishing of Herzeg-Bosnia was demanded almost simultaneously by [Bosnian Prime Minister] Hasan Muratovic in Geneva and [Bosnian President] Alija Izetbegovic in Sarajevo.

As the president of the Federation and a representative of the Croat people, I reacted very strongly to this, Kresimir Zubak said. International factors know that Herzeg-Bosnia is not the main problem preventing the Federation from taking hold. Problems lie on the other

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side, Zubak added, and said that Herzeg-Bosnia is only a pretext for Muslim weaknesses. The political leadership of the Muslim people is in crisis. It must cope with social unrest and it is trying—for example, Alija Izetbegovic before a demonstration of people maimed in the war recently—to blame the Croats for it. Croatia and the Croatian nation are not afraid of ultimatums or of the militarily much stronger side, so they will not bow now, either.

We can prove with valid arguments that the Dayton agreement envisages starting from square one and a two-track transfer of authorities to the bodies of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zubak said, adding that Herzeg-Bosnia has retained only those ministries that are not within the jurisdiction of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but of counties.

Speaking about a meeting of the Forum of the Federation in Sarajevo yesterday, President Zubak said that a statement by John Kornblum [U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs] totally coincided with the Croat policy. He clearly told the Muslim side that all responsibilities of the republic had to be transferred to the Federation, apart from the ministries of foreign affairs and trade.

If statements by Michael Steiner [deputy international coordinator for civilian affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina] encouraged them, then those made by John Kornblum did not, Zubak said. The sides have been given until the end of next week to submit the timetable for the transfer of responsibilities to the federal bodies.

In conclusion, President Zubak said that the Croat side would submit to the EU administration in Mostar a new proposal for the solution of the newly created situation. The proposal is that the town council should be made up of 16 Croat and 16 Muslim deputies, while the remaining five seats should remain vacant until a final decision on the election results from the polling station in Bonn is reached.

B-H: Report Details Kornblum, Menzies Talks in Mostar

AU0108152096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 1 Aug 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the EU building in Mostar, John Kornblum, assistant U.S. secretary of state in charge of Europe and Canada and U.S. envoy for the Balkans, met Special EU Envoy Martin Garrod and mayors of both parts of Mostar, Safet Orucevic and Mijo Brajkovic. The meeting was held behind closed doors. The first to appear before journalists was Safet Orucevic, who said he had informed Mr. Kornblum of the situation in the city. According to Orucevic, Herzeg-Bosnia is the key to the Mostar situation. Until Herzeg-Bosnia is abolished, there will be no united Mostar or Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mayor of eastern Mostar said. The next to address journalists was Mijo Brajkovic, mayor of western Mostar.

[Begin Brajkovic recording] We talked about the situation in Mostar and how it can be overcome. The Croat side gave two proposals. The city electoral commission proclaimed the Bonn elections invalid, and we hold exclusively to that. Nevertheless, the Croat side wants to continue the process as the worst thing is the status quo that exists today. We suggested that for the time being each side give 16 representatives—without these five other ones—until the main or the central city electoral commission proclaims the elections valid. The mayor should be elected and full confidence given to Sir Martin Garrod. We also said that elections in Mostar should be held normally in September, just as in all other municipalities. [end recording]

Addressing journalists, John Kornblum, assistant U.S. secretary of state in charge of Europe and Canada, said that he came to Mostar to acquaint himself with the situation in the city.

[Begin Kornblum recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] In talks with political leaders, we wanted to demonstrate to everyone here the U.S. readiness to build up the Federation and the joint administration in Mostar. The EU-organized electoral process was well done, and we think that the authorities here should be formed on those bases. There are some question regarding the regularity of some of the electoral results, above all those in Germany, but the proposals made by the EU and others make it possible to take a good road toward continuing the process. [end recording]

John Kornblum also told journalists that he is leaving this evening for Washington, where he will inform Presidents Clinton and Tudjman of the outcome of his Mostar visit. Kornblum did not want to comment on the proposal made by the Croat side and said that the talks about solving the Mostar situation are led by the EU, not the United States.

In addition to Ambassador Menzies and John Kornblum, U.S. ambassador in Vienna Swannee Hunt, who is said to be a close friend of President Clinton, also visited Mostar today. Ambassador Hunt arrived in Mostar on the occasion of the opening of her exhibition of photographs, which is being held in the building of the Bosniak Youth Center today. Apart from her job as ambassador, Mrs. Hunt also deals in professional

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photography, and her works have been exhibited in almost all [words indistinct]. Mostar citizens will have the opportunity to see them today.

B-H: Croats Reject EU Ultimatum on Mostar Cooperation

AU0208135696 Paris AFP in English 1346 GMT 2 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Neum, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Aug 2 (AFP)—Hardline Bosnian Croats, meeting in special session here, on Friday rejected an EU ultimatum to resume cooperation with rival Moslems in the divided southern Bosnian city of Mostar, a senior Croat official said.

The European Union has threatened to pull out of the city unless the Croats end a boycott of the city council elected in a June 30 ballot which the Croats lost to a Moslem-led coalition.

B-H: Mostar Croat Mayor on Election Validity, Unified City

LD0108180196 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The chairman of the Mostar municipal council, Mijo Brajkovic [mayor of Croat-controlled western Mostar], today met John Kornblum, the US assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian issues. Blasko Raguz reports:

[Begin recording] [Raguz] After the meeting, which was held behind closed doors and lasted a little longer than half an hour, Brajkovic, the chairman of the Mostar municipal council, was first to address the assembled local and foreign journalists. He said:

[Brajkovic] [Passage omitted] It is all about the Dayton agreement again. You know very well that the Dayton agreement has so far been violated four times in Mostar but the Croat side has never been responsible for this.

[Raguz] Asked by the journalists who was authorized to proclaim the elections valid or not, Brajkovic said:

[Brajkovic] The law, Article 93 of the law, says that the city election commission has the power to proclaim the elections valid or not, not the ombudsman. The city election commission has this authority. We lodged a complaint with the federal supreme court against the ombudsman. Everything should follow this legal procedure and we can work normally until the decision has been reached.

[Raguz] Foreign journalists wanted to hear what Brajkovic thought about the future of Mostar:

[Brajkovic] The future of Mostar is a normal one—we live and work normally, as you can see, there are no problems whatsoever.

[Unidentified correspondent] And if the other side does not accept your proposal?

[Brajkovic] If the other side does not accept it, they will have to talk to the EU. We have nothing against the other side. We work with them normally.

[Raguz] Asked whether the united Mostar had a future, Brajkovic said:

[Brajkovic] What does it mean, a united Mostar? Mostar is united—you can see that cars are moving from both sides. What does it mean? A united Mostar cannot be built on brotherhood and unity. Yugoslavia no longer exists. Mostar will exist, that is sure. We have learned to live with everyone. We went to school with these people, kept each other company, and we shall do this again. But this will be based on interest—each should have its own identity, both the Bosniaks [Muslims] and the Croats. We never give rude statements, do we? Thank you. [passage omitted]

B-H: Article Describes Muslim Crimes Against Bugojno

AU2907191996 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24, 25, 26 Jul 96

[Article in three installments by Marko Barisic]

[24 Jul p 3]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Berislav Pusic: I Saw Mujahidin Camps and Beheaded Bodies of Croats

Ever since the conflict between the Serbs and the Muslims ended, Croat authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been trying to discover the truth about the Croat civilians and soldiers who died, were missing, or taken prisoner. UN representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina have also insisted on that. However, despite all the agreements signed, it is very difficult to make any progress toward this purely humanitarian task. For instance, Muslim authorities are not willing to provide any information about the people who were forcibly taken from Bugojno three years ago. On 25 February, after the Dayton agreement, Generals Roso and Delic signed an agreement on the exchange of living and dead prisoners and the excavation of mass graves on both sides. The intention of the agreement was to ensure proper burials for the dead and relieve families' concerns about the situation or places of burial of their missing loved ones.

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However, certain parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not shown good faith toward this effort. Consequently, Bildt's deputy, Michael Steiner, recently forced all three sides in Banja Luka (25 June) to sign a new agreement. The agreement enables each party to excavate two mass graves regardless of their location. Furthermore, excavation sites are to be protected by IFOR [Implementation Force] and supervised by the UN Department for Humanitarian Matters.

Thirty-Six Croats Executed

In accordance with the agreement, the Croat side chose the region of central Bosnia, or more specifically, the municipality of Travnik. In that region, in the village of Maljine, which is about 10 km from Travnik, 36 Croats were shot by the mujahidin on 8 June 1993. The exhumation team consisted of: Berislav Pusic, head of the office for the exchange of prisoners of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia; pathologist Robert Kirschner, member of the UN exhumation expert team for Bosnia-Herzegovina; Jean Daniel Bieler, head of the UN Department for Refugees and Humanitarian Matters; and Marija Gajanovic-Definis, forensic expert from the Firule clinic in Split, who conducted the exhumation procedure. In accordance with the agreement, representatives of the Serb and Muslim side were also present: Dragan Bulajic and Amor Masovic, respectively.

On 14 July, when the team escorted by strong IFOR security forces reached the foot of the Vlasic mountain, near the villages of Maljine and Bikosevo, they began manual preparation of the site for their work. Berislav Pusic said that the entire team was very surprised to see that the mass grave was covered by layers of garbage. The local authorities had probably tried to hide the grave by putting garbage on it. However, the excavation began despite the unpleasant atmosphere created by this unexpected act by the Muslims. According to Pusic, the team first discovered two complete skeletons, which would help make identification possible. The third body was equally well preserved, and a man who witnessed the exhumation immediately recognized the body of his mother by the remnants of her clothes. The remains of bodies had been wrapped in blankets, and most of them had not been buried—some soil had simply been shoveled over them. However, Pusic said, the team and all who witnessed the excavation were very surprised to see that seven out of the nine bodies in the grave had been decapitated. The team found skeletons with lower jaws and teeth, while upper jaws and upper parts of skulls were missing.

Unprecedented in European Wars

Everybody was speechless, because decapitated bodies are seldom associated with European wars. Although the scene was horrifying, the Muslim side did not do as much as look into the grave and try to explain. Berislav Pusic said that the Serb representative Dragan Bulajic was the only one who had something to say: "Thank God, Serbs are not the only war criminals. There are Muslims, too." It was a morbid and harsh statement, but also true, Pusic said, because the results of the excavation shocked everyone. In previous excavations experts could tell by the skull whether a person had been shot in the back of the head or hit with something on the head. In the case of the murdered Croats, heads were not even there.

Perhaps the Croats from central Bosnia who survived the massacres by the mujahidin—citizens of Islamic countries who came to Bosnia-Herzegovina to fight on the Muslim side—know best what happened to those people and how they died. "We have people who witnessed the murder of a Croat named Popovic," Berislav Pusic said. "They had to sit in a circle and watch as the mujahidin decapitated that man. Then his head was placed on a tray and passed around, and the next victim had to kiss it. The process was repeated." The rest of the mujahidin rite is too horrible to describe, and we do not want to publish photographs of beheaded bodies, as we have to protect the dignity of the excavated victims and their families. We have not managed to find out whether such traditions are dictated by the religion in the countries from which the mujahidin came, or whether Islamic war regulations specify such a horrible method of execution, especially as most of the murdered Croats in central Bosnia were prisoners of war. The Croats who were shot in Maljine had surrendered to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army because they were guaranteed they would not be harmed. However, all men in uniforms were taken away and civilians were lined up in front of a wall of one house. Pusic showed us a photograph he took during his visit. "There are still big blood stains on the walls of that house," he said. Judging by the remains found in mass graves, other people were not lucky enough to be executed that way. They were apparently handed over to the mujahidin groups who executed them according to Islamic traditions.

Mujahidin in Croat Houses

After all mortal remains relevant for identification were gathered from the mass graves in Maljine and Bikosevo, the exhumation team escorted by IFOR went toward other graves. They came to Orasac, a village that used to have a Croat population, and as Pusic said:

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"Our dead are there, too." Although all preliminary arrangements for the visit had been made, Pidra, the representative of the operative bodies of the Security Service Center in Zenica, told the team that "the center had no further instructions." They actually prohibited further excavation. Robert Kirschner spent a whole hour trying to persuade them to allow the excavation, as the agreement said that the team could visit two sites in two days. Despite all efforts on the part of Kirschner and Pusic, Muslim authorities refused to cooperate.

Most of the team knew why. On their way to Orasac, they saw many mujahidin, or persons from Islamic countries, who drove freely on the roads or stood in the villages. They obviously inhabited Croat houses, as the region around Guca Gora used to be populated mainly by Croats. However, the village of Orasac was really something to see. According to Pusic, the formerly Croat village was surrounded by barbed wire. Like a huge camp, it had a gate and a guard. The team was told that they could not enter the village without special permission. Local Muslims said that "El Mudzahid" [name as published] unit was located in the village, still under the command of the 3d Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and its commander, Sakib Mahmuljin. A mujahidin group is still treated as a regular unit within the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and it does not end there. Many Muslim politicians and senior officers of the Muslim Army reportedly frequented the unit in Orasac, organized celebrations, and decorated the soldiers. All those events took place several months after the United States declared that the village was a base of, as they said, Iranian advisers who had to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the meantime, the U.S. military program "Equip and Train" began, but the mujahidin stayed. Instead of leaving or at least trying to stay hidden, the Iranian instructors make themselves at home, and Muslim authorities do not try to hide them or send them away. On the contrary: In Pusic's opinion, Muslim authorities cannot carry out any plan or decision in that region without the consent of the mujahidin. Local authorities had probably intended to allow the excavation, but the Orasac mujahidin, who live there with their families, did not agree, and their wish had to be complied with.

Therefore, the Croat side will have to wait for new permission which, they hope, will be given by Sarajevo soon under pressure from the United Nations. Nobody knows how soon that will be. Berislav Pusic informed us that the Croat side was looking for bodies of 36 persons from central Bosnia. Only nine have been found so far, and all of those were bodies of civilians. Except for two children, the average age of the victims was 75, which proves that they could not have been soldiers. However, they were executed in an utterly horrible way, as apparent from the beheaded bodies that the team excavated. We do not have to look too far to find those who committed the crime—they are still in central Bosnia, in mujahidin camps like Orasac, which is probably the reason for the barbed wire.

[25 Jul 96 p 3]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Truth About Mlaco's Crime Against the 'Missing' Persons From Bugojno

Almost three years have passed and nothing has been discovered about the situation of the prisoners of war who were taken by force from the Bugojno prison. In early November 1993, every trace was lost of the group of "26 [number as published] missing Croats," as they are known. Muslim authorities have refused to give any official information. In the meantime, four out of 26 were reported dead by private sources, and one person from the list of the missing came back alive.

This case is special because 11 out of 21 persons from Bugojno who are still missing were registered by the International Committee of Red Cross [ICRC]. Even Bosnian Serbs refrained from killing persons registered by that institution. The reason is simple: Killing registered persons is a violation of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war.

However, Dzevad Mlaco, presently mayor of Bugojno, apparently did not heed any conventions. Amor Masovic was obviously aware of that during the recent Sarajevo meeting. The Croat side inquired about the missing persons from Bugojno, and he said that there was not a single living Croat from Bugojno left in the Muslim prisons. He added that he could not help in that matter, as Dzevad Mlaco was the only person responsible for that.

When Berislav Pusic, head of the office for the exchange of prisoners of war, published that statement, Masovic and Dzevad Mlaco issued denials. Mlaco even maintained that the missing Bugojno Croats "pretended to be missing." However, that was not what Masovic told Pusic in private.

The Croat side and the UN representatives, who had organized the meeting, witnessed what really went on during that meeting.

Berislav Pusic recounted the meeting: "That day in Sarajevo we had to choose two mass graves that we wanted to visit under the UN escort. We suggested two locations in the villages of Maljine and Bikosevo. Then Dragica Galic, member of the Croat team, suddenly

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asked Michael Steiner if he knew anything about the present situation of the 26 missing Croats from Bugojno.

What Masovic Said

"Amor Masovic spoke then and said that he was sure that there were no living Croats from Bugojno in the Muslim prisons. I was shocked, as that was the first time that the Muslim side actually declared those missing Croats dead. I immediately asked for Mr. Steiner's support in our request to excavate the mass grave of the missing persons from Bugojno instead of the graves in Maljine and Bikosevo. Masovic then said that he had no influence in Bugojno, with Dzevad Mlaco, and that Alija Izetbegovic was the only person who could help. We had to settle for Maljine and Bikosevo."

The following day Berislav Pusic sent a written request to the Muslim side to turn over the bodies of the Croats from Bugojno by 19 July or at least give information on their present situation. There has been no response. We contacted Dragica Galic in Baska Voda where she lives as a refugee, and she told us about the Sarajevo meeting: "I inquired about the persons from Bugojno who were taken away by force. Those 26 persons were taken away from the camp and their fate remains unknown; my husband was among them. I demanded to hear the truth, regardless of whether it was good or bad. I just wanted the truth."

According to Dragica Galic, Masovic told her: "I am sorry, but there is nobody from Bugojno in our prisons." If that is true, Dragica Galic went on, they must have been murdered. Accepting the painful possibility, she requested that their bodies be delivered to the Croat side. Masovic told her that he had no legal authority in Bugojno—according to Dragica Galic, he said exactly what Berislav Pusic published later.

According to those reports, which can be confirmed by Michael Steiner and all who were present at the meeting, Amor Masovic and Dzevad Mlaco lied when they denied Masovic's statements. It is clear why they lied. The Muslims, under the leadership of Dzevad Mlaco, chairman of the War Presidency of Bugojno, committed such crimes against the Croats that they will probably receive an "invitation" to The Hague soon enough.

The conflict between the Muslims and Croats in Bugojno ended approximately around 25 July 1993. The HVO [Croatian Defense Council] members and most of the Croat civilians from Bugojno were taken to prisoner camps. The most notorious of the camps was Stadion [Croatian for stadium], actually the football stadium of a local football team named Iskra. For over two months Dzevad Mlaco refused to allow the ICRC into this and other camps to register Croat prisoners of war and civilian inmates. During that period—note that it was after the conflicts ended—many imprisoned persons were murdered.

Killed on the Streets, in the Yards, in Trenches

Survivors testified that in those days anybody could kill a Croat anywhere: on the street, in their houses, in their yards, or while they were digging trenches. Soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army were free to enter the camp and take two or three Croats away and beat them to death, or take them to an undisclosed location. The rest of the inmates would later hear that those persons were dead. That was information if nothing else. The case of the 26 missing Croats from Bugojno is different: Their fate remains unknown.

Mario Subasic, Vinko Ivkovic, Stipica Zelic, Mihovil Strujic, Frano Jezidzic, Jadranko Gvozden, Niko Dzaja, Marko Bartulovic, Nikica Milos, and Branko Crnjak were not registered by the ICRC. They were taken away, usually two by two, from the Prusac camp (Crnjak was taken away from Stadion) and that was the last anyone had heard from them. However, before they were taken away they managed to write messages to their displaced families. They usually wrote that they were alive and hoped to see their children, wives, or parents very soon.

Those pieces of paper with the messages and dates are the last bits of evidence the families have that their members were alive when the messages were written. Almost three years have passed since then, and no information has been available. The fate of the persons who were taken away by force from the Stadion camp is the same. Tearful members of their families showed us letters that said: We have been registered by the ICRC, and we hope to get out of the camp alive and quite soon.

On 30 September 1993, the following persons from Bugojno were registered: Pero Crnjak, Dragan Erkapic, Zdravko Juricic, Pero Kovacevic, Ivo Milos, Nikica Milos, and Niko Zlatunic. They are still missing. Mlaco's soldiers tried to stop the ICRC from registering all prisoners by transferring imprisoned Croats to other camps on the day scheduled for registration. Thanks to the persistence of the ICRC representatives, Miroslav Dilber, Zoran Galic, Anto Markulj, and Dragan Milicevic were registered on 20 October 1993. Survivors said that they considered the registration by the ICRC to be a guarantee that they would get out of Bugojno alive.

However, Dzevad Mlaco did not pay much attention to war regulations and the Geneva convention. From mid-October to mid-November, more than three months after the hostilities ended, presently missing persons were taken away by force. According to one of the

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survivors, Zeljko Milos, one of the persons who was taken to the mujahidin camp in Mehurici, Muslims used imprisoned Croats to teach their recruits how to kill enemies. That was probably an arrangement made by Dzevad Mlaco and the mujahidin, because we know the names of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army soldiers who took Croats away from the camps.

Who Commanded the Camp

For instance, Kukavica, the person in charge of the camp, took Dragan Milicevic away for an "interrogation." Marko Bartulovic was taken away by Enes Sijamija, deputy head of the military police of the MOS [extension unknown]. Most prisoners were taken away by Nihad Sabic, member of the military police of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. However, prisoners could not be taken away without the permission of Enes Mandzic, head of the security service of the Stadion camp, and Nisvet Gasan, commander of the camp, or his deputy, someone named Cetin. The three of them were under the direct command of Dzevad Mlaco.

Despite the constant efforts of the Croat side, especially the Bugojno municipal authorities-in-exile, there has been no reliable information available on the missing persons. The only certain fact is that removing them from the camps and hiding the truth about them is a violation of all Geneva conventions and, actually, a war crime. According to our information, the ICRC will take part in the investigation, because it is its duty to find out the situation of persons registered by its representatives. Despite Masovic's acknowledgment that the missing Croats from Bugojno are not alive, Dzevad Mlaco refused to admit that or hand over their bodies.

Mlaco will clearly try to stall the investigation, since he would certainly incriminate himself by providing any information. However, the amount of evidence against him—in this and other crimes—is increasing so rapidly that he will probably be dismissed from the post of chairman of the Club of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] Representatives in the Federal Assembly in Sarajevo.

Croat representatives will not agree to discuss the laws of their common state with a war criminal, as Mlaco's actions in Bugojno revealed that he did not care whether a person was a soldier or a civilian, registered by the ICRC or not. Mlaco ordered murders according to his personal preferences several months after the hostilities ended, having mujahidin groups perform the executions.

What happened in his camp, the Stadion? Croats who were first imprisoned in the Serb camp at Manjaca and later in Mlaco's Stadion said that Manjaca was a hotel when compared to Bugojno. Dzevad Mlaco apparently knew how to prepare horror scenes for the imprisoned Croats.

[26 Jul p 3]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Bugojno Had Its Auschwitz

In late July 1993, when the Muslim authorities were established in Bugojno and its surroundings, Dzevad Mlaco ordered the formation of camps for the imprisoned HVO members. Besides soldiers, he gradually imprisoned most of the Croat male inhabitants of Bugojno regardless of their age. He seemed to pay special attention to imprison every prominent Croat. He first established concentration camps in the basement of the high school building, in the furniture store, in Vojin Paleksic elementary school, and in the bank. People were later imprisoned in the school that used to be run by nuns and in various garages and basements.

At the same time, Mlaco prepared to open a bigger camp that could hold the majority of the imprisoned Croat soldiers and civilians. He chose the football stadium of the Iskra team. First, he had the stadium surrounded by barbed wire, mine fields laid behind it, and watchtowers with machine guns placed on both ends. Then he transferred the majority of prisoners from the improvised prisons mentioned earlier to the stadium. Approximately 800 Croats spent almost eight months in the stadium under incredibly difficult conditions. The survivors of the Stadion camp call it simply the Auschwitz of Bugojno.

Miljenko Juricic, whose brother Zdravko—a mathematics and physics teacher—is still on the list of the missing, explained: "I was the headmaster of the high school in Bugojno for 12 years, and I never had any confrontations. They asked me to come for an interrogation and I went, thinking they might need some information from me. Besides, I believed that my Muslim neighbors would help me if there were any misunderstandings. To my surprise, I was arrested and taken into the school basement. Later on, I was transferred to the Stadion camp, where I stayed for almost eight months. I was eventually exchanged."

Beginning his story about the camp, Mr. Juricic sighed and nodded his head as if he could not believe he had managed to survive all that: "About 300 Croats were huddled in an area that measured approximately 75 square meters. There was one small room with a shower in it, and 14 persons slept in its 7.5 square meters. We were squeezed in there so tightly that we all had to sleep on our sides—there was not enough space for anyone

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to sleep on their back. We had one toilet that could not even flush in the beginning, so the excrements flowed into the hall. We had to live in that unbearable stench. If people had to use the toilet during the night, they had to walk through all that dirt and then come back to the room where we mostly sat, as there was not enough space to lie down. Plastic foil was spread over all the windows, and we were not allowed to remove it. The camp was horrible."

Prisoner in His Own School

Principal Ante Mustapic was imprisoned in the basement of his own high school. "In the beginning there were about 140 Croats in a room measuring 45 square meters. We had no water, no toilet—we were actually deprived of basic conditions for life." He was later transferred to the Stadion camp. During his imprisonment in Bugojno, two Muslim families lived in his house in Brela, near Makarska [Croatia]. While they lived there for free and enjoyed the sea, Mustapic—like other inmates of the Stadion camp—began to look more and more like a skeleton each month. An average Croat prisoner lost about 30 kilograms. That was especially obvious in the exchange of prisoners between the Croats and Muslims on 19 March 1994. The Croats who were released from Bugojno looked like living corpses and were barely capable of walking, and the Muslims released from Heliodrom at Mostar looked almost normal when compared with them. It was a consequence of systematic starvation. A daily meal of the Bugojno prisoners consisted of boiled lentils and one slice of bread. They got beans once a week. A slight improvement came along at the end of November, when their relatives were occasionally allowed to bring them some food from home. All those facts led the representatives of the international community to the conclusion that Stadion at Bugojno was absolutely the worst prisoner camp in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, they reached that conclusion after considering only the housing and nourishment conditions. They would probably be interested to hear about what they did not see. Miljenko Juricic said: "At 2300 hours we would hear cars coming to the camp. Certain prisoners were called and taken away. They brought them back several hours later and threw them among us in an unconscious state, all beaten up. The older people among us always knew what would happen, so we saved some water to sprinkle on the victims and keep them from dying before our eyes."

We asked him about his brother who was in the camp with him. "My brother usually sat with me. One day at about 2300 hours the guards called his and another prisoner's name and told them to come with them. I asked him if he was told where he was being taken to, but he just waved his hand. When they left, I climbed to the window and removed the plastic foil a little. I could see the guards tying his hands and leading him across the stream, into the Bosnia-Herzegovina Bank building. We lost every trace of him after that. We have really been persistent in our attempts to find out something about him. There were people who were fair, people who tried to help us in our search. However, they were not allowed into the bank, and we have not received any information about him."

From the Bank Into Death

Other witnesses said that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Bank building was a place where people were beaten up and tortured. After they were "processed" in the bank, Croat prisoners were either taken to be executed or to an undisclosed location. "We thought everything would be all right after we were registered by the ICRC," Miljenko Juricic said. "My number was 368928, and my brother's number was 368927. We were registered on 20 August 1993, and he wrote to his wife: 'We have been registered, and they cannot hurt us anymore.' He was taken away later, and he has been on the list of the missing ever since." There are other cases that show how cheap a life of a Croat was in those days in Bugojno. For instance, Niko Grabovac was taken out of the shelter and killed in front of the bank; Pavka Maros was killed on her own porch by her neighbor Enes Manjusak, who is still at large in Bugojno; Franjo Kirn, born in 1907, was killed with an ax by Adem Tankovic, who still lives in his victim's house. Many other Croats lost their lives in attempts to visit their homes and see whether there was anything left. Ivo Viskovic was burned to death; Ana Lozic was killed on her porch; and five members of the Milos family were murdered in the village of Gracanica, in the house of Ferid Custa.

The names of all Bugojno Croats and their murderers have been registered and this shows that most of the crimes were committed by the soldiers of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Those cases were not accidents. Homicides were committed, houses burned down or blown up in order to drive the few remaining Croats out and complete the ethnic cleansing of the town. There are less than 1,000 Croats in Bugojno today. Their former population is best described by the fact that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] got most of the votes in the 1991 elections. Here are more statistics: About 1,500 Croat houses have been blown up or burned down and thus completely demolished; about 1,000 have been plundered; about 3,000 apartments previously occupied by Croats have been plundered and are now occupied by Muslim tenants. Catholic churches and cemeteries have

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been demolished, and few have remained untouched. Dzevad Mlaco has apparently managed to carry out his plan: Even if the implementation of all federal agreements on the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes began, it would be impossible to do in Bugojno, and it would also be impossible to establish the structure of authorities as it was in 1991.

Persistence in Crime

All Mlaco's actions were undoubtedly criminal: He formed the Stadion camp in Bugojno; he ordered executions of Croat soldiers and civilians; he commanded the systematic demolition of Croat homes, churches, and cemeteries. Therefore, it is a duty both of the Croat side and the international community not to accept the results of those actions and not to recognize the fait accompli. Perhaps they should take the organization of mothers and wives of the missing Bugojno Croats as their model—they said they would never stop trying to find out the truth about their loved ones. "Mlaco must know that we will never leave him alone. He will have to give us answers to our questions someday, regardless of where he is—in Bugojno, in Sarajevo, or abroad," they said. Likewise, Croat prisoners will never forget the Stadion camp. Perhaps football games will be played there again soon, or celebrations will be held, but that place will forever stay a reminder of one of the worst camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was Mlaco's private Auschwitz.

B-H: Federation Ombudsmen: Legal State Does Not Function

AU0208101596 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jul 96 p 7

[Report by Azra Alickovic: "Politics Above Rights"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the authorities often ignore them, particularly the municipal and cantonal leaders, the ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoy ever greater trust among the citizens. The total of 8,000 interviews and of around 6,000 open cases confirm this. Beside the breaches of human rights, when it comes to houses, apartments (which we have already written about), in the last few months an upsetting passivity can be noticed, that is, an inaction on the part of the authorities, in particular of the police.

Breaches of the Right to Work

In the words of Vera Jovanovic, one of the three federal ombudsmen, on the reintegrated areas of Sarajevo people report to the police thefts, attacks, physical maltreatment, misappropriation.... The police arrive at the scene of the crime, and then they either do not report the attacks or submit reports against unknown perpetrators. Although in many cases the perpetrators are known, the police does not react. Beside Sarajevo, such cases exist in Tuzla, in the western part of Mostar. In this part of Mostar, Jovanovic says, not only does the police not assist during evictions, but in some cases they even decide themselves who should move out, and then put their own members into those flats.

In the first half of the year in the Mostar office of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina ombudsmen 815 cases have been opened, the majority of which refers to the breaches of the right to work and of property rights. The breaches of the right to work are most present in Livno. The ombudsmen also point out that there is no political will for the return of citizens in Stolac. And whereas the UNHCR must organize the reparation of the houses, the ombudsmen demand that the materials should be given to the Bosniaks, who should repair their houses by themselves. And everything would be all right if human rights were stronger than politics in Stolac, and if people realized that they have to go on living together. However, the ombudsmen Esad Muhibic, Vera Jovanovic and Branka Raguz point out:

"Several times now we have publicly said that in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina the legal state does not function. Everything is covered by politics!"

Because of such a situation the ombudsmen work with difficulties but they have no direct pressures from the authorities.

"We are not asking for anything more than what is provided by law," the ombudsmen point out.

Request Necessary

They stress that by now no Bosniaks that were exiled from Stolac have appealed to them for the protection of the right of movement. Although they often invoke that, although they can often read about it in the papers, they cannot do anything unless they get a direct request from the citizens.

It is the same with Neum, i.e., with the private property in this, still Bosnian, town. In order for the ombudsmen to be able to work they have to have individual requests from the citizens. And until now...

"Not one citizen has turned to us with a request concerning his right to property that has been breached in Neum, that is, asking for the protection of his private property in this town. We can work only when we have individual requests. We hope that with the solution of individual cases we will open up the process of the return of people to their homes," Vera Jovanovic points out.

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As they told us, in the still existing [self-proclaimed] Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia the authorities do not cooperate with the office of the ombudsmen, and there is consequently a "negative reciprocity." "In Mostar we have by now managed to unite around 10 families that returned from the eastern part to the western," Jovanovic says.

"If You Had Not Complained..."

Although the ombudsmen opened their office in Bihac on 27 May of this year and although they have still not completely solved the question of accommodation, they have the information, which does not come from their office, that around 2,000 people have once again left Velika Kladusa for Kuplensko [refugee camp]. Those are the same people who earlier returned to their homes, together with a group of 16,000 returnees. It is not hard to guess that they have left again because of provocations, individual as they say. Although the legal authorities do not stand behind those provocations, it is clear that more can and must be done here. Just like in Bugojno, where citizens' requests reveal that the human rights situation is not very good. When the ombudsmen intervene with the local authorities, the citizens get an answer: "Had you not complained to the ombudsmen, maybe something could have been done. But this way—nothing."

Most Problems With Flats

"We doubt such explanations. Only the people from the list of the pilot project can return to this town. And it is no secret that there have been some corrupt dealings with the lists," ombudsmen Muhibic, Jovanovic and Raguz say, and they add that if citizens who are not on the list return, the police throws them out.

That is why the ombudsmen do not advocate the implementation of the pilot project, but the implementation of the Dayton agreement, i.e., the return of all people to their homes.

However, as the ombudsmen say, in Stolac the mayor conducts the policy of a certain circle of people, in Bugojno Dzevad Mlaco ignores them, and in Sarajevo, on the reintegrated areas, parallel with the municipal organs, offices of other municipalities are also functioning, for example those of Visegrad, Rudo..., which give out permits for people to move into deserted Serb houses. And the inaction of the police only contributes to that.... On the other hand, there are shining examples in many towns of good cooperation with authorities....

Thus, in Vares the authorities have fulfilled the requests of the citizens to return to their homes. The ombudsmen do not know which nationality those people have, but it is not hard to guess. Then there is an example from Tuzla in which some Serbs, after the Srebrenica massacre, were chased out of their houses. All of them have now returned to their homes. Positive examples come from Sarajevo and Zenica, in which in the last year the ombudsmen recorded around 50 percent, or 66 percent, of cases as being successfully solved, that is, cases in which the restitution of the rights of the citizens was fully or partly carried out.

B-H: Silajdzic Sees 'No Fair Chance' for Party in Polls

AU0108102896 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 1 Aug 96 p 8

[Interview with Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina Chairman Haris Silajdzic by Peter Muench; place and date not given: "No Fair Chance for Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Muench] On 14 September elections will be held in Bosnia. Will the elections be fair and free as required by the Dayton Peace Accord?

[Silajdzic] The way things look now they will be neither the one nor the other.

[Muench] What is making life difficult for the opposition?

[Silajdzic] There is no equality of opportunity between the government and us. We do not have the same access to the media; television, in particular, is in the hands of those who rule. Our possibilities to make ourselves heard are altogether very limited.

[Muench] You were attacked and injured during an election campaign rally. Is that symptomatic of the atmosphere in the election campaign?

[Silajdzic] Yes, of course. It shows that there are people who are defending their power by all possible means.

[Muench] These people belong to your old party, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]....

[Silajdzic] My old party no longer exists, otherwise I would still be in it. It has turned into a party of fanatics and terrorists. This group has monopolized power in Bosnia and installed one-party rule. Yet, Bosnia needs pluralism—and this is what we are fighting for.

[Muench] How many of your fellow citizens do you think you can still win for the multicultural Bosnia that you are seeking to establish?

[Silajdzic] The majority. All those who refuse to cooperate with the other ethnic groups are working toward the division of Bosnia. Yet, we have not fought to live

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in a divided state. That would be the reward for aggression and genocide.

[Muench] You also accused forces in your old party of working toward a separate Muslim state. And in practice everything seems to be pointing toward a divided Bosnia.

[Silajdzic] At the moment Bosnia is de facto a divided country. Yet, de jure this must not happen, because it would put the Muslims in great danger. They would be wedged in between Croats and Serbs, and that would end like a large-scale Srebrenica.

[Muench] How do you think you can stop the disintegration of Bosnia? The Serbs are closing themselves off in their Serb Republic, and the federation of Muslims and Croats is not working as can be seen from Mostar.

[Silajdzic] We cannot cope with it ourselves. Yet, if Bosnia gets divided we will have problems for many decades. To avoid that, international forces would have to monitor and secure Bosnia's external borders as a first step. That would create a framework for a single Bosnia. Promoting reconstruction would have to be the next step. We must create a constitutional state that also offers security to foreign investors. Without these conditions the refugees cannot return, either. They need protection and jobs.

[Muench] What makes you believe that after the war and all that hatred there is still a chance of coexistence among the three ethnic groups in Bosnia?

[Silajdzic] If we continue in the same way, it will not work. We must work toward the reintegration of Bosnia. Nobody knows how long that will take. Yet, time is a great healer—just look at European history.

B-H: International Reconstruction Aid Arriving Slowly

AU0208102796 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jul 96 p 5

[Report by I. Polimac: "Only One-Fifth of the Road Has Been Traveled"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Out of the promised $1,000,040,000 [as published] in economic aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, in this year contracts for the realization of this aid have been signed in the amount of $365.3 million. For a further $405.95 million, documents on the provision of aid have been signed, but no concrete details arranged; for $433.44 million there have been indications of donors' readiness, which has not been "ratified" on paper. Still not confirmed are $367.83 million, and that includes humanitarian aid and support to political parties, the elections, the police forces, and human rights. These data have been published by the sector for international aid and reconstruction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and refer to the period from 1 January to 11 July of this year.

The greatest part of the economic support for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina was promised during the two Brussels donor conferences—altogether $1.748 billion; and outside the conference room an additional $159 million have been agreed upon. As for the structure of these donations, $1.271 billion were intended as a grant, $135 million in donations in goods, $100 million in commercial credits, and $401 million in favorable credits.

Plan Has Not Been Fulfilled

According to the existing data, only around 20 percent of the announced aid has reached Bosnia-Herzegovina in nearly six and a half months. If one keeps in mind the climatic conditions that dictate the duration of the building season, it is certain that the plans will not be realized in the course of this year. Of course, there are numerous other factors, in the first place, those of a political character, which contribute to the slow rhythm of the arrival of aid. We must also not forget our own slowness in organizing the reception and realization of aid because of political differences. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bosnian Refugees in Hungary Register for Elections

LD0108142196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Three-quarters of the eligible Bosnian voters resident in the Nagyatad [southwestern Hungary] refugee camp sheltering 600 refugees have filled in forms indicating that they want to take part—either in Hungary or in Bosnia, if they return home by that time—in the Bosnian elections scheduled to take place in September.

The camp's management sent the secretly handled documents to the [Hungarian] Refugee and Migration Office, which will forward them to the Budapest Consulate of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: U.S. Withdrawal From Bosnia, WEU 'Attitude' Viewed

AU0108070296 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 30 Jul 96 p 2

[Commentary by Neven Kazazovic: "Are the Americans Leaving?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Admiral Smith was in charge of organizing the arrival and deployment of IFOR troops in

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Bosnia, as well as of the implementation of the military provisions of the Dayton agreement. Seven months later, Adm. Smith is being replaced by Adm. Lopez, whose duties are to organize the September elections and to organize the withdrawal of the IFOR troops by the and of year, which is the term envisaged. This is the official explanation for the change of military commanders. At the same time, the very top Americans have stressed a few times in the past several weeks that the U.S. troops will withdraw according to the already taken political decisions, that is to say, by the end of this year.

It seems that the top U.S. political figures have, thereby, blocked certain conjecture, of which there were many and which hinted, in rather figurative language, that the U.S. troops could stay in Bosnia even after the set term.

To be honest, the approaches taken by some countries or groups of countries are considerably different. This can be seen in many statements, although these statements themselves are very vague and it is difficult to get to their essence. The point is: there is a group of European countries which thinks that, even if IFOR withdrew, it could keep troops in this part of the Balkans. These are the members of the Western European Union (WEU), the military organization of the EU.

The WEU is an interesting case. Amid the medley of uniforms, insignia, and vehicles in Sarajevo, for instance, one can also see vehicles with this alliance's signs; the vehicles are painted white, the letters showing that the vehicles carry WEU members are pale blue and rather discreet. They look like vehicles belonging to one of the numerous humanitarian organizations, but they are military vehicles. Of course, we do not want to imply that these vehicles are here illegally or without the approval of the IFOR command—on the contrary. However, the presence of WEU personnel in Sarajevo demonstrates the complexity of relations between NATO and the WEU.

WEU members are also NATO members. However, the United States is not a WEU member and has, so far, maintained an extremely harsh rivalry to that military alliance. It is interesting to point out that some NATO members who are closer to the United States, such as Germany for example, and due to their European policy and surrounding, as well as obligations within the EU, have recently had ever more stressed and flexible stand to WEU, something which brings the U.S. policy and NATO into a different position. These European powers, regardless of all allied relations, still set up from the "realpolitik" that, in great number of cases, near is their shirt, but nearer is their skin.

There is no need here to go into an analysis of the U.S. electoral scene and turnabouts that are possible there, as well as why the present administration insists so much on withdrawing U.S. troops from Bosnia. If the question of the Americans staying or leaving Bosnia is a kind of question of questions, then that departure can be observed in the light of NATO-WEU relations. Bosnia is in Europe, Bosnia is a primarily European problem, but Bosnia is a problem for which Europe could not find either a political or military solution. Whatever has been done has been done under a U.S. umbrella and its political leadership.

It is also true that the United States is now the only global power, albeit, a global power that does not want to play the role of the sole and lonely policeman. It wants cooperation and alliance in that role, albeit, alliance that is precisely limited and that will never threaten the essence of the U.S. global position and its strategic interests. West Europe has been caught in indecisiveness, just like the United States: It agrees to these alliances and roles, however still wants general European interests.

It is within this delicate political delineation where one thing ends and another begins and which is a huge area; where one may seek an answer to the relations between the United States and Europe and NATO and WEU: the attitude that every West European power has to what is called the U.S. vital interest. It is therefore hard to believe that a global power would so easily let go of what it achieved with arms and that by leaving Bosnia it would disturb the entire system of its individual and global positions. An authority that renounces its own positions ceases to be authority.

B-H: Buha Denies Negotiating Karadzic's Departure With Kornblum

LD0108173196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1631 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 1 Aug (SRNA)—Dr. Aleksa Buha, Serb Republic foreign minister, today denied reports that the Serb leadership and U.S. envoy John Kornblum discussed Dr. Radovan Karadzic's departure from the country.

"There were no official negotiations with Dr. Kornblum, and I state categorically that I could never utter the words ascribed to me by REUTER in one of its reports," Minister Buha told SRNA. [passage omitted]

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B-H: Official on Formation of Krajina Liberation Army

AU0108195196 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 1 Aug 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Only a Question of Time Before the KOA Appeared"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—"It was only a question of time before the Krajina Liberation Army [KOA] appeared. All those who follow the situation on the territory of the Serb Krajina are not surprised by the formation of such an organization, because its creation has long been rumored among the Krajina Serbs," Savo Strbac, president of Veritas, a documentation and information center, tells DNEVNI TELEGRAF.

"The attitude of the Croatian people toward the Serbs continues to be full of hatred, and the latest proof is the case of Marija Despot, a 95 year old woman who was hanged on 4 July. In Karlovac, 623 Serbs have changed their names, surnames, and religion, but they nevertheless cannot live in peace.

"In the course of Operation Storm last year, the Croatian Army butchered people, threw bodies in caves, burnt bodies, poured chemicals over them, and even froze people, to which the Ukrainian soldiers testify, as a part of its classic routine.

"The OSCE, the EU, the Hague tribunal, and all the embassies in Zagreb and Belgrade received full documentation, but not even then were the sanctions slapped against Croatia. Such a situation had to provoke the Krajina Serbs into forming their own organization. In this way, they wish to draw the attention of the world. The sooner they start thinking about the issue of the Serb Krajina, the fewer victims and less damage there will be. Although I am a pacifist by conviction, I justify such an organization by the courageous Krajina Serbs."

B-H: Commentary: Serb Side Fears Outcome of Brcko Arbitration

AU0108152196 Sarajevo JAVNOST (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jul 96 p 17

[Commentary by Kolja Besarovic: "Roberts Is Owen Too"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no doubt any more that the U.S. architects of the Dayton agreement interpret this agreement not as a means of facilitating the peaceful ethnic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but as a process that, through a combination of various methods, will gradually dismantle the unwanted "separatist state": the Serb Republic. Proof of this U.S. intention is the recent "successful,"—but for the Serbs very humiliating—diplomatic mission of Richard Holbrooke, but also the simultaneous (obviously these are coordinated operations) opening of cards in another game, perhaps even more important for the Serb Republic—the arbitration game around Brcko.

The news that the International Court of Justice in The Hague (which formally has no connection with the War Crimes Tribunal, created by the Security Council to try alleged war criminals in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina), had appointed U.S. diplomat Roberts Owen as the third—and more precisely, decisive—arbitrator in the conflict around Brcko, perhaps failed to make the headlines and was overshadowed by the news of Karadzic's withdrawal, but it was soon to be seen what far-reaching impact this decision would have not only on the future of the contested area around Brcko, but also on prospects for the entire peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The logical question that comes to mind is why would the appointment of Owen as the third member of the Brcko arbitrating commission even now have to be accompanied by so many dramatic characterizations? Regrettably, the answer is simple and comes down to the fact that in appointing the American as the third arbitrator, the Brcko sentence has practically already been passed. This sentence, it is no secret, is unfavorable and unacceptable for the Serb side, because in the case of its practical implementation, the Serb Republic would cease to exist, even in the form of a Dayton entity.

Formally, according to the Dayton agreement, the International Court of Justice in The Hague is indeed authorized to appoint a third arbitrator in the case of a conflict between two directly involved sides. We can also not deny the fact that the namesake of an even more well-known British diplomat is very knowledgeable in these issues, because as a specialist of the State Department, he not only worked on issues concerning the Bosnian conflict but was directly assigned to make the civilian segment of the Dayton document.

"Hawk"

This, unfortunately, does not end the list of positive characteristics that could justify Owen's appointment to the position of a decisive and officially unbiased arbitrator. It is common knowledge that in addition to a good background on issues concerning the problem at hand, arbitrators involved in such conflicts must also fulfill some other extremely important criteria—above all, they must be ethical and impartial in the sense of their own interest in the final outcome of the conflict. When we know that Owen not only comes from a country that directly advocates the creation of a unitary

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Bosnia, but he himself, as its high-ranking diplomat, is well known for his hard anti-Serb views (in addition to Madeleine Albright, Anthony Lake, and until recently Richard Holbrooke, who is considered a "hawk" in Clinton's administration), it is clear that such a man could not pass the basic requirements for any reasonably fair trial, much less be appointed as final arbitrator.

In spite of the fact that it must have known these particulars—and perhaps precisely because of that—the International Court of Justice in The Hague selected the U.S. diplomat when it could have chosen among a score of other far more favorable candidates. In fact, it is almost certain that this kind of personnel selection was forced upon it (even if in a nice way), thus practically turning this formerly distinguished legal tribunal (whose ruling was accepted even by the great powers) into an instrument for implementing prearranged political verdicts.

Maps

During all these post-Dayton months, officials of the Serb Republic had optimistically been claiming that the town of Brcko could never be an object of arbitration, only an ethnic boundary in its environs. They had stressed that through arbitration this boundary (corridor) had to be widened in favor of the Serb Republic (to solidify the territory guaranteed by the Dayton agreement and add to territory that is presently slightly less than the agreed 49 percent), but they also adopted a procedural, let us say, defensive contingency, warning that if agreement was not reached in the matter being arbitrated, the current factual conditions would remain unchanged.

Unfortunately, it turns out that all of these arguments and interpretations of the Serb side, no matter how justified they are, have no validity for a court that is controlled by U.S. judges. The selected arbitrator on the Serb side, Vitomir Popovic, recently became convinced of the truth of that statement when he asked to see the maps that show the exact issue of arbitration; he was simply told that the maps (which according to the Serb side were allegedly made in Dayton) are not available, and that they will be sent to the arbitrators at a later time. What exactly is going on behind the scenes regarding these famous maps became evident very quickly with the appointment of Owen as well as the announced (although not yet officially confirmed) decision of the OSCE to postpone the elections in Brcko until the final arbitration has been made. Although it is still uncertain when the U.S. decision will be announced officially, there is hardly any doubt that it will be extremely unfavorable for the Serbs. At this moment, several versions of the final decision are in circulation, but the most often mentioned solution is the one according to which Brcko would be proclaimed an extraterritorial zone under the control of the international forces, which, at least formally, would not take away the right of the Serbs to a compact territorial connection.

It is good that the Serb leadership keeps emphasizing that they will never, at any price, accept a solution that would mean the loss of Brcko and cutting the young state in two. However, in these extremely unfavorable circumstances and in a situation when yielding to pressure has gained momentum, the question is, regardless of our best intentions, to what extent can anything be done?

B-H: RS Justice Minister: No Extraditions Without Legislation

LD0108203896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1949 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, 1 Aug (TANJUG)—Republika Srpska's [RS's] Justice Minister Marko Arsovic said Thursday that Republika Srpska could not extradite its citizens to the Hague Tribunal without passing an extradition bill and amending the constitution of that Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Arsovic was speaking at a news conference in Belgrade on return from a four-day visit to the Hague, where a RS delegation, which he led, held talks with tribunal's officials.

RS Deputy Justice Minister Goran Neskovic told reporters that Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic could not be extradited to the tribunal since there was no legal basis for their extradition. Neskovic said that the indictment against Karadzic and Mladic was unfounded because it was based on the principle of objective responsibility. He said that such a principle did not exist in any of the criminal legislations around the world and that it had been made up for these cases.

Neskovic said that extradition could be carried out only on the basis of a law and that such a law could be adopted only by the assembly of the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina which would be formed after the elections, scheduled for 1 September.

Neskovic said he doubted that the union would pass such a bill because Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic would probably be indicted for war crimes. He said that legal proceedings had been initiated in Banja Luka, the largest RS city, against Izetbegovic, after an investigation, to be probably finalized before elections, an indictment will be issued against Izetbegovic, he added.

Neskovic said that tribunal officials would visit Banja Luka in August and examine material evidence and

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meet witnesses who will testify on crimes against Serbs committed by the Muslim army. Belgrade lawyer Igor Pantelic, who was part of the RS delegation, said that preparations were being made for proceedings against one Croat and three Muslims for war crimes perpetrated in the camp of Celebich, southern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: SDS Tightens Preelection 'Media Blockade'

AU0208080096 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 1 Aug 96 p 10

[Report by Sl. Pesevic: "Proscription by Decree"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The editor of the SRT [Serb Radio-Television] studio in Banja Luka, Vlado Slijepcevic, has issued a written decree according to which "any publicity (appearance or mention) of any representative of a political party in any program that is not specially devoted to the election campaign or the elections themselves is forbidden." Slijepcevic goes on in his written warning to all editors and editorial staff members: "This also applies to Predrag Radic, chairman of the Democratic Patriotic Bloc, even when he is in his role as Banja Luka mayor."

"The 'activities' of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] should be reported moderately and with dignity," Slijepcevic goes on, concluding that "dedication and attendance at work, as well as work quality, will determine salaries."

Opening yesterday's 56th session of the city assembly of Banja Luka, Predrag Radic himself first responded to the editor's decree when he asked the SRT cameraman on duty not to "take pictures" of him.

"Do not waste your film. Anyway, haven't you read the decree of your editor Slijepcevic?" Radic said.

"The Democratic Patriotic Bloc of the Serb Republic continues to be under a strong media blockade conducted by the state media of the Serb Republic, which is proven by this latest example of the SRT. This state-controlled broadcasting company did not report a single word from the Democratic Patriotic Bloc's press conference, held in Banja Luka on 29 July by Predrag Radic," a statement issued by this party says.

The statement concludes: "Serb Television has only confirmed that it continues even more drastically to implement the editorial policy dictated by the SDS."

B-H: Independent Social Democrats To Run as Coalition Partner

AU0108175896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1258 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 1 Aug (BETA)—Brana Miljus, spokesman for the Party of Independent Social Democrats of the Serb Republic (SNSD RS), said today that the coming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be "neither fair nor democratic."

"The elections could have been organized in a normal fashion, but there is no time for it. One should ask the OSCE why it decided to call the elections so soon after the war," Miljus said at a news conference of the New Democracy in Belgrade, at which his party was presented as the coalition partner of the New Democracy in the Serb Republic.

SNSD RS will run in the coming elections as a part of the Alliance for Peace and Progress coalition and under the slogan "For the Serb Republic," Miljus said, adding that this alliance will "definitely win."

He added that this alliance favors "the Serb Republic as an equal entity within the Bosnia-Herzegovina framework, which will have special links with FRY."

Miljus said that "only free elections can bring new, transitional authorities to power in the Serb Republic, which will place it on the road to economic and social recovery."

He branded "the exaggerated pressure of the international community to remove Radovan Karadzic from the electoral political scene as a bad move because it actually strengthens the Serbian Democratic Party and its staying power."

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Croatia: Tudjman Departs for U.S., Gives Statement

LD0108161696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 1 Aug 96

[Statement by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman at Zagreb Airport on 1 August, prior to his departure for a visit to the United States—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] A new meeting with President Clinton will certainly be an opportunity to strengthen bilateral and friendly relations between the United States and Croatia as partners. However, at present moment the importance of the meeting lies in discussing the problems regarding the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and the crisis that the international community and the European Union are facing in their efforts to resolve the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The meeting comes at the right moment and it is extremely important. Thank you. Goodbye.

Croatia: Klein Urges Reconsideration of Amnesty Bill for Serbs

AU0108201296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1822 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 1 August (BETA)—Jaques Klein, head of the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, has stated today that the demand by the Croatian side for the elections in that area should be considered, but not before the amnesty for the Serbs in that region.

Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa sent a letter to Klein on Tuesday demanding that local elections be held in eastern Slavonia in December this year.

"You can organize elections in one week, but some more complex issues should be solved first," Klein said, adding that "it depended more on them (Croats) than us. It also depends on amnesty and stability in the region."

In July this year, under the pressure of the international community, the Croatian parliament announced amnesty for 800 Serbs from eastern Slavonia, but Klein described this document as "inadequate."

"This act is not clear. People do not know whether they have been pardoned or not. The majority of these Serbs are elderly, some of them are even dead," Klein said.

He has expressed the hope that the UN mandate will be extended until next July despite the wish of the Croatian Government to see the end of the mandate on 15 January 1997.

"The first six months have fared well," Klein said, adding that the process of reintegration of eastern Slavonia should be completed by next July.

Croatia: Government Denies Voting Affects Refugee Status

LD0108172796 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have received a number of reports from our colleagues in regional committees for refugees about rumors amongst the Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees in Croatia that those who register for the September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina will lose their refugee status in Croatia, according to the Croatian government's bureau for refugees.

The Croatian government's bureau for refugees strongly denies such allegations, saying that registration for voting and taking part in the elections cannot affect the refugee's status.

Croatia: Belgrade Press Describes 'Krajina Liberation Army'

AU3107173896 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jul 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The KOA Is the Serb IRA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] DNEVNI TELEGRAF has discovered from circles that say they are close to this, presently unknown, organization, that the Krajina Liberation Army [KOA] is mainly made up of members of the former Krajina Corps and soldiers of the popular "Kep," the camp of Captain Dragan.

Sources also claim that KOA members were responsible for the fire in the "Djura Djakovic" plant, famous for its manufacture of M-84 tanks. In an operation that lasted almost four days, 75 percent of the capacities of that factory were destroyed, the sources claim.

The KOA was organized along the same lines as the Irish terrorist organization, the IRA, the sources claim.

Croatia: Serbs Discuss KOA, Oppose 'Terrorism'

AU0208115196 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0751 GMT 2 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 2 August (BETA)—In connection with the reports about the formation of the Krajina Liberation Army (KOA) DNEVNI TELEGRAF among others also turned to Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, president of the Party of Serbian Unity, who said that this was a gross deception by people who have never even seen a front line.

Arkan emphasizes that this amounts to a scam to extort money from "the wonderful Krajina Serbs" and adds that "we will not achieve anything by terrorism."

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On 31 July DNEVNI TELEGRAF on its front page published an exclusive report that KOA had been formed and that Croatia "will grow weary of 4 and 5 August in the year 1996 and all the subsequent years to come, when they plan to celebrate their victory over the Republic of Serbian Krajina."

Mihajlo Vucinovic, president of the Association of the Expelled Serbs from Krajina and Croatia, voiced concern that the Croats "could hardly wait for the formation of KOA to justify the continued discrimination of the remaining Serbs in Croatia and prevent those who wish to return from doing so."

Dusan Vukojevic, president of the Association of Injured from the Republic of Serbian Krajina, condemned the formation of KOA and added that "the political issues cannot be resolved by terrorism and we must, therefore, shed all illusions and wait for better times."

"One Serbian finger is worth more than 1,000 Ustasha heads and this organization is backed by Borislav Mikelic and other war profiteers," Vukojevic said. [passage omitted]

The cabinet of Milan Martic stated that for the time being there have been no reactions to the emergence of KOA and added that if needed, "over the next two to three days the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina will address the public."

The reporter of DNEVNI TELEGRAF was told in the Croatian Government bureau in Belgrade that "they are not authorized to comment on the news about the formation of KOA" and that a possible Croatian reaction could ensue after nine o'clock today.

Croatia: HDZ Right Tries To Oust Granic, Matesa

AU0208084996 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 1 Aug 96 pp 6-7, 63

[Article by Davor Butkovic: "Croatia Threatened by Sanctions Because of Its Policy Toward Herzeg-Bosnia and the Mostar Crisis!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Most of the ministers of Zlatko Matesa's cabinet went away for a vacation in the second half of July. However, Prime Minister Matesa reportedly requested that the ministers come to Zagreb every Wednesday and Thursday, thus making it impossible for them to have an uninterrupted vacation.

That is probably true. The television news at 1930 hours aired footage of Minister Susak taking his vacation in Herzegovina, accompanied by Miroslav Tudjman, head of the intelligence service, but Minister Susak appeared at last week's government session as usual.

Other ministers whom we recently contacted also mentioned their plans for a seaside vacation and complained about having to return to Zagreb for government sessions.

The only minister who has not interrupted his vacation is Mate Granic, vice president of the government, foreign minister, and one of the most esteemed Croatian politicians abroad. ARENA gave details about his vacation: He enjoyed the sunny beaches of his native Baska until he had to go for an official visit to Rome this week. It was Mate Granic's first long vacation in the last four years.

While one of the most important political leaders of Croatia and a person with a strong sense of duty relaxed in central Dalmatia, the Republic of Croatia faced the biggest international threat in the last 30 months.

It began when Hido Biscevic received a protest from the EU representatives because of the situation in Mostar. Reporters who are familiar with the Presidential Palace maintained that President Tudjman was planning to meet the EU representatives himself, but the meeting was canceled because of the sharp tone of the message from Brussels to Zagreb.

Then the president of the Republic spoke to the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] youth in Split on 27 July and warned the audience that Croatia was facing an international ultimatum. The former European mayor of Mostar, notorious for his intolerant attitude toward the Croats, stated early this week that Croatia would be deprived of EU economic aid if it does not accept the results of the Mostar elections!

At the same time, the Croat mayor of Mostar claimed that the real intention of the international community was to occupy the town. The conflict between the Croats and the Muslims was reopened all throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and churches and mosques were burning again.

Actually, new hostilities between the Croats and the Muslims are impossible as long as the United States is protecting the Federation. However, diplomatic sources in Zagreb—who first warned Croatia about the possibility of economic sanctions three years ago, and who informed Croatia and the world about the Z-4 plan for the solution of the problem of the Croatian Serbs two years ago, the plan that Croatia did not like—agree that Croatia is very likely to be placed under the new formal sanctions if the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina deteriorates and the process of the establishment of the Federation slows down!

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A Great Threat to Croatia

The decision of President Tudjman and the state leadership on the Mostar case, as well as the possible resolution of the increasingly threatening political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be crucial to the threat of economic sanctions for Croatia.

Recently, as Croatia is directly blackmailed by the EU and the implementation of the Dayton agreement is stipulated, a very different process is taking place on the Croatian political scene.

After the idea about a coalition government—promoted by the remaining technomanagers and liberals in the HDZ and initiated by President Tudjman himself—failed, radical nationalists and conservatives in the party in power began a successful counterattack. The latest political action of the HDZ's right faction is primarily aimed against Minister Granic and Prime Minister Matesa, and it is being conducted simultaneously in several fields of political interest.

It is not just another tactical confrontation in the party that is facing an increasingly fierce internal division, as occurred six months ago, when Franjo Greguric and Ivica Todoric were allegedly in danger of being arrested. It is an attempt of the right faction of the HDZ to weaken the managers (Matesa, Sarinic, Greguric, and other important Croatian executives who are not directly connected with the Herzegovinian circle) and the Christian Democrats (Granic and Radic). They would thus force Franjo Tudjman to neglect the international requests concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina and actually violate the Dayton agreements. That would result in an irreversible blockade in Croatia's admission to international organizations and increase the risk of sanctions.

Glavas Tries To Overthrow the Government

The right-wing HDZ apparently wants to shatter the political balance in the party in power by weakening Granic and Matesa and forcing Tudjman to take extremely radical decisions that would perhaps reinforce the half-illegitimate power of the HDZ over Croatia. In the long run, that would have disastrous consequences for the country. Of course, international isolation strengthens the tendency among the population to give strong, unanimous support to the authorities.

The removal of the liberals in the government takes place on several levels. It has been most apparent in the last two weeks: Branimir Glavas, the county prefect of Slavonia and a close associate of Vladimir Seks, disputed the decisions of his senior, Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa; and Mate Granic was forced to tender his resignation because of a number of wrong decisions from Zagreb and the Bosnian Croats.

Glavas's action against Matesa, for example the artificial increase in wheat prices, is one of the strongest blows this government has ever received.

Branimir Glavas (who once suspended his membership in the HDZ because of his fierce confrontations with President Tudjman himself) decided to pay the Slavonian farmers 1 kuna and 20 lipa for their wheat, although the government had set the price at 1 kuna and 5 lipa. Glavas had no right to make such a decision, as he is a government official and a direct subordinate of Zlatko Matesa. Besides, Glavas paid the Slavonian farmers through the Slavonian Bank, an institution included in the governmental program of the restoration of financial situation. That actually means that Glavas gained political popularity and jeopardized the supremacy of the government by paying the Slavonian farmers out of the state budget! In short, Glavas made a financial coup, and he probably could not have done that all by himself.

"I am the judge, the law, and the police in Osijek," Glavas confided to me very self-assuredly several years ago, over dinner on the 17th floor of the Intercontinental Hotel in Zagreb. I was discussing a legal case with Glavas. He wanted to take legal action against GLOBUS because of an interview, and I maintained that he was not likely to be awarded damages, at least not according to the valid Croatian laws, because the interview had been authorized. Glavas answered that laws were not the most important thing to him, as he could do whatever he wanted in Osijek.

Two facts are very confusing in Glavas's wheat affair. First, why did Zlatko Matesa, president of the government, not tender his resignation when his official Glavas refused to obey his orders? Matesa's predecessor Valentic managed to preserve some authority and autonomy in taking decisions thanks to his repeated threats of resignation. Second, why did the opposition actually support Glavas and thus make the position of the government even more difficult? We are free to pass strict judgments on the government, but it is still a better guarantee of the country's stability than a cabinet headed by persons such as Seks or Susak could ever be.

The second attack on the authority of Matesa's cabinet is in full swing in the judiciary system, in the debate between the chairman of the Supreme Court, Krunislav Olujic, and Public Prosecutor Marijan Hranjski.

In order to understand the nature of the conflict—which actually has nothing to do with the situation in the judiciary system—we must know that Krunislav Olujic is connected with the liberal faction of the HDZ. He

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was the government's candidate for the post of the chairman of the Supreme Court, where he replaced Milan Vukovic, an extreme rightist.

Attack on Mate Granic

On the other hand, Marijan Hranjski is not a figure of any real importance in politics. It is difficult to understand why Hranjski is participating in the action of the right faction of the HDZ aimed at removing Olujic and reestablishing their rule in the judiciary system.

The third attack is directed toward Foreign Minister Mate Granic, to whom the foreign emissaries to Zagreb have given most credit for Croatia's success in avoiding international economic sanctions in early 1994, during the Croat-Muslim hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two years later, I must admit, I heard quite a number of diplomats in Zagreb complain about the truth of Granic's statements. The foreign minister often promised that Zagreb would fulfill the obligations it assumed: That it would cooperate with various international institutions, respect the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the freedom of the media, and allow the constitution of authorities in Croatia's capital in accordance with the results of the local elections. However, President Tudjman usually failed to fulfill Granic's most important promises.

Despite that dualism in the supreme authorities, Granic has gained a reputation as one of those rare government officials who support the idea of the liberal Western democracy.

Since the tension in Herzeg-Bosnia ran high again, Granic has faced a succession of political attacks, which was the main reason why he offered his resignation.

First, Granic supports Croatia's cooperation with The Hague, but he cannot take any action to ensure at least a police investigation about Dario Kordic, the former HDZ leader in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a war-crime suspect. On the contrary: Kordic lives legally and peacefully in the very center of Zagreb, although his case has a tremendous impact on the international position of Croatia and despite the fact that Granic is constantly promising the international community that Croatia will cooperate with the international war crimes tribunal.

Second, Mate Granic has opposed the idea of the statehood of Herzeg-Bosnia ever since the hostilities between the Croats and the Muslims began. In July 1993, when the hostilities were just beginning, Granic told me himself that he would do everything in his power to stop that war. He also said that one of his major tasks was to neutralize Mate Boban, the leader of the Herzegovinian Croats and one of the main supporters of the conflict between the Muslims and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Granic still thinks that Croatia must act in accordance with the Dayton regulations and that insisting on the existence of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia—especially on the refusal to recognize the results of the Mostar elections—would entail disastrous consequences for the international position of Croatia.

Granic recently offered his resignation to prevent the possible sanctions and further deterioration in the international situation of Croatia.

Third, in November 1995, in his interview to GLOBUS, Granic condemned the crimes against the Serbs that were committed after operation Storm, saying that those crimes hindered Croatia from conducting a military intervention in Eastern Slavonia.

In the last government session, seven months after Granic made that statement, Ljerka Mintas-Hodak, deputy chairman of the government, suggested forming a governmental coordinating group for human rights, which would include certain nongovernmental organizations.

Granic's deputy Ivan Simonovic supported the suggestion, but Defense Minister Gojko Susak reacted by putting a veto on the attempt to form the group! Thus Susak confronted the Foreign Ministry, gave Mate Granic a sharp political slap on the face, and denied that there was any political agreement between the powerful Defense Ministry and the reputable Foreign Ministry.

Tudjman's Speech in Split

Last but not least, we must say that even some of Granic's colleagues who share his opinion—like Ivo Sanader, head of the President's cabinet—are plotting against the present minister. Apparently, they aspire to assuming his duty, which is an additional difficulty for Granic.

Franjo Tudjman must soon make another decision that is crucial for the international situation of Croatia. His speech on the occasion of the congress of the HDZ youth organization in Split implied his resolution to wage war on the international community by supporting the politically and morally dubious authorities in Herzeg-Bosnia. (Even the Herzegovinian Croats have lost faith in those authorities: 10,000 Croats from Mostar abstained from the Mostar elections. The HDZ would have won the elections with these 10,000 votes!)

Split heard President Tudjman saying what the most radical and the least conscientious HDZ members wanted him to say. In real life he will probably comply with the wishes of the international community.

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We must admit that there are mitigating circumstances in Tudjman's decision to force Herzeg-Bosnia to really enter the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The most important thing is the actual economic power of Herzeg-Bosnia. Political monitors described it as a tax-free region: More than 15,000 firms are registered, and only 5,000 of them have their giro accounts properly registered. That means that 10,000 firms are making illegal business transactions without paying any taxes!

Moreover, the whole of central and southern Dalmatia, especially Split and Dubrovnik, have commercial connections with Herzeg-Bosnia exclusively. As Herzeg-Bosnian firms do not pay any taxes, their goods are approximately 30 percent cheaper than the goods that Zagreb or Osijek can offer the Dalmatians! Herzeg-Bosnia is also the biggest exporter of food to Croatia. It is important to note that Herzegovinian firms pay a duty of only 1 percent when they export food to Croatia, which makes the Croatian producers furious!

Finally, we must note that a part of Herzeg-Bosnia is ruled by narcotics traders whose bosses occupy exclusive hotels in Zagreb.

Reason or Disaster?

President Tudjman is facing the question of whether he should really terminate Herzeg-Bosnia, not just formally, institutionally. If he makes that decision, he will have to face the interest groups of tremendous strength both in Herzegovina and in Zagreb. Those groups have supported him so far.

On the other hand, President Tudjman runs the risk of sanctions or an informal economic isolation of Croatia—as occurred two years ago and after operation Storm—as well as losing one of his most helpful associates.

The attack on Matesa's relatively liberal and pro-European oriented government is conducted in various ways by Slavonian County Prefect Glavas and his close friend Seks. They are accompanied by the unimportant, but instrumentally extremely useful Public Prosecutor Hranjski, who is actually Minister Susak's man. Susak obviously cannot face the real termination of Herzeg-Bosnia without at least having the satisfaction of Matesa's and Granic's fall. He is doing his best to postpone Tudjman's order to the Herzegovinian Croats to accept the results of the Mostar elections, which will make Herzeg-Bosnia a part of the Federation.

It is almost certain that President Tudjman will eventually, after many negotiations and compromises, make that decision. The only alternative—sanctions and international isolation—would be a disaster for Croatia.

Croatia: Finance Minister on Fiscal Policy

96BA0397A Zagreb BANKA in Serbo-Croatian Jun 96 pp 16-23

[Interview with Bozo Prka, M.A., finance minister of the Republic of Croatia, by Marina Ralasic, Franjo Kiseljak, and Zeljko Ivankovic; place and date not given: "Isolation of the Spendthrifts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Finance Ministry has successfully gotten through the first quarter, one which is usually difficult for the state budget, which enters the season of more abundant revenues only at midyear. At the moment the people at Katanciceva Street are working out alternative versions of the state budget for the coming year, which is uncomfortable because adjustment of wages and salaries—and of pensions which are linked to them—cannot be avoided. Can 1997 be a year which takes the burden off the economy, can it be better for pensioners and less painful for creditors? Is the state becoming a sound debtor? Why is the kuna (still) such a rare commodity? How is the issuance of state securities progressing? We talked about this and many other current topics with Bozo Prka, finance minister.

[BANKA] Is Croatia too expensive a state? Public expenditure in 1995 was up 34 percent over 1990. GDP [gross domestic product] has in the meantime dropped 33 percent, industrial output 47 percent, turnover in the trade sector 51 percent, and capital investments all of 83 percent.

[Prka] Our analysts are calculating the share of investments erroneously.

[BANKA] Wages and salaries are not a cause of overstrained expenditure. They have been managed in such a way that the shock of supply has remained under supervision. Nevertheless, the economy is complaining that public expenditure is an intolerably heavy burden.

[Prka] You might say that the state is expensive. According to extreme liberal theory, every state is expensive. The share of government revenues in GDP, together with the costs of local self-government, ranges at a level of about 53 percent. As a matter of fact, Croatia is one of the cheapest states in transition. In Hungary public expenditure takes a bite of 65 percent, in Slovenia more than 50 percent. There is no state which would not spend about 50 percent of its GDP.

[BANKA] We need to look at where that expenditure is going.

[Prka] The state has a relatively high share of expenditure. But current outlays for goods and services are less than current state revenues. The state has a surplus in the current subbalance—somewhere around 3.5 percent

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of GDP, or about 3.5 billion kunas. That is the amount of the state's savings. The state is saving 3.5 billion kunas out of tax revenues and other current revenues. Capital outlays are being financed with that portion of savings. It makes a difference, then, how we break down the budget as an instrument of current economic policy and redistribution of GDP. Its structure is essential. If the state is investing in its own sector 6 to 7 percent of GDP, and if it is financing 3.5 percent of that GDP with its own savings, and only 2.5 percent of capital outlays are financed through foreign loans, I would say that we can be satisfied with that structure.

[BANKA] The state is saving, but it is doing so by first taking away.

[Prka] Our budget is a multiplier of development. It is investing 6 billion kunas—6 percent of GDP—in the state sector alone.

[BANKA] The burdens are nevertheless heavy, difficult to support. It is debatable how favorable an effect the budget can have on development. Perhaps some of its effects toward development are still not evident?

[Prka] The level of industrial output in April was 2.3 percent greater than in the same month of last year. In addition, by 18 May we had collected 36.5 percent of the budget (11.3 out of 31.8 billion kunas of the total budget, not including financing). In the first four months at reduced rates, we collected 12 percent greater revenues from taxes than over the same period last year. I ask you where that 12-percent growth of revenues came from if not from increased economic activity?

[BANKA] Perhaps better collection of revenues?

[Prka] Certainly, several factors deserve credit for those trends, but part of the growth is undoubtedly the consequence of a considerably greater economic activity. The problem is that the statistical service still has not changed the methodology for measuring economic flows. If all the components of GDP were taken into account, the sum of the sales tax, salaries, interest, dividends, depreciation, and other factoring services, we would arrive at a considerably larger growth of economic activity.

Some of that activity is concealed and cannot be measured statistically.

[BANKA] You are arguing that economic activity is greater on the basis of collection of revenues?

[Prka] The sales tax, as a component of GDP, has grown 8 percent. Add in other factor services—interest, dividends, amounts of depreciation, rent, as a matter of fact, the price of every factor together with the costs of manpower—when you add all that up, you will see that the result is different.

[BANKA] What is the situation with liquidity of the state budget? That is, very large installments of short-term loans come due in May.

[Prka] I do not want to send signals to those who want to work with the state, but the state is getting better and better as a debtor. We did have difficulties to some extent in financing outlays for defense. Following the military actions last year, we were forced to carry over considerable amounts of remaining payments to this year. I am happy with the level of fulfillment of the military budget. Debts have at this point been cut in half, and by the end of July, I am convinced, we will not have any arrears. The Army will fit into a budget of 8.7 billion kunas. In other areas, if we exempt to some extent the financing of the refugees, we have achieved the necessary dynamics, which means that the state is not behind in its payments. I must emphasize that we achieved that improvement using only 100 million kunas of a short-term loan from the central bank. As of 30 April, the state was a net creditor of the central bank. The deposits of the consolidated state in the central bank were larger than the amounts of loans taken from the central bank.

[BANKA] Recent interviews have cited the figure of 700 million kunas of obligations come due which the state budget has not discharged. What is this about—why have the debts not been paid?

[Prka] These are arrears from the previous year which have not been included in the budget. The Defense Ministry overran the budget by a certain amount of expenditure for well-known reasons. We have now drawn up a different schedule for all those arrears, so that we can pay the obligations in six or seven months. The military operation was completed in August of last year, but the "war" in the budget began after that. The amount of the debt has now been cut in half. I repeat, the state budget has a share of some 10 percent in total illiquidity. I am not talking about public enterprises. That is something else, that should be kept separate.

[BANKA] Do you feel that those 10 percent multiply in subsequent cycles?

[Prka] We have allowed everyone bilateral compensation precisely in order to avoid that kind of spread of illiquidity from the state sector to others. We are allowing everyone who has back taxes and contributions to offset them with claims against the Defense Ministry.

[BANKA] The budget is the reason for 700 million kunas of debt still unpaid. Who are the others who have caused the debtor crisis?

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[Prka] The government has done a great deal, and that in two directions. On the domestic side, we have separated from the banking system and altogether isolated the entire sector of organizations operating at a loss. Some 40 or so enterprises are no longer receiving bank financing, and the banking system need not monetize their losses. We are talking about the Croatian Railroads and about the Croatian Highways, which are entirely budget-financed, together with repayment of debts. The Sisak Steel Mill is in that group. There is no danger of its losses being monetized. We have shut off the losses of the HEP [Croatian Electric Power System] so that they are no longer being financed through the banking system. We are abandoning the Bakar Coking Plant. TEF [expansion unknown] and TLM [Light Metals Factory] are in the process of rehabilitation. The restructuring of all five large shipyards is being done entirely through the state budget. Last year, we set aside 200 million kunas for shipbuilding, and this year we are furnishing another 270 million kunas. Agriculture, which has always enjoyed selective credits for planting and harvesting and for purchases, is being entirely covered and financed from the state budget and through State Commodity Reserves. We should add to this many other smaller enterprises with losses important to the local community. The hotbeds of inflation in the past have now been isolated from banking. That part of the restructuring is being done through the government and its institutions. Postponement of payment of principal and interest to the Paris and London Clubs has strengthened the restructuring front. There is no question that we have brought about the necessary prerequisites for fundamental changes.

[BANKA] You have praise for everything the state has done. Do you allow the possibility of the economy arriving at a different assessment of what has been done?

[Prka] The essential fact is that there is no longer what we have referred to as arbitration in financing. The London Club signifies reorganization of foreign obligations. On the other hand, we are reorganizing domestic debt in rehabilitation of the banks. The state is also putting order into its own debts by restructuring the budget. Any further demand for money will be a demand of a sound and real sector. It is not enough to merely point a finger at the state. Everyone must sweep in front of his own house. A large segment of the economy is waiting for Godot. Let us ask to what extent high costs have been reduced in the economy. If their output rises by 1 percent, ask them how much costs are rising? The management of costs is still clumsy. Another question is why creditors have not initiated bankruptcy proceedings against their debtors.

[BANKA] What if those debtors are public firms?

[Prka] Forgive me, but public firms are net creditors of the economy, which means that the claims of public firms are greater than their debts. It is an important circumstance that the international component needs to be purged from the obligations of public firms. At least 1.3 billion kunas should be omitted from those 6 to 7 billion kunas in debt. Those were unmet obligations based on the claims of the PBZ [Privredna banka Zagreb] against INA, the railroads.... That debt is no longer an unmet obligation. Approximately a fourth of the debts should be deleted on the basis that the foreign debt has now been regulated. The state did that.

[BANKA] In spite of everything, the kuna is a very scarce commodity.

[Prka] We certainly dare not underestimate the inadequate money supply. It is a question of our not realistically assessing economic activity. I have said that economic activity is greater than shown in the official statistics. I ask you how to account for the 12-percent growth year over year!

[BANKA] You are again calling attention to the gap between real economic growth and the money supply. This has been the subject of certain discussions between the government and the NBH [National Bank of Croatia]. Did you not reach agreement?

[Prka] It is not true that we did not agree on the figures. I would recall once again that we have isolated the losing operations from the banks. What is left now? What is left is the sound part of demand.

[BANKA] But even that sound part of demand is choking because of the shortage of money.

[Prka] When we made the transition from a hyperinflationary economy to a noninflationary economy, the turnover of money slowed down to between one-third and one-fourth of its previous rate. During hyperinflation, money turned over as many as 25 times per year, while under today's circumstances this occurs only six to seven times. Also honor the fact that we have intentionally slowed down payments with the system of double coverage, which was so that the banks could plan liquidity. If you have slowed down the turnover of money to one-third of what it was, then, according to Fisher's formula, you must increase its amount by the same factor. This is now a problem which the NBH must solve.

[BANKA] Well, is it solving it satisfactorily?

[Prka] I will tell you how this is affecting the budget. Since we received $100 million from the privatization of

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Pliva, with intervention of the NBH we have managed to exchange only $30 million. I am not accusing the NBH, but the new realities in monetary policy have to be honored.

[BANKA] What would we do with $1 billion if we happened to get that much for the HPT [expansion unknown]?

[Prka] I have had difficult debates when I asked for $60 million to be exchanged, and they exchanged only $20 million. You talk about the state having unmet obligations. Last year we had to pay some $50 million of obligations in foreign exchange. Under the Law on the NBH, we have the right to credit financing up to 5 percent of the value of the annual budget. That comes to 1.65 billion kunas. I took 100 million kunas. Now tell me how that can be a loan to the budget? Hungary finances 3 percent of the budget deficit, and the central bank handles all management of the public debt. Our central bank has a hard time issuing money on this highest-quality basis. Issuing money backed by the dollar is almost the same as issuing it on the basis of a gold bar.

[BANKA] It is the task of the NBH not only to convert foreign exchange, but also to see that that money does not go to consumption.

[Prka] I have said that the money must finance consumption, the only question is what consumption? If that money does not finance the expenditure of the state, and we have said that it is not financing it, if it is not financing losing operations, then tell me what other money guzzlers are left?

[BANKA] The most radical measure of the former arrangement with the IMF was the restriction of credit to money guzzlers. The announcement concerning the new arrangement claimed that the conditions for concluding credit will not be any less strict.

[Prka] Instead of the net domestic assets of banks, the IMF would restrict net domestic assets of the National Bank. It would redefine the aggregates being controlled. The NBH has considerably greater room for monetary expansion.

[BANKA] The NBH has been continually issuing a warning: We are not printing money because we do not know that it would go to sound enterprises. Does the IMF have more trust in the NBH or the government?

[Prka] I personally trust only the figures. The quarantine on debtors is still in place. And do you know how? We have installed creditors in the Bank of Rijeka and the Bank of Split, [illegible]an be sure that it will never occur to them to approve a loan to an overindebted shipyard. In making loans to such enterprises, the banks have to destroy the corresponding share of capital. Let them make three such transactions, and the bank is right back where it was. Thanks to incisions in the banking system, certain firms are still under financial quarantine. Whatever anyone thinks, one thing is beyond doubt—we now have essentially different conditions for the conduct of monetary policy. Whereas a year ago we were afraid of "too much" money in circulation, there is no reason for such a fear today.

[BANKA] The problem of rehabilitation of the banks is being treated separately from the entire debtor crisis. What has the experience been to date with the rehabilitation of the three banks?

[Prka] Rehabilitation is always an economic issue, but also a political issue, because it touches upon sensitive relations. The Bank of Slavonia ended last year with a profit of 12 million kunas. That is the end of the story for the Bank of Slavonia. The state acquired a majority block of stock. We ended rehabilitation in the sense of payment of obligations. We have added 150 million kunas to the bank's capital and taken shares of stock.

The Bank of Rijeka and the Bank of Split are much more problematical. They are now undergoing rehabilitation. You recently heard the governor when he said in a meeting of the government that interest rates had fallen 4 percentage points since the first remittances by way of additional capitalization. Interest rates will continue to fall, because these two banks are playing an increasingly vigorous role on the money market. We are convinced that these two banks will achieve a level of normal adequacy of capital with the transactions envisaged, that the capital will be appropriate to the property they are managing. That is by and large the beginning of rehabilitation. Then comes restructuring in order to improve liquidity and performance. This will be achieved by restructuring, above all by reducing the number of employees and through better operation of the bank. In the breakdown of our interest rates, we have found that 5 to 6 percent of the interest rate margin results from excessive manpower in the bank. Those are immense costs which burden the loan of every entrepreneur.

[BANKA] What about the announced rehabilitation of the PBZ?

[Prka] The PBZ is the bank with the greatest problems; it has 17 billion kunas in assets. All three banks undergoing rehabilitation at the moment represent only a third of the problems of the PBZ, whose assets tell the history of the downfall of the former state, beginning with deliveries of and payments for petroleum. The PBZ "arbitrated" in financing the largest investment failures

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of the former state, from Obrovac, where today we have more than $80 million in debt, to investment projects in Kutina, on Krk, on the railroads.... All the loans of the Croatian Highways went through the PBZ, the entire oil pipeline, and all of agriculture.

[BANKA] Are those sufficient reasons for the debts of the PBZ to become Croatia's public debt, as is being demanded?

[Prka] We must not by any means repeat the mistakes from the past, when the former National Bank took over exchange-rate differences and the repayment of loans. Rehabilitation of the PBZ will soon begin. We are waiting for the result of the vote of the foreign banks and their confirmation of the "London" transaction so that we can also take that part of the debt into account during rehabilitation.

[BANKA] Are there differences in the model of rehabilitation?

[Prka] The rehabilitation will be carried out according to the same principles on which a similar operation was conducted in the Bank of Rijeka and the Bank of Split. In the former system, there were several attempts to rehabilitate the PBZ. We want the rehabilitation to work the first time, and we will do so by setting aside the bad assets and reducing the bank's capital. The agency for rehabilitation is to take over the bad assets and provide additional capital to the level of minimal capital adequacy—that is 8 percent of total property. That capital will be injected in the form of new bonds, but also in cash. We expect to be aided in this with a loan from the World Bank. We have an expensive transaction ahead of us, and for that reason we need to be thoroughly prepared so that it is never repeated.

[BANKA] What will change in ownership relations if the concept of rehabilitation is the same as the one in the Bank of Rijeka and the Bank of Split?

[Prka] As of the date of the rehabilitation, depending on the losses, the shareholder structure is suspended, and that means that shareholders face the knowledge that they have been operating badly and that their present shares are worth little on the market.

[BANKA] Is thought being given to selling off the enterprises which the bank owns?

[Prka] The overall problems of the PBZ are similar to those in the Bank of Split and the Bank of Rijeka. The PBZ needs to be restored to health. The confidence of depositors and savers needs to be restored. After a certain time, the bank will be privatized. We need a large bank which will compete with the other large bank. We need both local and foreign banking competition.

[BANKA] Sketch in broad outlines the budget memorandum for 1997 which you probably will soon be taking to the parliament.

[Prka] We have already prepared several projections of fiscal policy for next year and for the three-year period. We are still keeping those parameters for internal use only, but I can say that we are examining the possibility of a quite considerable relief to the economy. That relief will be performed above all by means of the value-added tax [VAT]. That will be an appreciable relief, because a considerable part of the input tax which is included in the base for new taxation is excluded from the price of the input.

[BANKA] Is the calculation still relevant whereby the effect of the difference in the method of taxation would amount to some 3 billion kunas of relief for the economy?

[Prka] That calculation remains, it is a question of relief at the level of 3 percent of GDP. We are making up for the saving through better coverage of taxpayers, that is, the gray economy. We also intend to take the burden off labor costs. At the moment, we are examining the possibility of reducing certain contributions. The burden in financing the social welfare functions of the state is extremely high. Expenses for health insurance take 8 percent of GDP. We are spending relatively more than other countries on health. The same applies to old-age insurance (the share is 11 to 12 percent of GDP). There are also some contributions which do not have that much to do with social welfare. In one version, such contributions would be reduced even in the coming year. But the budget for next year will be awkward above all because we must take a position on income policy, and when wages and salaries go up, so do pensions. We should add to that reintegration of eastern Slavonia and further continuation of construction of highways and other transportation routes.

[BANKA] What will be the upshot of the debate about the customs tariff, will the balance in the end mean relief?

[Prka] Various comments can be made about the customs tariff. The tariff has a multilevel task. From the economic standpoint, the tariff should be neutral because of investment allocation. A highly protected product and a product altogether unprotected send different signals. This is a dangerous game in operation of the customs. Protection is the second task. I agree that the Croatian economy needs protection, the only question is what degree of that protection is sensible. With the exception of agriculture, I believe protection is sufficient if customs cover one-fourth of inefficiency. If customs covered 50 percent of Croatian inefficiency, then

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we would be protecting entrepreneurs by paying them an unjustifiably high price. The third task is fiscal: We have calculated that lowering customs duties will eliminate 700 million kunas of revenues. We expect to make up that loss dynamically through increased demand, that is, through greater propensity to consume products with lower protection—raw materials, supplies, goods, and technology. The main problem is whether we are ready to pay for the inefficiency of domestic production above a certain level. With protection of 40 or 50 percent, Croatia has no chance of success if for no other reason than the constitution of its open economy.

[BANKA] To what extent do our duties coincide with what the World Trade Organization is requiring of Croatia as a potential member?

[Prka] The level of protection in agriculture could be problematical. We have to be cautious because what is favorable to agriculture may undercut the position of tourism.

[BANKA] It will be interesting to see the ultimate outcome of dealings with the London Club.

[Prka] There are good prospects of the job being completed by the date envisaged. How good that job will be for Croatia and its economy will be evident as the rehabilitation operation continues. We expect that banks with at least an 80-percent share in the total debt will vote for the transaction.

[BANKA] What is the per capita external public debt in Croatia?

[Prka] Per capita about $800.

[BANKA] What is the maturity?

[Prka] There is not very much short-term debt. It will all be mainly long-term debt. The total state debt, that is, the debts of all state entities, amounts to about $3.7 billion.

[BANKA] Borislav Skegro, deputy prime minister, emphasized at the meetings in London and New York that Croatia needs to quickly enter the world capital market. Even in September or October at the latest, a new issue of Eurobonds is being announced in the amount of $200 million. That means that the bonds would be issued without a credit rating? Why such haste, which could be the introduction to unfavorable borrowing?

[Prka] We have foreseen a budget with a 2.5-percent deficit. That means that a net amount of $400 million must go into the budget if we are to finance 6 to 7 billion kunas of capital outlays. We most probably will not issue the Eurobonds, because we have good prospects of obtaining an investment credit rating by the end of the year, BB+ at the worst. If Slovenia obtained AA-, and we are in the same position toward our creditors, we are repaying the debt with the same capacity, and we are not overindebted, we have good reason to expect a high investment credit rating. We most probably will undertake two syndicated loans. We have already taken certain steps in that regard.

[BANKA] Which means these are loans, not state securities?

[Prka] Yes, we would go for syndicated loans. One fortunate circumstance is that we have many offers of such loans. We need to wait a bit, because the interest rate margin for Croatia is dropping. When we contracted for the first $100 million in credit, the interest rate margin for Croatia was 3.5 percentage points above LIBOR. With the London Club, we obtained the opportunity to settle obligations at an interest rate of 2.1 percent above seven-year U.S. bonds. Today, we have an opportunity to borrow money at 1.7 to 1.8 percent above that.

[BANKA] We are going back to the question of whether the central monetary authority has sufficient mechanisms for effective implementation of the desired policy.

[Prka] The monetary authority is conducting a restrictive policy. It is issuing money by buying up foreign exchange. If a new set of instruments were introduced, and the possibilities of that exist, there are quality three-year securities, state bonds which are officially quoted on the market—the central bank could perform open market operations. It could buy securities or take them as collateral for loans. This is, of course, a new issue of money. And under present circumstances the central bank has a hard time issuing money by means of foreign exchange transactions. Aside from note issue by means of foreign exchange transactions and the purchase of foreign exchange, the central bank would have to issue money through the secondary market.

[BANKA] Would anyone else aside from the central bank purchase state securities?

[Prka] The secondary market is extremely active. The demand for money is very great. I am convinced that this is real demand that originates in real economic developments, which has not been satisfied. If the state appears on the foreign market, it will only increase the demand for money. The result of that will be a rise of the rate of interest which it does not pay the budget to pay. It does not pay us to pay 25 percent for short-term securities when we can borrow money on the Austrian market at 6.5 percent interest. The state wants to engage in small auctions of securities, only enough to test the

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interest and possibilities. The state cannot finance its deficit on the domestic market. There is no satisfactory saving in kunas. Savings are still 90 percent in foreign exchange.

[BANKA] Why have the members of CROSEC not been appointed on time?

[Prka] Because enough quality people did not apply.

[BANKA] According to the Law on Securities, the members of CROSEC are required not to divulge privileged information for six months after they leave their position. Is six months long enough for privileged information to change?

[Prka] It is difficult to define privileged information. In addition, today we have more important insiders than members of the Commission for Securities. Much more can be learned on the Zagreb Exchange. Every broker could know more.

[BANKA] To what extent is the State Securities Commission independent in its operation if it is financed out of the budget?

[Prka] Just like the Constitutional Court, which is also financed from the budget. Every state function is financed from the budget. Our main problem is that professional people with a reputation and prestige did not apply for membership on the commission. With all due respect to the exceptions, one pensioner even applied in the competition who said that he would very much like to earn something.

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FYROM: UK's Portillo, Handziski Sign Accord

AU0108142296 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1330 GMT 31 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already announced, a memorandum on mutual cooperation in the military sphere was signed in Ohrid today between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Great Britain. The document was signed by Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski and British Defense Secretary Michael Portillo. During his visit to our country, the British minister was also received by Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov and Premier Branko Crvenkovski.

[Correspondent Todor Keramitcievski] The fact that Defense Secretary Portillo was received by the top Macedonian leaders speaks for itself about the importance that is attached to the visit and to the signing of the memorandum. Furthermore, this is the first visit by a British secretary of state to the Republic of Macedonia. At the meetings with President Gligorov and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, satisfaction was expressed with the military cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and the United Kingdom, with the function of the visit being assessed as helping to promote full relations between the two countries. The guest was informed about events in Macedonia and about the realization of the political and economic reforms. After the talks Portillo and his host, Minister Handziski held a news conference, at which they said that they had also discussed the general political and security situation in the region and in the entire euro-atlantic region, as well as the paths that both countries would choose toward safe peace and stability. Minister Handziski emphasized Macedonia's firm determination to become a member of collective security systems, first of all NATO, which has been also demonstrated in its active participation in the activities of the Partnership for Peace program. Portillo expressed satisfaction with today's meetings and talks, and stressed Great Britain's great interest in promoting cooperation with Macedonia in the defense sphere both by continuing present trends and also by establishing new forms of cooperation that would be of mutual interest. Britain will continue to encourage its great interest in the maintenance of peace in the region and therefore in Macedonia as well, Portillo said, and expressed his belief that the cooperation between the two countries would be further developed in a positive direction. This afternoon the guest ended his one-day working visit to Macedonia and left our country.

FYROM: Border Police Detain Kosovo University Group

AU0108161796 Tirana ATA in English 1102 GMT 31 Jul 96

[Article by B. Jashari]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Prishtina, July 30 (ATA)—The Prishtina and Tirana Universities have signed an agreement of cooperation, according to the Prishtina University Information Service. [passage omitted]

The agreement was signed on July 26 in Struge during a meeting of the two university delegations, headed by Prishtina University dean Prof. Dr. Ejup Statovci and Tirana University dean Prof. Dr. Nestor Tereska. [passage omitted]

On its way back, at the Kosova-Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] border, the Prishtina University delegation was detained for more than one hour by the Macedonian police. It confiscated the video cassette with aspects from the two delegations' meeting and the ceremony of signing the agreement.

FYROM: Bosnian Refugees To Return Home From Skopje

LD0108132596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1157 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Aug. 1 (TANJUG)—Several hundred of the 940 Bosnian refugees who have obtained guarantees from the Muslim government in Sarajevo for organized return home have left Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to date, Macedonian papers said.

In specially organized air tours from Skopje to Sarajevo, about 600 refugees are to be transferred by mid-August. Their journey is sponsored by the El Hilal humanitarian organization, with guarantees and in agreement with the Macedonian and Muslim administrations.

In Macedonia, about 2,000 Muslim refugees have asked the Sarajevo government for guarantees to return to Bosnia. According to figures provided by Skopje, there are another 6,000 Bosnian refugees in Macedonia, but analysts believe the figure is considerably lower.

During the four years of war, several thousand Muslim refugees fled Bosnia to Macedonia, but the ultimate figure has been manipulated out of different motives.

Bosnian refugees are accommodated in camps, and also with relatives and friends.

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FYROM: Aide-Memoire on EU Agreement Criticized

AU0108182496 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 1 Aug 96 p 11

[Unttributed commentary: "The Agreement With the EU Is Unfavorable After All"—reprinted from LIBERAL, the Liberal Party newspaper]

[FBIS Translated Text] Whether it was out of carelessness or political ignorance, those who claimed that the agreement of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] with the EU was as good as the one that the EU signed with Slovenia and who strongly attacked the Liberal Party because it claimed the opposite, have now been caught in their lies!

Recently, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia sent an aide-memoire to a number of "relevant" addresses informing the recipients of Greece's inappropriate conduct regarding the agreements of the interim accord that was signed a year ago. This aide-memoire says that Greece is erecting obstacles for Macedonia, primarily in the European Union, that, aside from disputing its name, it is rejecting the internationally recognized registration mark MK for traffic with the EU, and that all this indicates further problems in the regulation of the relations between the EU and Macedonia.

All this has been presented shyly in the aide-memoire, but careful observers can see that it is admitting what the Liberal Party has said so many times before. It is becoming clear that somebody must have agreed that the MK mark is to be rejected, and the negotiator, Deputy Prime Minister Miljovski, hid this from the eyes of the public. Mr. Miljovski could have done or signed this only if he had no idea of what he was signing. Let us recall that the international code is stronger than anything that might have been agreed between the two sides. Particularly interesting things have been happening regarding the Macedonian language. The formula that was offered by the Bulgarian side, and this is something that we are persistently refusing, was accepted by our negotiating team when it was offered by the EU. Our public was not even informed about this, and we found out about this from the aforementioned aide-memoire.

No matter whether the EU "cheated" Macedonia or whether Macedonia was naive, it has finally been admitted that there are problems that will become even tougher. Perhaps this was why Foreign Minister Frckoski did not receive Hans van den Brooke, commissioner for foreign affairs (it would have been absolutely necessary). However, we do not know who Frckoski is angry with—those in the EU or those with whom he sits in the same government?

So, it is clear. Macedonia did not sign an agreement with the EU that is "identical to the on Slovenia signed." There are problems that are to be expected in the future, some of which have become apparent right now.

For instance, there is the framework agreement that says that all assistance to Macedonia will go through the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program. Does this mean that we will not get the same assistance that Slovenia received (ECU150 million), which usually comes in a "package" after the signing of agreements with the EU? It would truly be interesting to explain to the Macedonian public opinion why Slovenia received this assistance, although it did not suffer an embargo, a blockade, or problems with the balance of payments, while Macedonia has suffered all these. It would really be interesting to discover that Macedonia has also received at least ECU150 million, but we have not yet found it out, but perhaps we will be "surprised" by another aide-memoire that we will get to read at some time.

Are we perhaps going to see that Macedonia is the one making the false moves? Is our side not familiar enough with the EU policy and practice? Aide-memoires are a good thing as long as they try to give a right direction to a certain trend of events. However, can they help doing anything more than just admitting one's own failures and ignorance during the signing of international agreements? Will anybody from the government, particularly those who signed the agreement, admit their mistakes a little more explicitly than by trying to attack the Greek side by saying that it is erecting obstacles against them?

It was certain that Greece would make obstacles! Would it not have been wiser if these matters had been anticipated and if one had insisted on a more favorable treatment in the agreement with the EU? Now, this shows that the government needed an agreement, no matter what, because considering the list of permanent slipups, it needed a success, even if it was to be admitted that it was a failure after only a short period of time.

The questions are numberless and unanswered. They are not just in the domain of international policy. We know that it is conducted outside the country, motivated by the domestic conditions, and defined by the principles that are laid down by society. So, political addresses such as the one Prime Minister Crvenkovski made to the emigres recently and particularly what Foreign Minister Frckovski said in Trnovo [where emigres' rallies are held annually] not only did not contribute to the reinforcement of Macedonia's international position, but were nothing but "raising dust for domestic use." In

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order to have a stable foreign policy, it is necessary to have stable people and stable views that will be able to feel and use every advantage instead of creating conditions that are backward in every sense.

The authorities must not take the agreement with the EU, regardless of how "distasteful" they find the attacks, only as a blow that speaks of their inconsistencies, but also as showing that Europe is aware of the authority that it is dealing with. If the lesson is not learned after this, then it will be difficult to expect better perspectives.

The aide-memoire itself and the course that has been taken with it is similar to the well-known shouts about an "international conspiracy," against us, which is a well-known method used by our northern neighbor. On the other hand, objectively speaking, this aide-memoire is confusing, without perspective, and useless, and it just shows that its authors have lost their minds and do not know what they are doing because their maneuvering space has been narrowed.

They are now uselessly yelling "this is injustice."

FYROM: Government Approach to Emigres Criticized

AU0108193896 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 1 Aug 96 p 10

[Commentary by Aleksandar Soljakovski: "New Strategy or Struggle for Emigres' Souls?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the meetings of the Macedonian Emigrants' Association that are still underway, some eminent members of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government headed by the prime minister have addressed the emigres very warmly. Their addresses were mainly in tones of understanding and care and contained a lot of promises.

So, the emigrants were promised conditions for better organized contacts with the fatherland, conditions for their financial investments in profitable projects, a strong national company, less taxes on their investments, consulates, chances for their return....

All this has all been seen and heard before. As in the "good old days" when the emigres were used as targets of the ideology in order to avoid their close association with the "rotten capitalist world" out there and thus become dangerous for those who they had left behind or in an attempt to prove that we were caring about "our people out there in the world." This "care" was mainly contained in very well-designed efforts to prevent the Macedonians from organizing and thus becoming a threat to the regime here.

Or, as in the near past, for instance, when the rising nationalism, which could not find sufficient support in the country, was trying to use the emigres for its own goals here in Macedonia in a perfidious way. However, it was then realized that a Macedonian who has painstakingly earned his German marks and U.S. dollars is not so naive and cooperative, because the very promising nationalists finally emerged with "little to show." Divisions followed once again, as it has always been throughout history, but this time in an organized way! Two nationalist congresses were held, both unsuccessful unfortunately, because the authorities took care to separate them. If you remember, parliament then started a session on this question that has never ended.

Now, we have the same situation, although in a somewhat distorted form. Those who were flirting with the emigres the most and who have been now "exposed" are missing. Their role has been undertaken by the authorities, which is identical in the smallest details to that of those who went before. Even their vocabulary is the same. Following the facts, it will not be surprising if the adversaries of yesterday who waged a deathly battle will become the first political partners. No, this is not just a communist allegory. The theory of attracting the opposing sides is now being put into practice. If they can agree on the question of the emigres, they will be able to find a common language on other questions as well.

However, the same situation will be repeated, because others will come with opposing opinions and the emigres will once again be left with unfulfilled dreams.

How these people are treated is really sad. It is clear that it can be done differently, of course.

In this newspaper, there is an article dealing with the new government policy that is clearly stating that there are no chances for lamentations over the "sad fate of the Macedonian emigre" who cannot (does he wish to?) return to his birthplace.

In a paragraph of this article, an eminent emigre, sincerely wishing to do something for his fatherland, presents a plan for the possible reintegration or participation of the Macedonians (and not only them, because when they speak of emigres they mention some others, who are very numerous) in the economic reconstruction of the country.

This emigre is Vlado Ralev, and he says that for the investment (and thus reintegration of the emigrants) five things are needed: Political stability, legal norms, developed communications, developed banking system, and trained and professional personnel.

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This arises from either confusion or dumbness. Only someone who is either not informed or a liar will say that we fulfill at least one of these conditions. If we are to add the other conditions (returning the bank savings, denationalization, laws on construction land) that have not been fulfilled, the confusion becomes total.

Unfortunately, not a single condition that Ralev mentions has been met yet, and it is hard to believe that they will be fulfilled in the near future. There will be no political stability as long as there is the belief that political stability is something that God (or Marx) provides instead of working towards it. We do have legal norms, but they are creating disorder rather than order. Developed communications—what are those? Is that when you wait for hours to cross the border or when you endlessly try to make a phone call across the street? Developed banking system—isn't it when the saving houses have a thoroughly worked-out system of how to rob you of your money and run away (with the approval of the state, of course)? Let us not speak of the well-trained and professional personnel—it is difficult to find even a secretary here who is capable of answering the phone and speaking properly to clients!

So, "very weak." The government's good wishes and projects can be either interpreted as a continuation of the former demagogy or as a desperate attempt by the present government that is driving away everybody (from the neighbors to the world financial organizations) because of its bad work, and is now, as some others were before, starting a struggle for the emigres' souls. There is no other answer!

FYROM: Editorial on Ethnic Albanians' Street Protests

AU0108170396 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 1 Aug 96 p 11

[Commentary by Mahi Nesimi: "Do All Roads Lead to Rome?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the past few weeks, our public witnessed a number of similar protests of the Albanians in this state under the slogan "We Are Asking for Protection." In a number of towns in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], including the capital, Albanians gathered to show their disagreement with the measures that the state bodies took against persons who were engaged in the creation of a third university in Macedonia.

The protesters themselves do not represent an important segment in the process of transforming the society. However, the two-year-old idea for the creation of a third university in Macedonia, aimed at encompassing a greater number of Albanian students, has created a certain atmosphere and problems among the domestic and foreign audience which, like it or not, places Macedonia in the position of "guilty."

This is exactly why, regardless of how much they served to defend the university or its officials and activists, these protests cannot and must not leave any Macedonian citizen indifferent, particularly the members of the intelligentsia, regardless of their national origin.

The substance of the problem is contained in two exactly opposite positions that have finally been adopted. The first is contained in the aspirations of the Albanians to form a university [using] Albanian, and the second is manifested in the consistent refusal of the Macedonian state bodies to make it legal. I believe that both views are fully "carved into" a defense of their own justifications and realities. Both protagonists firmly believe in their arguments. Both are, in principle, for a resolution of the problem, but only according to their own tendencies. Both are referring to international standards without explaining them. Both (each in its own way) are referring to the quality of the lectures that have been given at Tetovo University for two years.

It is not true to say that the positions are in favor of eliminating possible large-scale ethnic conflicts. Regardless of the position of the government bodies that was manifested after the protests, it does not mean that in the future there will not be any unwanted consequences.

Apparently those in authority have analyzed all possible consequences in their laboratories, the political as well as the security ones. In this sense, there are no doubts that the government is presently in the lead, regardless of the scores, but I dare say that this result is defeating for the government itself. I am sure that in making its calculations it starts from the profitability on the international level. With its demonstrated inferiority and alleged democracy, it wants to present itself to the audience as a fully democratic society.

This kind of determination, from the aspect of perspectives, cannot be justified. Why? Because of a simple reason—this "democratic authority" (I am convinced) is simply filling in the files of the Albanians and spreading the fame of their disloyalty to Macedonia. However, the story about the "Albanian protests" does not end here. I am really not in the position of giving an answer to the Macedonian citizens on the conduct of the government toward these protests. I am not familiar with the methods of its officials.

The other side of the "Albanian protests" has certainly made its own calculations and interpretations. The organizers of the protest meetings are certainly measuring

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the effects of the several rallies that were held throughout Macedonia. They are also convinced that the activities were successful. They certainly believe that the efforts will yield results and that these results will contribute to the accomplishment of the ultimate goal.

The goal, regardless or whether it will be accomplished by the pressure of the domestic or international community, will first of all be in favor of the now 2,300 students registered at Tetovo University, who represent a reality in the region. The government must accept this reality if it wants to have the credit of a government that is realistic and with due respect for the situation in the state.

It is evident that both sides consider the protests successful. Actually, we had the opportunity to read commentaries by both sides about the gains. Who actually profited from all this? Do all roads lead to Rome? If the government believes so, then it is an introduction to anarchy, which is legalization of the opinion that the street can solve the burdened social, economic, and political problems. You will agree that this is not a characteristic of democracy. So, manipulation with the people and the street, no matter who organizes it, must be replaced with a real feeling for the needs of the citizens.

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Poland: Equal Support for SLD, 'Solidarity' Initiative Shown

WS2607143596 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Jul 96 pp 1-2

[Report by Renata Wrobel: "RZECZPOSPOLITA's Electoral Poll; SLD's Position Jeopardized by the 'Solidarity' Electoral Initiative"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Support for the "Solidarity" Electoral Initiative and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is equal: both parties are backed by more than one voter in four. All their rivals are lagging far behind. This is what might have happened if parliamentary elections had been held several days ago, predicts the Sopot-based Social Research Laboratory [PBS] on the basis of a poll carried out for RZECZPOSPOLITA. Aside from the two aforementioned political groups, Sejm deputies would have come from the following parties: The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], the Freedom Union [UW], and the Union of Labor [UP].

The "Solidarity" Electoral Initiative (an agreement between "Solidarity" and over 20 parties of the center and the right wing), which has never appeared in our monthly polls before, threatened the leading position of the SLD. It is worth recalling that the SLD has been the sole leader in opinion poll "elections" since July 1993; at that time it dethroned the UW.

The "Solidarity" Electoral Initiative is gaining popularity quite rapidly. The same was observed in the case of the ROP, a party headed by Jan Olszewski. Soon after it was established, the ROP rated high in all opinion polls, a situation which has not changed, and is confirmed today by all the major polling institutions.

Nonetheless, the "Solidarity" Election Initiative is doing much better than the ROP, and the 27 percent of support which it garnered in our poll may even seem to be a rather surprising result. In our June poll, when we still measured the popularity of each group separately, "Solidarity" received 17 percent, and its current allies did very poorly.

The Electoral Initiative, which is selling itself under the "Solidarity" trademark, is not an entirely unknown and unclear structure to the average voter. All the more so because the very idea and the name certainly became very popular due to the fact that they were presented at the "Solidarity" congress.

The Electoral Initiative has attracted the supporters of a large number of small and insignificant parties, which in the past—and in the months in which they received relatively high support—obtained 2 or 3 percent at the most. As a consequence, increasingly fewer votes are "wasted" in opinion polls, that is, fewer and fewer people tend to support parties which would not be able to obtain enough votes to win seats in parliament. Here is an example: in June, when we did not include the Electoral Initiative in our poll, the "parliament parties" were backed by 86 percent of the "voters" and in the previous months—even fewer. Today those parties are endorsed by 97 percent of the voters.

In comparison with the June poll, the number of SLD supporters dropped by 4 percent. In the case of the other parties, the changes were less significant. Support for the ROP grew by 3 percent (and reached the highest level since the movement was established), and support for the PSL increased by 2 percent (the best result since last August). The rating of the UW and the UP remained practically unchanged—in both cases the change was only 1 percent: the UP gained and the UW lost 1 percent.

The most recent PBS poll was conducted for RZECZPOSPOLITA on 21 and 22 July 1996 on a representative group of 1,100 adult Poles. The method used was as follows: each respondent has 100 points to distribute. If a respondent is certain that he will vote for an actual party, he gives this party 100 points. If he is considering various options, he distributes the 100 points among several parties, giving more to some and fewer to others, as he wishes. If he is sure that he does not want to go to the polls, he gives 100 points to this option, and so on. The data given in the text refer only to the group of respondents who want to go to the polls. The statistical error does not exceed 2 to 3 percent either way.

Electoral Preferences—July 1996

	Percent
"Solidarity" electoral initiative	27
SLD	27
ROP	12
PSL	12
UW	11
UP	8

Poland: Interior Minister Comments on Oleksy, Tasks, Reform

WS0108144096 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 27-28 Jul 96 pp 1,7

[Interview with Polish Internal Affairs Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, by Ewa Rosolak and Zbigniew

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Wasik; place and date not given: "Controlled Intelligence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [TRYBUNA] Mr. Minister, why are the telephones of as many as 727 people being tapped by the police?

[Siemiatkowski] Because those people are suspected of committing grave crimes. According to legal procedure, special equipment can be used against people suspected of such crimes as, for instance, murder, drug trafficking, racketeering, white slavery, spying, or other heinous crimes aimed at destabilizing the state. This includes equipment for tapping telephones.

I believe that the use of special equipment against more than 700 people, as compared with the 960,000 crimes committed in 1995, is not a big figure.

[TRYBUNA] The telephones of four people have been tapped at your special order. Why?

[Siemiatkowski] Let us use the past tense: their telephones were tapped. The flash tapping method was applied to the people suspected of killing Wojtek Krol. I gave my verbal consent. Another case involved the detention of a large shipment of narcotics. These were the only two cases within the five months I have been minister in which I verbally approved tapping telephones.

[TRYBUNA] We know of four cases.

[Siemiatkowski] You are right. Telephones of four people involved in two cases were tapped.

[TRYBUNA] How many bugs have been planted in TRYBUNA's editorial office?

[Siemiatkowski] Not a single one.

[TRYBUNA] Are you sure?

[Siemiatkowski] There is a rule that telephones of individuals can be tapped, and telephones of institutions cannot. If someone working for one of the newspapers was suspected of a heinous crime, the same procedure would be used against this person as against any other suspect. However, there have been no cases of using special equipment against journalists or politicians. At least, I have never approved this.

[TRYBUNA] One of your statements is a perfect confirmation of the saying that a person's viewpoint depends on where this person sits. When you were in the opposition, you claimed that telephones of the politicians of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] were tapped. Now you say: the situation is different; those were only my impressions.... Why is the situation different?

[Siemiatkowski] I am glad you have asked this question and that I will be able to clarify everything. In 1992 I asked former Interior Minister Zbigniew Dyka at a session of the Sejm commission about the "Pamela" case and whether special equipment had been used during the investigation against SLD politicians.

The minister answered that this was not true. I had many doubts then, but I had no chance to verify them. Today when I am interior minister, I can say that in 1991 tapping was used within the framework of operational procedures against several leading SLD politicians. The tapping was discontinued after those politicians became Sejm deputies. I do not know about any cases of using special equipment against any politician after 1991.

Later, for instance during the presidential election campaign, my colleagues claimed that tapping was being used. I did not specialize in such statements. I only said, as I later admitted, that we had the impression that the Office of State Protection [UOP] was undertaking measures aimed at discrediting the SLD's candidate for president.

Judging by the events which took place after [Interior] Minister Milczanowski's speech in the Sejm in December 1995, after he had presented the military prosecutor with a motion and after the prosecutor's verdict was announced on the basis of presented materials, it turned out that I was right. The UOP was conducting this kind of operation. Currently, there can be no doubts that the so-called Oleksy case was meant to discredit the left. I admit that I could not even imagine at the time that the UOP would base its indictment on nonexistent evidence. Soon when the "White Book" is published in the beginning of August, TRYBUNA readers will be able to see the strength of that "evidence." I could not comprehend this.

[TRYBUNA] What was your first reaction after reading the 800 pages of documents which make up the "White Book?"

[Siemiatkowski] It took me five nights to read the documents. I had known some of the materials because I read some of the documents after I had received a report by the UOP internal commission at the end of May. Until that time I had deliberately stayed away from that case because I was aware of the experience of Deputy Minister Zbigniew Sobotka, who—when he was acting interior minister—asked to be shown the documents and was later accused of taking them out of the ministry. This was an evident lie because he read the documents in the ministry in the presence of a high-ranking UOP officer.

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As for my reaction, the documents do not carry revelations of any kind. Readers will probably notice how unprofessionally the motion was formulated and how many childish mistakes were made.

I am very interested to see the reaction and to hear public statements by those who so definitely supported the activities of a group of officers in January, as well as by those who believed in everything those people had to say. What will those editorial offices say which published sensational two-page reports about the "Majorca" operation, those who claimed that the officers who participated in the operation were armed to the teeth? Meanwhile, it turned out that they [the UOP officers] ran short of audio tape to record the entire conversation [between Alganov, Oleksy's alleged leading officer, and Zacharski of the UOP].

I think that an attentive reader who will take the time to read several hundred pages of texts of interrogations, recordings from wiretapping devices and the like may draw many interesting conclusions. I think that the book will evoke a lot of conjecture and speculation in the media. It will raise many questions.

[TRYBUNA] Mr. Minister, what if the tape on which the conversation with Alganov was recorded in Majorca was too short? Perhaps this is a technical barrier rather than ineptitude.

[Siemiatkowski] I saw professional recording equipment at the UOP office with tapes that can record for 24 hours.

[TRYBUNA] Why was there a difference of opinions between you and [Justice Minister] Minister Leszek Kubicki with regard to the contents of the "White Book?"

[Siemiatkowski] As prosecutor general, Minister Kubicki is responsible for the protection of the interests of third persons involved in the case and of public morality. Therefore, he deleted all the vulgarisms. Certain statements in the book were made up solely of prepositions, pauses, and vulgarisms. Meanwhile, I am responsible for protecting state secrets. Before I finally signed off, an expert appraisal of the documents had been conducted and signed by directors of all the intelligence and counterintelligence directorates. When they declared that the publication of the "White Book" would not harm the operational interests of Polish intelligence and counterintelligence, I decided to submit the book for publishing. This caused the difference between my opinions and Minister Kubicki's opinions. However, after many discussions with the prosecutor general we arrived at unanimous conclusions and accepted the final version of the "White Book."

[TRYBUNA] From what you have said, we presume the "White Book" does not contain evidence of ineptitude and mistakes made by the UOP officers who investigated the so-called Oleksy case.

[Siemiatkowski] It does not. The prosecutor did not analyze whether unprofessional mistakes had been made. This was done by the UOP's internal commission.

[TRYBUNA] Will the readers be shown the evidence collected by the commission?

[Siemiatkowski] I am certainly not going to make the decision to publish the protocol of the UOP commission in the form of a supplement to the "White Book." Access to the information contained in the protocol cannot be granted to anyone except state bodies envisioned by the law. As interior minister, I cannot allow a situation in which a supplement would carry information which by far is not directly related to the case and refers to the activities of officers, viewed against the backdrop of the UOP's routine operations. I would only permit the publishing of selected excerpts.

[TRYBUNA] It is an open secret that Zacharski, who had the rank of colonel at the time, passed on operational materials to WPROST reporters in one of the Warsaw hotels. There is evidence of this and it is probably kept in the Interior Ministry. Why are you so restrained when certain facts are widely known?

[Siemiatkowski] There is no mention of this evidence in the internal report. The report encompasses only the period prior to Andrzej Milczanowski's motion to the military prosecutor. Meanwhile, the case that you have mentioned is being investigated by the Warsaw Prosecutor's Office.

[TRYBUNA] What are the fates of Generals Zacharski, Jasik, Libera, and Fonfara?

[Siemiatkowski] Since 1 July, all four officers you mentioned are no longer with the UOP. They applied for resignation and were granted it. Their current activities are beyond our interest.

[TRYBUNA] Newspapers recently published articles which disclosed Deputy Bogdan Borusewicz's meeting with General Jasik. They also wrote that directors of certain UOP missions (for instance in Lublin, Krakow, Szczecin, and Bydgoszcz) held secret meetings to discuss what kind of tactics they should approve with regard to the current interior minister. Has the UOP made inquiries about those meetings?

[Siemiatkowski] There is no procedure in the UOP envisioning control over deputies' meetings. First, because it is not in the UOP's habit to conduct any kind of surveillance of politicians. Neither General Jasik nor Deputy

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Bogdan Borusewicz or any other person involved in the aforementioned case are of any interest to the UOP. In any case, I do not know anything about this.

As for the meetings of UOP mission directors.... Colonel Kapkowski, the UOP chief, is an energetic person and as far as I know, he is making steps aimed at strengthening discipline in his agency. I cannot say anything more on this issue.

[TRYBUNA] Will there be purges in UOP missions?

[Siemiatkowski] It is not true that we are going to make more changes in the posts of mission directors.

I value good work. I recently gave a big cash award to the chief of the Bydgoszcz UOP mission for discovering a drug trafficking operation. Similar awards were given to the chiefs of the Gdansk and Szczecin missions. There will be awards for good work. However, every instance of insubordination and lack of loyalty will entail consequences envisioned by regulations.

[TRYBUNA] How did you manage to avoid addiction to gambling? People say that you lost only $50 in Las Vegas.

[Siemiatkowski] That was a long time ago. When I stayed in Salt Lake City, I made a wonderful trip. On a free weekend I drove alone along state highway 5 from Salt Lake City in Utah into the very heart of the Rocky Mountains—some 350 miles. From there I drove another 150 miles to Las Vegas in Nevada. When I came to Las Vegas, I naturally went to a casino. I had $50 which I could spend, so I decided to test my luck. I lost but the pleasure remained.

[TRYBUNA] Have you played roulette since you became minister?

[Siemiatkowski] I have not. However, I can imagine how happy reporters would be if they spotted me at the roulette table. I imagine photographs in SUPER EKSPRESS and, I presume, also in TRYBUNA.

[TRYBUNA] If you ever decide to go to Las Vegas or Monte Carlo, please keep us posted. Let us go back to daily routine now. How will the Interior Ministry look after reform?

[Siemiatkowski] It will be a very important ministry. Aside from the current tasks (with the exception of the UOP), it will combine all the administrative functions. Voivods and the entire government administration of the voivodship and powiat level will be subordinated to it.

Beginning in October, the UOP will undergo transformation and should acquire a new shape by 1 January as an institution subordinated directly to the prime minister and supervised by the Special Services Board. According to a relevant resolution, the process of reforming the UOP should be definitely completed between 1 January and 31 March.

[TRYBUNA] Certain people ask whether you are trying on the new duties of Minister Miller.

[Siemiatkowski] Ill-wishers say so. Judging by everything, I will be the 16th and last minister. This gives me huge satisfaction because no matter what I do I will be remembered as the last minister in the current cabinet.

However, I have greater ambitions. I want to be the first minister in the Third Republic during whose term crime will be reduced. I devote most of my time and efforts to this cause. Believe me, public opinion does not care much what is going on around the UOP or what will the organizational structure of this agency be, or who will head it after 1 January. What public opinion does want to know is when will the crime rate in Poland decline. I have such ambitions and I think that I can do this. Therefore, I am currently concentrating my efforts on drafting and winning the best budget for the Interior Ministry, the police, and the Border Guard. I think I am doing a good job because the budget of the Interior Ministry and the police in 1997 will be the same as in 1996. In addition, an inflation adjustment will be made and there will be a real increase, which makes me very happy. For instance, investment funds will be increased by 275 percent, which may result in the resolution of many burning problems, including housing for the police or the acquisition of rescue equipment for the rescue fire-brigade service that was established several years ago. The new budget also will enable the opening of 2,000 positions in the Border Guard, due to which the latter will become a more professional service with the features of border police, as well as the opening of 1,000 civilian positions in the police, thanks to which police officers who currently do office work will be moved to the operational sector. If we add that after September 1996 the Vistula Military Units will be rapidly transformed into police-like units, given that part of their military functions will be taken over by the Defense Ministry, this will be my specific contribution.

If I manage to accomplish this, I will be able to say that I did not waste my time in the post of interior minister.

[TRYBUNA] It is true that the police have achieved a number of spectacular successes recently. However, when will those accomplishments have an impact on increasing the feeling of public security?

[Siemiatkowski] The 10-15 percent real decrease in the crime rate in 1996 is not a perceptible change. If we

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manage to bring down robbery and car theft rates, public feelings will improve.

[TRYBUNA] In the short run, anyone who wants to know when Polish streets will become safer should turn to a fortune teller and not to you?

[Siemiatkowski] This is a very tough question. The interior minister and the chief of police can be asked what they are doing to increase public security. The chief of police is responsible for organizational and personnel changes and for discipline. There are many fields of police work which can be improved without investments in order to improve public feelings. For instance, police officers should be more polite; there should be no drunkards among the police; corruption should be eliminated in the police ranks.

I am responsible for the budget and for legal regulations. There is a lot of ground to cover in the latter field because many errors have been made. However, those errors are being gradually corrected. I have already signed a resolution which envisions that police officers are entitled to monetary awards to the tune of 20 percent of the value of stolen property [reclaimed by the police]. The drafting of other resolutions is nearing completion, as well. Those resolutions stipulate danger differentials for both police pensioners and active officers and housing differentials.

[TRYBUNA] Chief of Police Jerzy Stanczyk recently said that the Oleksy government was the first government which began to meet its commitments regarding improving the situation in the police. Was this an attempt on the part of Stanczyk to flirt with the government?

[Siemiatkowski] In my assessment—and I have had the opportunity to make assessments since 1991 when I became a member of the Sejm Commission of Administration and Internal Affairs—it is a great paradox that the Oleksy government did more for the Interior Ministry than any other government. The largest real increase of budgetary funds allocated to the Interior Ministry and the police occurred during Oleksy's premiership. Nevertheless, the prime minister, who did so much for the ministry, has been deeply insulted by it.

[TRYBUNA] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Cabinet Office on Anticrime Agreement With U.S.

LD3007190096 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1730 GMT 30 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Leszek Miller, head of the Council of Ministers Office, who in the United States has signed an agreement on cooperation in fighting organized crime and terrorism, has announced that both countries will exchange intelligence concerning, among other things, suspects' bank accounts and financial documents.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Jan Szul] Since four years ago Poland cooperated only with the Interpol branch in Washington. Thanks to this, it was possible to find Lech Grobelny and hand over to the Americans David Bogatin. The agreement that has been signed is to facilitate this cooperation. It is the first document of this kind to be signed by the United States with a Central European country.

[Leszek Miller, head of the Council of Ministers Office] It provides for closer cooperation between all the services involved in prosecuting crime and administration of justice—that is, not just police but also prosecution services, tax offices, customs bodies, and border guards.

[Szul] Poland and the United States have undertaken to exchange intelligence helpful in fighting gangs and the mafia.

[Miller] We very much wanted to get at least a declaration from the leadership of the FBI about the possibility of using the data base the FBI has, and this will happen. So if we are going to hand intelligence over, it will be done in order to get whatever interests us from the American side.

[Szul] The number of Poles trained at the FBI academy will increase. At present there are 20 Polish officers there. In the autumn an FBI office will be opened in Warsaw.

In talks with Minister Miller the Americans emphasized that so far the struggle in Poland against organized crime involving drug and motor vehicle smuggling has not been bringing the desired results because of a lack of cooperation between the services dealing with this and also because our laws are too liberal. [end recording]

Poland: Elite Commando Unit Head Interviewed

WS3007132396 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Jul 96 pp 11-12

[Report by Anna Marszalek: "A Military Antiterrorist Operation; The GROM Unit Strikes Like Thunder"—interview with Colonel Marian Sowinski, commander of the GROM commando unit, by Anna Marszalek; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Terrorists have taken hostages and barricaded themselves in one of the houses in a small town somewhere abroad. Attempts at negotiation have failed. It is decided that special units should be used. Their task is to find the building in which the

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terrorists are hiding, free the hostages (it is not known how many), eliminate the terrorists (their number is also unknown), and return. A few hundred people participate in this action. Here is what they have at their disposal: helicopters, armored personnel carriers, all kinds guns (primarily MB-5) along with ammunition, and other necessary military equipment.

First to go are the marksmen and observers; they take positions in various places near the street (their task is to hide and watch the area) on which there are five several-story buildings which have been singled out as places where the terrorists and the hostages are staying. The area is being slowly surrounded by supporting groups (more than 100 soldiers who are not directly taking part in the rescue operation; they are here to protect those who are taking part in it. They have arrived here in combat vehicles). A helicopter squadron is hovering over the street. The area is split into five sectors (each of the buildings can be a dangerous area) in which the operation must be carried out simultaneously. Soldiers get out of the helicopters and land on the roofs of the buildings and on the ground near them. (Some of them come down in no time at all using a rope.) A small "army" of marksmen in the helicopters secure the operation to help the soldiers enter the buildings. The soldiers get inside the buildings—through windows, for example—and search rooms one by one, by forcing doors open; they try to find the hostages and terrorists. In this case, the bandits are represented by targets which must be "shot." It turns out that there are 10 of them, but they are in various rooms. Hostages (six people in all) are found in two rooms. The soldiers withdraw themselves in the same way: The helicopters and the armored carriers take everyone away from the site of the operation. The entire operation, from the "begin attack" signal to the "all hostages freed" report, took a quarter of an hour—this is how the joint Polish-American exercises were briefly described to RZECZPOSPOLITA by Colonel Marian Sowinski, commander of the GROM [Group of Operational-Maneuver Reaction] unit, one of the most secret special units. The public found out about its existence after it took part in the Haiti operation (the Polish troops were under the command of Colonel Slawomir Petelicki, who at that time was the commander of the GROM). Experts say that the Polish GROM can be compared to the best special units in the world; it is even compared to the American Delta Force or SEALs, as well as the English and Australian SAS.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Do you train "killing machines" here?—we asked Colonel Sowinski.

[Sowinski] We certainly train people who, if such a need arises, will not hesitate to do it. They must react very quickly to certain situations, but this does not mean that their task is to kill. We train them so that they will have well-developed muscular memory, as a result of which after assessing a situation very quickly they react almost like computers. GROM soldiers, unlike members of police antiterrorist units, will always be faster. Policemen act in line with the following model: first detain, shoot only in the last resort. GROM is a unit of last resort; it comes into action when all other attempts to resolve a problem have failed and the enemy must be eliminated. The soldiers who are members of our unit are selected in a very special way. The selection consists of many stages. No random people can find their way here. Their intelligence exceeds the average. In this unit there were only three people whose intelligence was classified as average. This shows that they are not "killing machines." They analyze situations and certainly do not thoughtlessly carry out orders.

All over the world it is people with a strong character and great will who become members of special units. During exercises with a foreign unit I saw a soldier who took part in a landing operation as a paratrooper; it was an attack on certain objects. There would not have been anything strange about that if it had not been for one thing: That soldier did not have one leg (which he had lost in a combat operation), he had a prosthesis. His fellow soldiers bought him the best prosthesis available, but he had to work very hard to regain his fitness. One needs great strength and fortitude to be able to endure the extremely strenous exercises they go through.

Our task is to take action if something extreme happens. Perhaps the reason why Poland is not a terrorist's paradise is that it has the GROM. Also, at any corner of the world our citizens may be taken as hostages and we may have to act jointly with foreign units. We must get ahead of certain threats. For example, the famous Greenpeace attack a few years ago, during which a drilling platform was in danger, became one of the reasons why we began to prepare for "water operations." In Poland we are the only unit which is able to carry out special operations in the sea. There has never been anyone who was as well prepared as we are. At that time the issue was settled in negotiations. However, one can imagine that some terrorist or a madman will not allow anyone to dissuade him from carrying out his plan. If control over a drilling platform is taken over by a madman, this poses a threat not only to the workforce. This might also have imponderable consequences for the natural environment and for the economy (if, for example, the platform were set on fire).

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Are such terrorists already operating in Poland?

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[Sowinski] We are opening to the world, thus becoming more and more of a "global village," and even if we are not witnessing such spectacular acts of terrorism in our country today, this does not at all mean that they will never occur. For example, we may develop very friendly relations with a certain country—which others will not like.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] For example, someone did not like the fact that Jews who left Russia for Israel went through Poland.

[Sowinski] Yes, that is right. Arabs did not like this, and we could expect terrorist attempts to discourage us from performing these operations. Aside from the situation in Beirut (two of our diplomats were shot at, one of them was killed), such occurrences did not take place. That was one of the reasons why it was decided that the GROM should be set up.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] As far as I know, apart from the Haiti mission, you also secretly entered the Pecice palace and the Art "B" office [company accused of embezzling funds from Polish banks] on Wspolna Street. Do you also take part in other operations, such as those against organized international criminal organizations—Russian, Chechen, and Italian mafias?

[Sowinski] The decision of when to use the GROM rests with the highest levels. After all, it is a problem of whether or not to use the Armed Forces.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You also provided security during the Pope's visit to Poland.

[Sowinski] We simply were ready to take action if anything happened.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] How frequent do situations arise when it is necessary to use special units?

[Sowinski] I can only talk about the operations which have already been made known.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] It is known that during the process of selecting GROM candidates, you make the candidates go through some kind of a survival school in the Bieszczady Mountains. Do you organize similar exercises in big cities?

[Sowinski] We certainly cannot shoot at each other on a street; but, for example, we train soldiers on how to get lost in a crowd. A marksman should know how to get to, say, a hotel roof of a building as quickly as possible; for this reason, we sometimes use skyscrapers to do such training.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Can you climb all the roofs of the Warsaw hotels without being noticed?

[Sowinski] We have not trained in all of them yet.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] The GROM is a military unit, but it is part of the Internal Affairs Ministry structure. What will happen to the unit after the ministry is reorganized?

[Sowinski] I do not know. The decision rests with politicians.

Poland: U.S. Asylum Request of Belarus's Paznyak Viewed

WS0208095196 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 1 Aug 96 p 6

[Commentary by Jan Skorzynski: "Asylum and Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is difficult to establish a worse reputation than that acquired by Alyaksandr Lukashenka over the two years he has been in power. The attempts to introduce authoritarian rule, pushing the country back into the arms of Russia, limiting freedom of speech, abandoning attempts to reform the economy—as a result of all this the first president of the independent Belarus is increasingly often seen in the world as a dangerous mistake. On its road to the free market and democracy, Minsk is lagging far behind its post-Soviet neighbors. Therefore, it is no wonder that Belarus is the first country in this region from which political dissidents emigrated after 1989.

The increasingly more intensive persecution of the opposition justifies the fact that Zyanon Paznyak and his colleague have asked for political asylum in the United States. The request is justified in human terms at least. The two activists of the Belarussian Popular Front have good reason to fear for their freedom, or even for their lives, if they return to Minsk. The answer to the question concerning the political consequences of their action is not so clear-cut. Have they not lost the possibility of putting up effective resistance to the Lukashenka regime by leaving the country?

The greatest strength of the people who opposed communism was the example which they themselves set—the fact that they persisted despite the many threats and persecutions which allowed such people as Andrey Sakharov to provide credible testimony against the system. The voice of a citizen who stood up for his rights in Moscow or in Warsaw, under the rule of Leonid Brezhnev or Wojciech Jaruzelski, sounded far louder than similar appeals made in Paris or Washington. This is why the authorities of the Soviet Union expelled Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Vladimir Bukovskiy from the country. This is why General Kiszczak suggested to "Solidarity" leaders that they emigrate in exchange for getting out of prison. Also, this is why Lech Walesa did

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not go to Oslo to collect his Nobel Prize—he was afraid that the authorities would not readmit him.

In 1983 it might have seemed that "Solidarity" was a lost cause. However, it was not. Today the fight for the sovereignty of the country and for the freedom of citizens in Belarus is not such a cause either. To the surprise of many observers, the democratic slogans presented by Paznyak were not ignored, which was proved by the mass demonstrations in Minsk. The parliamentary opposition became more active as well, protesting against the president who was exceeding his powers.

By choosing asylum in the United States, the leader of the Belarussian Popular Front gains personal security, but loses the force of influencing the people in Belarus, which he had thanks to the resistance to Lukashenka which he put up in Minsk.

Poland: Companies Bid To Build Regional Telephone Networks

WS3007122996 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 30 Jul 96 p 14

[Report by Pawel Rozynski: "Telephones; Competitors Are Coming"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is quite possible that two or three years from now there will not be one region left in Poland where Polish Telecommunications [TP] SA will not have at least one strong competitor.

Yesterday five companies put in their bids to build TP SA-competitive telephone networks in the Bydgoszcz and Lublin Voivodships.

Bydgoszcz Eldorado

The voivodship which was more popular with bidders was Bydgoszcz, where as many as four companies presented their bids. Why? Because this is an economically well-developed region and the TP SA is not heavily investing there.

The other companies which want to obtain a license in Bydgoszcz Voivodship are as follows: Telekom Torun, EL-Net Regional Telephone Networks, Bydgoszcz Telephones, and Poland-West Telephones.

Telekom Torun is part of Netia, an international telecommunications holding company which has been set up by the RP Telekom group (a 65-percent stake), the Swedish Telia (25 percent), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (10 percent). Over three years Netia intends to invest $350 million in Poland and connect 350,000 telephone owners to its network.

EL-Net Regional Telephone Networks is a company where first fiddle is played by the Elektrim (40 percent). The rest of the shares belong to the following firms: Bydgoszcz Cable Factory, Centrostal, CECOMM Research and Production Center, and Bank Rozwoju Exportu. This bank is also taking care of the financing of the project.

These companies will have a strong rival—Bydgoszcz Telephones, set up by Tel-Energo and by two natural persons. Both Tel-Energo and Elektrim also have stakes in the two cellular phone networks which will operate in the Global Standard for Mobile Communication system and which are under construction right now.

The fourth company which has submitted a bid in the Bydgoszcz Voivodship is Poland-West Telephones. The firm was set up in late 1994 and has licenses to build telephone networks in Gorzow and Szczecin Voivodships. Its shareholders are Central Telecom and Bresnan International Partners.

Only One in Lublin

Miroslaw Zurawski, chairman of the 12-person bidding commission, did not hide his disappointment when it turned out that only one company had put in a bid in Lublin Voivodship. The company was Telekom Puchaczow, partially owned by Netia; it has 3,500 telephone owners.

This does not mean that the bidding in Lublin Voivodship will be invalid. In the case of both Bydgoszcz and Lublin, it is enough if only one company presents a well-prepared bid.

Why was Lublin Voivodship so unpopular? At the end of last year, there were 150,000 telephone lines, and the TP SA launched large-scale investment projects; as a result, in the years 1996-98 it intends to install 160,000 new telephone lines. This will leave little room for a competitor.

In addition, the minimum fee for a 15-year license is approximately $670,000 here. In Bydgoszcz Voivodship this fee is at least $930,000.

Bidding Time

Those who put in the best bids will receive licenses from the communications minister in the first half of September. However, losers will have no reason to despair. Soon bids will be invited in other voivodships as well. The first in line will probably be the following: Koszalin, Elblag, Kielce, Slupsk, Tarnobrzeg, Zielona Gora, Bielsko Biala, Czestochowa, Wroclaw, Walbrzych, and Jelenia Gora. In each of those voivodships the TP SA will have one strong rival.

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The requirement of obtaining licenses by bidding was introduced by the Sejm, which amended the Communications Law last year. Until recently the principles of competition on the telecommunications market were vague. Telecommunications companies themselves specified the area which they were interested in, and the communications minister either granted them a license to build a network or not (the most attractive areas were, as a rule, not available). Despite the fact that nearly 100 licenses were granted, only a few privately owned telecommunications firms began operating. Together they are rendering services to only 35,000 telephone owners. Now the situation is to change, and the Communications Ministry is hoping that by the end of the century as many as 1 to 2 million telephone owners will use private networks.

Nonetheless, TP SA's competitors will have a lot of problems. It is not known whether their cooperation with TP SA, which is a monopoly right now, will be good. So far TP SA has often drawn out negotiations on connecting other companies to the national network and on mutual settlements. Also, long distance and international calls, which are the most profitable, will still be offered only by TP SA.

Poland: Radar Regiment Transferred to Polish Air Force

LD0108200096 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1500 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with a decision by the chief of the General Staff, the 5th Zgierz Radiotechnical Regiment has been transferred from the structure of the Pomeranian Military District to the Air Force and National Air Defense Command with effect from today.

[Correspondent Tomasz Lasota] This is connected with changes in the entire structure of the Polish Armed Forces. Until now the regiment has been carrying out tasks for the air defense forces, including radar surveillance—monitoring the skies over our country. According to the Air Force and Air Defense headquarters, apart from streamlining the command structure, the changes will bring the Polish structures closer to the European and NATO standards.

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Federal

FRY: Statement on Cooperation With Foreign Countries

LD0108191996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1735 GMT 1 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 1 (TANJUG)—The ratification of economic and other agreements between Yugoslavia and other countries, including Russia, China, Ukraine, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, which will be on the Yugoslav Parliament's agenda in late August, will enable the Yugoslav businessmen to use the most-favoured-nation clause in trading with these countries.

A Yugoslav Government statement issued after the Thursday session said that the government had described as very successful the participation of a Yugoslav delegation in an economic summit of Central and Eastern European countries in Salzburg in July.

Yugoslavia's participation in the summit helped affirm the basic principles of its foreign policy, the statement said and added that the country's indispensable role in the peace process and readiness for and commitment to cooperation with all countries, including those in Central and Eastern Europe, were confirmed.

During the Yugoslav delegation's visit to Salzburg, delegation head Prime Minister Radoje Kontic had bilateral meetings with heads of state and government of Austria, Ukraine, Poland and Hungary.

The Yugoslav Government also drafted a bill on interstate agreements, regulating this field in keeping with Yugoslavia's new constitutional solutions, the statement said.

The government also accepted a Yugoslav delegation's report on the talks on an agreement on opening a liaison office of the International Criminal Tribunal in Belgrade.

Head of the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations Ambassador Vladislav Jovanovic is authorized to exchange letters with U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, confirming the agreement on the accord on opening a tribunal's liaison office in Belgrade.

Under a decision on the setting up of a Yugoslav Government commission for the implementation of a subregional arms control agreement, it was established that the commission would take care about the fulfillment of commitments undertaken under the subregional arms control agreement and coordinate the work of relevant Yugoslav organs in its implementation.

The government has established a platform for talks between Yugoslav Traffic and Communications Minister Zoran Vujovic and the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal this month, the statement said.

FRY: Seselj Comments on Upcoming Elections, Karadzic, Mladic

AU0108161196 Belgrade NEDELJNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jul 96 p 13

[Interview with Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, by Radmila Stankovic; place and date not given: "They Are Not Letting Me Go to The Hague, Because I Would Ruin the Hague Tribunal"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Serbian Radical Party [SRS] will go into the federal elections alone, and its leadership has already started the election campaign. "From one village to another, throughout Serbia," as explained by its leader Vojislav Seselj, who, because of the "absolute media blockade," will have to cruise through municipalities in the next few months, convincing the voters to vote for the radicals. To our question as to why a wider coalition of the opposition was not possible, particularly if one knows that the new law on electoral units is very unfavorable for all parties but the ruling one, Seselj answered that a coalition "with traitors is out of the question," and he had already said that "that thing between Djindjic [Democratic Party chairman] and Draskovic [Serbian Renewal Movement chairman]" will definitely "blow up" before the elections.

[Seselj] In 1994 and 1995 we had a huge conflict with Slobodan Milosevic, and Draskovic was in secret alliance with him then. In that, Draskovic materially profited from Milosevic because he got a luxurious house in the elite part of town, Kosutnjak, at 70 Blagoja Parovica Street. After Milosevic's Dayton betrayal, Draskovic got a new order, since Milosevic is no longer important to the Americans, and the new order is to start an attack against Milosevic. But that is not what we radicals complain about. We can hardly wait for Milosevic and the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] to go from power. However, we radicals have a double task before us—to oust Slobodan Milosevic and the SPS from power, but also to prevent the traitors' coalition between Draskovic and Djindjic from coming to power. That is why we have decided to go into the elections alone. Our objective could, briefly, be formulated like this—to win at least one vote more than the socialists and to have at least twice as many votes as the traitors' coalition between Draskovic and Djindjic. [passage omitted]

[Stamenkovic] What is the position of the SRS in Montenegro now?

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[Seselj] The SRS is in a rather difficult position because all eight of our representatives have been thrown out of the republic assembly. They have stolen our three mandates in the citizen council of the federal assembly, and they have stolen our party name. We were called the Serbian Radical Party of Montenegro, and they took that name away from us and declared three or four police agents as the "real" Serbian Radical Party of Montenegro. We have now registered a new party, which is officially known as the Serbian Radical Party "Vojislav Seselj." Hopefully it is not possible for them to steal that name. However, our popularity among the people is great, and I expect better results than in 1992. [passage omitted]

[Stamenkovic] How big is the strength of the SRS, and what are your chances in the elections?

[Seselj] Judging by the public opinion research carried out by the MF agency, the only agency that has been affirmed by now, and the only one that predicted the results of 1993, according to the latest research in Belgrade we radicals are right alongside to the socialists [sentence as published]. They are not even as much as 2 percent ahead of us. And this traitors' coalition is far behind—they have 10 percent, we around have 18 percent, and the socialists around 20 percent.

[Stamenkovic] Where is JUL [Yugoslav United Left], judging by its real strength?

[Seselj] JUL does not exist among the people. That is a cancer of the SPS and the fundamental proof of the absolute irrationalism of Milosevic's regime. People who have read Djerdj Lukac's book about the traditions of German irrationalism, from Kant to Hitler, can discover certain grounds for all that has been happening in Serbia. The problem is in the personalities of Milosevic and his wife. I believe that that has created big problems for Milosevic in the SPS, and that it is really chaotic there now. How would it look if my wife formed a new party and said that it was above the SRS? [passage omitted]

[Stamenkovic] Why do some people insist so much on Karadzic's extradition to the Hague tribunal?

[Seselj] The reason is, first of all, that they know that the Serb Republic will be very unstable without Karadzic. Second, they need key witnesses against Milosevic, and that is why they are looking for people who directly carried out his orders. However, one should keep in mind that throughout the war Karadzic never commanded any action nor did he command the army. All the generals of the Serb Republic and of the Republic of Serb Krajina received their orders directly from Belgrade. Sometimes from the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia and sometimes from Milosevic. I met Mladic only twice and, on both occassions, it was in the cabinet of Slobodan Milosevic. That was in 1992 and at the start of 1993 when the Srebrenica operation was taking place. [passage omitted]

[Stamenkovic] Are you attracted by direct political engagement in Bosnia?

[Seselj] No. I am a citizen of the Republic of Serbia and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

[Stamenkovic] But a crisis of leadership can be discerned in Bosnia?

[Seselj] I do not think that there will be a crisis of leadership in Bosnia, and I believe that Krajisnik will play the most important role there. I expect that a coalition government will be formed in Bosnia between the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] and the SRS, and that that will be a firm government. We have decided to support Krajisnik, who is the SDS candidate for the presidency of the union, and Biljana Plavsic for president of the Serb Republic. [passage omitted]

[Stamenkovic] You were in Pale recently. Did you meet with Karadzic?

[Seselj] Yes, I did. We had a meeting from 1100 to 1900. Karadzic, Biljana Plavsic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Aleksa Buha, Deputy Prime Minister Vjestica.... The session of the Main Committee of the SDS was several hours late because of that meeting of ours.

[Stamenkovic] What was the atmosphere like?

[Seselj] Very calm and relaxed.

[Stamenkovic] What did you talk about for so long?

[Seselj] The meeting was behind closed doors, and we agreed not to give any statements.

[Stamenkovic] How do you see Mladic's position today?

[Seselj] If we come to power, Mladic will have to retire straight away.

[Stamenkovic] Why?

[Seselj] Because the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic and the supreme commander of the Serb Republic passed a decision on his removal to another post, and he did not accept that decision, and because the people's assembly made a decision on the retirement of six generals and colonels and Mladic did not want to carry out that decision. Under war conditions I would have executed him for that. When a general does not obey the people's assembly, then the problem is not in the people's assembly but in the general because

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decisions of the assembly must be carried out. However, I do not want to say anything bad about Mladic now, because he is being prosecuted by the Hague tribunal. But I will tell you about his closest colleagues, Gvero, Tolimir, Salapuri, Beari—I would execute them all. Obeying the orders of Belgrade, they gave away one-third of the Serb Republic. They are guilty for all the bad things that happened on the fronts in the course of this war, and they were utterly incapable of conducting military operations. Manojlo Milovanovic proved to be good on the terrain, as did some self-made soldiers who knew how to make war, unlike those who had come from Belgrade. [passage omitted]

FRY: Academicians, Politicians Discuss Kosovo Issue

96BA0378B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jun 96 pp 16-17

[Article by Srboljub Bogdanovic: "Kosovo-Metohija: A Country for Albanians—A Myth for Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Is the government also thinking along with academicians about the division of the Kosmet and who has drawn the map of the southern province?*

Ideas about the division of Kosovo-Metohija have occupied minds and entertained the public in the past but never as now. Probably not just because Aleksandar Despic is president of SANU [Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences], since thoughts on this topic were also tied to the name of an academician before (Dobrica Cosic), but all this still had a relatively small reverberation within the public. Territorial arrangements determined in the most recent past have shown that the demarcation of borders in the Balkans has spread and that no rules exist, or at least that they are so cruel that it is better to find some conciliatory solution. As people say, better a poor agreement than a fat lawsuit.

The reaction of prominent Albanian names in Kosovo-Metohija to Despic's thinking out loud is indicative: if this is a proposal for drawing up borders, they welcome it, but they do not want to see it as a proposal for the division of the Kosmet because this would mean "ethnic cleansing."

Would it? No one is mentioning ethnic cleansing; Aleksandar Despic especially is not. However: "I want someone to tell me where the border will be. If it is in front of this street I will cross to the other side, if necessary, but then they know that they also are to cross from this side of the street to their side," is the thinking of a typical Serbian visitor at a cafe in Pristina, expressed, by the way, before academician Despic's statement.

Naturally, Despic can indicate that he was not exactly thinking of division and, moreover, Dobrica Cosic himself was not even caught in the act with the card of a divided Kosmet in his pocket but, nevertheless, he has loudly and clearly spoken several times about the need for drawing up borders.

The basic problem that Serbs have with setting up borders and drawing a map is that this always comes as the result of an agreement between (at least) two sides and that compilers of maps perform that job not because they are very wise but because they have real political power. This has never been the case with a single proposal from the Serbian side. There have still been these specialists on the menu, we will see, and they always come from the kitchen of SANU.

One of the best known achievements of cartography was published in the Italian geopolitical magazine LIMES. The importance of this map lies in the fact that Italians have emphasized that this is a question of a product that stems from "Belgrade opposition" circles; this was the code name in 1993 for a map that is attributed to Dobrica Cosic.

The essence of this not entirely precise map of the division of Kosovo lies in the fact that Serbia or Yugoslavia is left with the greatest part of the historical inheritance (Pec and Pecka patriarchates, Decani monastery, Gracanica monastery), and Trepca as an economic landmark would also fall to them. The border would go right next to the urban nucleus of Pristina, practically through the city's area, and, like the one in Brcko, it would represent a "corridor" by which the Podujevo region, in which the percentage of Serbs is negligible, would be connected with the majority of the Albanian part, and this has all remained. The curious nature of this division lies in that the Metohijan part, which includes Pec and Decani, would not have geographical continuity with Serbia, so these areas would actually belong with Montenegro.

So that the plans would not be completely made without consulting those concerned, this is what Ibrahim Rugova has said in Albanian in the press, commenting on some of the proposals for drawing up borders, but evidently not on the proposal presented here but on some other one, which, from the Serbian point of view, was much more ambitious and which Rugova criticized because the main shortcoming to him is that "more than one million Albanians remain outside Kosovo."

Therefore, the "division of Kosovo is unacceptable" in principle for the Albanian Kosovo leader, but in case of partition, "Serbs can only count on a newly formed Zubin Potok district" and on parts of northern Kosovo that were added to the Mitrovica area after the Second World War (Leposavic, Lesak, Banjska, and

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Zubin Potok). However, in return, Serbia would have to give up areas outside Kosovo where Albanians are in the majority (Medvedja, Presevo, and Bujanovac, says Rugova). A hard negotiator.

Therefore, Rugova has also thought about territorial arrangements. What is important is that he does not see Kosovo as something that has its subjectivity in strictly determined borders, as an "entity" that appears only the way it is. Changes are possible, perhaps even desirable—but whether they, in the Rugova interpretation, are close to or identical with maximum territorial demands is another matter.

Contrary to academic ideas like "give what you give," there is also another approach to which members of the modern government-financial elite are close. The essence of this story is that it is senseless to renounce without need parts of state territory that have important economic potential and many people who represent an inexpensive work force and many taxpayers. There would hardly be such examples in history.

It is interesting that, according to one of the theories, the main factor that will not permit the division of the Kosmet is American policy in the Balkans. Supposedly a Kosovo in which—or in the greater part of which—Albanian sovereignty would be established would drastically complicate the situation in western Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], and the United States would not want this to affect its Balkan protege. However, what the United States—and not only the United States—allegedly has "wanted" or "not wanted" has been heard about a lot in recent years, but it has been the way the Balkan leaders, masters of the situation in the field, have decided.

The whole idea of the division of the Kosmet—after which it would still remain under Yugoslav sovereignty—was presented three years ago by Dr. Milovan Radovanovic, director of the "Jovan Cvijic" Geographical Institute of SANU. Under this plan the province would be reduced in size by about 40 percent (to the benefit of Serbia), and Albanians would have extensive autonomy on the remaining 60 percent, but not so much that, in perspective, it could be threatened by the sovereignty of the Serbian state. Albanians on the remaining territories would also have certain national rights but fewer. The district of Kacanik and Kacanik gorge, through which a vital transportation line passes on the way to Skoplje, would belong to Kosovo and would practically divide the territory of "Serbia outside the province" into two unconnected parts. The main problem with this option, as we already said, is that it is infinitely far from reality, but reality is determined in political agreements.

A complicating circumstance is that there are varying views of all this even among Kosovo Albanians, regardless of the fact that it does not seem like that now. One should consider first of all that there is no agreement on what the attainment of sovereignty would mean for them—the creation of an independent state of Kosovo, or only the territorial expansion of the state of Albania. Nevertheless, to judge it according to some world trends (Moldavia), at least for the first time, the first variation is more certain.

As usually happens under Balkan conditions, Kosovo's geography assumes certain insoluble features that no solution can rectify. With any variation of division, Serbs must part with Sirinac region, a constant Serbian ethnic area in which very old forms of the Serbian language and customs have been preserved just because of its isolation. The center of this region is Strpce district, and skiers know that the Brezovica ski center, about which opinion is undivided that it has the best ski terrain in this country, is in direct proximity. However, Brezovica has reached only the fourth category in the categorization of tourist areas; this is at least illogical and can only underline fears that the state of Serbia has reasons for neglecting the tourist potential of this area.

In general, the entire uproar over the division of Kosovo will only contribute to increased nervousness among Serbs who live there. The manner in which national interests were "protected" in the Knin area, where there are no more Serbs, and in the "Croatian area along the Danube," where Serbs will receive only those rights that Tudjman wants to given them, creates, with reason, distrust of the authorities in Belgrade and their competence.

At the same time, construction of the Nis-Podgorica road has even been planned in congress documents of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] and in the Area Plan of the Republic of Serbia. The road goes through Kosovo-Metohija. This can encourage Kosovo Serbs, but this would not be the first area plan in the hilly Balkans that would be thwarted because of territorial complications.

Federal Minister of Police Vukasin Jokanovic, who occupies the highest function held by a Kosovo Serb, qualified the statement of SANU president Despic as irresponsible, adding that not just Despic but the whole Academy knows nothing about Kosovo that would enable them to engage in such plans at this time. However, the first unfavorable reaction to Despic's presentation, let's not forget, came from the academician Kosta Mihailovic, who, as someone close to official circles, was immediately interested in Despic's report, but later criticized him, saying that he had to "emphasize more

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strongly acting in his own name, not leaving room for guessing in order to speak at someone's order," as some parties—for example, Seselj's SRS [Serbian Radical Party]—have already informed the public.

The concept of Aleksandar Despic is based on some demographic realities, and there is not much new in it. Only the thought that Serbians and Albanians, in perspective, could administer the state of Serbia jointly is new; to be sure, Despic does not recommend this as a solution that fills him with confidence, but he treats it soberly and coldly. Some would say that, in the dilemma between historial and ethnic rights, Despic would choose ethnic rights in the territory, but at the expense of historical rights. This can be described as follows: it is not disputed that the Kosmet is a historically Serbian country, but what would we do with this today? More interesting is the manner in which the SANU president doubted the concept of the Kosmet within the framework of Yugoslavia. This is being criticized, Despic thinks, by the Germans, who are for their own reasons our historical enemies. As soon as they do not support the Kosmet's being separated, then just the opposite must be good for us.

There is one fact, and Mosta Mihailovic says it: heating up a psychosis over the division of Kosovo will sooner weaken rather than strengthen the negotiating positions of Yugoslavia.

It seems that Vukasin Jokanovic is right when he challenges the Academy not only for its political competence but for every other competence in judging these matters. Academician Despic, by training a chemist, supports the drawing up of borders in Kosovo, and academician Mihailovic, an economist, is duplicating him.

FRY: Seminar on Freedom of Media in Balkans Detailed

96BA0397C Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jun 96 pp 18-19

[Article by J. Ormai: "Defense of the Profession"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A seminar entitled "The Media in the Balkans: Freedom of the Press—A Condition for Reconciliation," organized by the Media Center in Belgrade and "Article 19," an international organization for the fight against censorship in London, was held last week in the British Cultural Center in Belgrade. The purpose of the meeting was to survey the current media situation in the Balkans. There was discussion about the extent to which the media contributed to the events of the war and still more about how now, after the conflict, they could help in the further resolution of the contradictions and especially how much help they could be in building democratic societies in this region. When everything had been said that had to be said in those two days, which is how long the discussion lasted, along with the indisputable fact that the role of the media is extremely important, it was evident that it continues to be very cramped in the Balkan region. The room to maneuver for professional journalism, which in turn signifies creation of conditions for relevant decisionmaking and orientation of the public and democratization of this region, is very limited. After all, the Balkan media are under the control of their own respective regimes—some more, some less. Censorship by governments is still strong, and there are more and more extralegal forms of censorship, that is, concentration of power, and the increasingly intensive participation of crime in the functioning of these societies has also contributed to that.

This meeting was attended not only by representatives of the independent media of all the Balkan countries but also by representatives of the international organizations UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the International Journalists Federation, etc., and representatives of the state media were also invited. "All were invited, even both information ministries. But they did not come. So once again we have a dialogue among people of like mind," said Harry Steiner (Media Center).

Right to Truth and Service

In the part of the debate devoted to the role of the media in resolving conflicts, Clem McCartny of Belfast delivered a particularly inspiring speech in which he said "that he could not offer a solution, but only dilemmas." Nevertheless, his postulates, based on many years of experience in the efforts in Northern Ireland, opened up prospects. Conflict by and large indicates a need for change; the road to change and the change itself lead to resolution of the conflict. Can the media help in this? Governments may opt for the war option or the peace option, but the media also have an impact on both of those two levels. The answer is that they can help by providing information, by interpreting the need for change, and by helping to alter perceptions and aspirations. That takes time and space. And the media need to be provided those things in order to facilitate change and make it possible. C. McCartny also mentioned the very delicate question of the truth, which usually has "at least two faces, and the journalist must have that in mind." Not only information, but also analysis, interpretation, and critical approaches and caution are also indispensable. McCartny also said that not every truth must be published. He was against sensationalism, one-sided and rabble-rousing "truths," and in general he favored moderation and thoughtfulness in media interpretation of reality. By

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contrast with him, whom we asked to present his views for EKONOMSKA POLITIKA, Igor Medina (MLADINA, Ljubljana) was more one-sided, more hard-line, and more definite: "The journalist's task is to inform the public, and the media are above all accountable to the public for that. That is my constitutional right and my obligation. The task of the state official is to preserve a secret if it is a secret. However, if it is a fact which threatens the public, it is my duty to report on it. The situation that existed in the former Soviet bloc and the way in which periodicals functioned at that time, PRAVDA, for example, is a very dangerous one. It is very dangerous when the state is thinking about the journalist's duty, and the journalist is thinking about reasons of state. The foundation of every democracy is for each to do his job and tend his own garden."

FERAL's

The media in the Balkans are under state control whether or not they are state-owned, it was said later in the debate. When they are not, it is mainly done through various frustrations of operation and repression, from the inability to obtain paper to the inability to distribute the product. The method of censorship is very diverse, and also imaginative, "sometimes visible, sometimes invisible."

Journalists in Croatia have said that the media situation is rather bad and that two newspapers, FERAL TRIBJUN and NOVI LIST in Rijeka, face court trials. These media were not supported by more than 200 protesting citizens, T. Tagirov commented. Darko Barac said that the media situation is in fact slowing down Croatia's entry into Europe.

"Nor was the group of citizens any larger in front of Studio B," said Lila Radonjic in her interpretation of the Yugoslav situation. Veran Matic (B92 radio in Belgrade) said that over the last six months, since the Dayton Agreement, the number of electronic media in Serbia has been cut in half.

The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina also is a "certified" copy of the political situation, explained D. Peranic (of the agency AIM). In the sections which are under control of the Sarajevo government, the independent media have survived, while in the part controlled by the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] there is no question of that. The situation in the Srpska republic was described quite precisely by S. Perovic, editor of an independent newspaper NOVI PRELOM.

A representative of the Albanian media (F. Lubonja) assessed the media situation in his country to be relatively good, but he did say that the electronic media, so essential to informing the broadest strata of the population, are under the control of the regime. Representatives of the Bulgarian media said that the control of their independent media is "invisible," while the Greek journalist N. Voulelis observed that the media situation in his country "meets European standards."

It was interesting to hear the most recent experience of the Slovenian media, because this state has in many respects been ahead of its East European colleagues in its European adaptation. The meeting was informed on this by I. Medina: "Our media situation is relatively satisfactory; there is pluralism in the media and I cannot complain too much. The legislation is fairly good. At the moment, we have three commercial media which have been allocated frequencies and cover a large portion of Slovenian territory. State Television has an editorial council made up of 25 members from various structures, from trade unions to athletics, and five of them were delegated by the parliament. They conduct editorial policy of state television, and no party is given an opportunity to push its own positions in this area. Nevertheless, there are quite a few unsolved problems. For example, state sources of information are closed, the journalist's right to protect his source, the question of slander. (We recently had a court case, and the journalist was convicted and given a suspended sentence because he allegedly insulted the mayor of Ljubljana. Yet public rather than private matters were involved.) Slovenia has laws which prohibit accumulation of the media in the hands of private individuals or firms, because such a private monopoly could shape public opinion."

Insufficient Attractiveness of Censorship

Lawrence Early of the Council of Europe recalled Europe's position concerning freedom of the media, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as subsequent moves of both the European Union and European Court against violators of those freedoms. Frances d'Souza from the organization "Article 19" responded as follows to the direct question of EKONOMSKA POLITIKA concerning international regulation of this subject matter: "There are numerous pieces of legislation, there are UN standards, the United Nations has a convention concerning civil and political rights, and then there is the European Convention and regulations. All or numerous governments are signatories of these treaties; however, many are inclined to evade this obligation and do tend to control their own media. Especially if they are not signatories of these conventions. Censorship is a rather widespread phenomenon."

The conclusions and recommendations of the Belgrade meeting on freedom of the media in the Balkans, which have been sent to UNESCO, the European Council, the

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European Union, and the International Journalists Organization, as well as the government and nongovernmental organizations, said that the media in this region need to be provided the conditions, the legislative space, and respect for all this in practice so that they can carry on their professional activity. The Council of Europe, the European Union, and UNESCO were asked for further political and material support. A message was sent to the governments of the Balkan countries to sign all the relevant international conventions, especially with respect to activity of the media, and above all guarantee conditions for all the media in their countries, both state-controlled and independent, the conditions for ethical and professional work.

Montenegro

Montenegro: State-Owned Media Not To Comment on Officials

LD0208120296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1119 GMT 2 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Aug. 2 (TANJUG)—State-owned media in Montenego can only report on activity of state bodies and officials without making any comments, while officials cannot use their state activity for party campaigning.

This is stipulated by an agreement on the presentation on an equal footing of party candidates by Montenegrin media that will go into force on September 3—two months ahead of elections in the republic.

The agreement contains 12 provisions. Moreover, a committee for monitoring the implementation of the agreement is to be set up on August 6.

Montenegro: LSCG, NS Refuse To Sign Accord on Media Coverage

AU0108192796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1155 GMT 1 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 1 August (BETA)—The forthcoming November elections in Montenegro will be neither free nor democratic. This was declared today in a statement issued by the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG), following the Liberals' refusal to sign an agreement on media presentation of parties.

Late last night in Podgorica, 18 parliamentary parties signed an agreement on media presentation of the parties that have announced their participation in the parliamentary elections scheduled to take place on 3 November.

The two strongest opposition parties in Montenegro—the LSCG and the People's Party (NS)—have refused to sign the agreement. They said that the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS CG) will again attempt to manipulate and deceive the citizens of Montenegro.

"At that meeting, the representatives of the DPS did not allow the setting up of a truly independent body that would ensure, protect, and guarantee the freedom and openness of the state media during the election campaign," the LSCG statement points out.

The statement also adds that the agreement that was signed by the majority of political parties gives the editors in chief of the state media the possibility to act as political arbiters and judge the political suitability of the political parties' statements. [passage omitted]

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